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“When we gazed upon all this splendour at once, we scarcely knew what to think, and we 
doubted whether all that we beheld was real. A series of large towns stretched themselves 
along the banks of the lake, out of which still larger ones rose magnificently above the 
waters. Innumerable crowds of canoes were plying everywhere around us; at regular 
distances we continually passed over new bridges, and before us lay the great city of 
Mexico in all its splendour.”  
 
– Bernal Diaz del Castillo, Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo 
 
 
 
 
 
“He [Hernán Cortés] said to them[Cuauhtémoc and his nobles]: “What of the Gold? That 
which was guarded in Mexico?” 
 
– Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Florentine Codex, Book XII 
 
 
 
 
“We wander here and there 
in our desolate poverty. 
We are mortal men. 
We have seen bloodshed and pain 
where once we saw beauty and valor.” 
 
– Unknown Author, “Flowers and Songs of Sorrow,” The Broken Spears 
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Pronunciation Guide 
 
 
Vowels: 
a as “ah” in far  
e as “ay” in ace 
i as “ee” in deep 
o as “oh” in tote  
u as “oo” in rule 
 
Consonants that are not pronounced the same as in English: 
x as “sh” in shell 
z as “s” in suit 
hu as “w” in waste or weed 
ll as in fully 
que, qui as “kay” or “kee” in case or keep 
cu as “kw” in quasar, query 
tl as in Tlingit (soft emphasis on the l) 
tz as in pretzel
1
 
 
 
  
                                                 
1
 Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University  
Press, 2006), xxiii. 
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Preface 
 
 
 
 When talking about the Conquest of Mexico there are certain terms and names 
that are incorrectly used.  For example, there was never an “Aztec Empire”; the term 
Aztec is a modern derivation of Aztlan, the mythical homeland of the Mexica, the ethnic 
group commonly referred to as the Aztecs. Aztec can also refer to the people in and 
around the Valley of Mexico because they share the language Nahuatl and many of the 
same gods.  However, I prefer to use the term Nahuas for these people due to their 
linguistic kinship.  The peoples of Mesoamerica commonly referred to themselves by 
their ethnic group, such as Mexica, Alcohua, Tepanec, etc., or by their city-states, such as 
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, Tlacopan, etc.  The three ethnic groups and cities mentioned are 
the people who constituted the Triple Alliance.  The Triple Alliance’s conquests resulted 
in what is referred to as the Aztec Empire.  The Mexica of Tenochtitlan were the 
predominant ethnic group in the Alliance and their tlatoani, essentially a king, became 
the de facto leader among the Empire.
2
 See map 2. 
There has been debate whether or not the Triple Alliance actually constituted 
what is in the Western view an “empire.”  The Triple Alliances’ power was that of an 
indirect empire; it was created by conquering other city-states, who acknowledged the 
Alliance’s dominance in the form of paying tribute.  The Alliance had a loose control 
over conquered city-states, and low cost management because they did not have an 
extensive bureaucracy.  The Alliance’s empire is often compared to that of Athens’ 
                                                 
2
 Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 4. 
 8 
during its classical period.
3
  Furthermore, towards the end of the Empire, it was 
increasingly bureaucratized in order to deal with logistical problems of the Empire’s size, 
which unprecedented in Mesoamerica.  Part of this process of bureaucratizing was the 
dividing the conquered city-states into thirty-eight tributary provinces, centered around 
the dominant city-state in ethnic enclaves.  This process involved record keeping and the 
appointing of meritocratic nobles to supervise the flow of tribute.
4
  It is tempting to 
speculate how the Empire would have continued to develop if Hernán Cortés had not 
truncated its growth. 
The Triple Alliance’s Empire encompassed a large area of what is called 
Mesoamerica.  Mesoamerica is less of a geographical distinction, but rather an area that 
constituted peoples of similar cultural beliefs and attitudes when compared to other 
regions of the Americas.  Mesoamerica is geographically diverse and spans all of modern 
day Mexico and even to parts of Costa Rica.  See map 1.  The Alliance’s Empire spanned 
many ecological ranges; it controlled areas on the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean.  
The climates ranged from the tropical lowlands to those of the Valley of Mexico high in 
the central Mexican plateau.  Land along the Gulf of Mexico and the other areas below 
1,000m in elevation are considered the tropical lowlands.  The land between 1,000-
2,000m in elevation is considered the Mesoamerican highlands, and finally the central 
Mexican plateau, which is all the land above 2,000 m in elevation.
5
 
The Valley of Mexico is situated in the mountainous central plateau.  A mix of 
mountain ridges and semi-dormant volcanoes cradles the Valley; these features created 
                                                 
3
 Smith, Aztecs, 173-4. 
4
 Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma, 1995), 261-3. 
5
 Smith, Aztecs, 6-7. 
 9 
an internally drained continuous lake system.  The Lakes Zumpango and Xaltocan were 
the northern most and their lower elevation made them brackish; conversely, the southern 
most lakes, Xochimilco and Chalco were higher in elevation and were fresh water.  Lake 
Texcoco, in the middle, was moderately brackish.  The Mexica founded Tenochtitlan, 
their city-state, on an island on the western side of Lake Texcoco.  The lakes themselves 
provided abundant natural food sources, and the Valley itself had rich fertile soil from the 
erosion and run off of the surrounding mountains and volcanoes.  Beyond having 
incredible potential for agriculture, the Valley is located near two obsidian sources, 
Otumba and Pachuca.  Pachuca obsidian was the highest quality and had a green hue 
making it the most appealing variety of obsidian to the Valley’s various inhabitants.6  The 
importance of obsidian to the development of Mexica’s culture was nearly as great as it’s 
abundant agricultural resources. 
  
                                                 
6
 Smith, Aztecs, 8-11. 
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Introduction 
 
 The Conquest of Mexico by Hernán Cortés is often written and examined from 
the view of the European victors.  This approach inevitably minimizes the actions and 
roles of the majority of the people involved, the Mesoamericans themselves.  The lines of 
the conflict have traditionally been drawn as the Spaniards versus the Triple Alliance, 
commonly known as the Aztecs.  In reality, the Spaniards, with the aid and complicity of 
dozens of native city-states, were able in the end to conquer the Alliance of the Mexica of 
Tenochtitlan, the Alcohua of Texcoco, and the Tepanecs of Tlacopan. In addition this 
conquest has often been simplified as a conquest in which European technology and 
disease trumped the Amerindians’ stone weaponry and lack of immunity. 
The above explanations, however, have begun to change with the addition of a 
more recent view that the Spaniards with the guile of Hernán Cortés were able to take 
advantage of the internal dissatisfaction within the Triple Alliance’s Empire.  As 
anthropologists Geoffrey Conrad and Arthur Demarest phrase it, the Triple Alliances’ 
“loosely knit empire flew to pieces” as the tributary states sided with or directly aided 
Hernán Cortés.  Nonetheless, the deathblow to the Triple Alliance is still commonly seen 
as the result of smallpox that allowed Cortés to swoop in and claim victory. 
Because of these views, the Conquest is often seen as the inevitability of 
European dominance of technological and societal advancements along with the impact 
of disease.  This view of inevitability of indigenous defeat is epitomized in Jared 
Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.  His work sets out to explore and understand why it 
was the Europeans who were the dominant world powers, and not some other civilization 
 11 
from another continent.  His argument is not based on race but geography and the 
environment as an attempt to trace the root causes of European success and why 
civilizations developed the ways that they did.  The focus of his work is to explore and 
better understand why history unfolded “differently on different continents,” and what 
factors made European states the initial world powers and why this dominance did not 
originate elsewhere.  Diamond’s argument is essentially that environmental factors such 
as, the large size of Eurasia, the larger number of wild plants and animals, and the 
horizontal axis of Eurasia leading to similar climatic zones – were stacked in favor of 
Eurasian advancement.  He views the collapse of the Triple Alliance as the combination 
disease, and the “overwhelming military superiority” of the Spaniards along with their 
“political skills at exploiting divisions within the native population, did the rest.”7  Put 
simply, Jared Diamond argues that Eurasian success was an inevitability that derived 
from environmental determinism, which was slanted in Eurasians’ favor.  This advantage, 
ultimately, culminated in societies with advanced technology and fortuitous early 
exposure to diseases, which societies on other continents did not have. 
Jared Diamond identifies the environment as the predominant and determining 
factor in European conquests and subsequent colonization.  He avoids cultural factors 
impacting history, and thereby, pushes human agency aside.  Historian Joachim Radkau 
warns against placing too strong an emphasis on the environment, writing, “A history of 
human environmental awareness cannot be written as the history of a sense of nature’s 
right to exist on its own terms, but only as the history of a coevolution of a culture and 
                                                 
7
 Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: the Fates of Human Societies (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1997), 9, 373. 
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nature.”8 Nature must be understood as not only as a force that shapes human 
development but is also in turn shaped by that development.  Man and nature’s 
coevolution have been and will continue to be inextricably connected and influenced by 
one another. 
Radkau admonishes Crosby, an earlier proponent of environmental determinism, 
stating that “when he describes the victory and defeat of ecosystems, what he presents is 
a substantially constructed history, one which assumes that the Old World and the New 
World exist as more or less compact, large-scale ecosystems above all ecotopes and 
ecological niches.”9 Diamond also views continents as “more or less compact 
ecosystems” and follows in Crosby’s footsteps. This is evident in Diamond’s view of the 
importance of Eurasia’s horizontal axis contributing to the spread of farming, which gave 
a “head start” in Eurasian societies.  However, Diamond’s biggest flaw in his argument is 
that he focuses only on what sets Eurasia apart and how it developed from its advantages.  
From there he assumes that because the other continents lack these features, the success 
of Europeans in conquest was inevitable.  His argument, because of its scale, lacks the 
finesse of actually examining on an individual basis the ways that the non-Western 
societies developed from the environment in which they existed.  Furthermore, his 
argument removes culture as a contributing factor to a society’s advancement. 
Anthropologist Heather Lechtman has made invaluable contributions to the 
understanding of the ways that culture affects technology.  Her focus specifically on 
Andean metallurgy has provided important insights into both understanding the 
                                                 
8
 Joachim Radkau, Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment, trans. 
Thomas Dunlap (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 5. 
9
 Ibid., 158. 
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metallurgy of Mesoamerica as well as its astounding lithic technologies.  Lechtman 
argues that technological style (style being the “manifest expression, on the behavioral 
level of cultural patterning,” and technological style is one of the ways a culture is 
physically expressed) is “rarely if ever dictated solely by the environment.”  
Technological style reflects cultural choices more than it does an environment because 
the environment is a set of “immutable conditions” that a culture is structured around.10  
Meaning that while the environment shapes culture, technology is, ultimately, a reflection 
of the culture that made it. 
Geography, climate, flora, and fauna constitute the ecosystems and the 
environments in which human societies develop; however, human culture affects the 
ways in which societies interact with their environment.  Part of this work will explore 
the ways that the environment of Mesoamerica impacted the development of 
Mesoamericans, and specifically on the Mexica and the Triple Alliance.  I will explore 
why the Triple Alliance developed into, arguably, the most advanced lithic society, and 
why metallurgy was largely reserved for religious and status items.  
There are three known factors that contribute to the development of advanced 
metallurgy, that is metallurgy of bronze, iron, and steel: warfare, wheeled transport, and 
agriculture.
11
 Therefore, to understand Mesoamerica’s technological development I will 
need to examine the ways that Mesoamerica’s agriculture developed and how it differed 
from Eurasia’s. I will also examine how abundant deposits of high quality obsidian 
                                                 
10
 Heather Lechtman, “Style in Technology – Some Early Thoughts,” in Material 
Culture: Styles, Organization, and Dynamics of Technology, ed. Heather Lechtman and 
Robert S. Merrill (New York: West Publishing Co., 1977), 5-6, 14-5. 
11
 Heather Lechtman, “Andean Value Systems and the Development of Prehistoric 
Metallurgy” Technology and Culture, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1984): 1, www.jstor.org. 
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developed a culture and society focused on lithic technology whose physical and 
aesthetic attributes filled the roles metallurgy would have.  The difference in agriculture 
led to a different style of farming and this was also influenced by the lack of large 
domesticated animals.  Both of these factors, as I will show, hindered an impetus to 
develop advanced metallurgy.  In addition, I will show how the cultural attitudes towards 
obsidian along with its unique abundance and physical qualities, too, hindered the 
development of advanced metallurgy. 
Finally, I will examine how the Conquest of Mexico actually unfolded.  One 
assumption is Cortés’ use of indigenous animosity towards the Triple Alliance, especially 
of the Tlaxcalans.  Yet the alliances Cortés formed, aside from that with the Tlaxcalans, 
were often tenuous and based on a display of power or rather as a means to avoid Cortés’ 
wrath.
 12
  Furthermore, Cortés was nowhere near as cunning as he is given credit for.  
Disease’s role was by no means clear since the overwhelming majority of Cortés’ army, 
and even logistics, depended on Amerindians who were just as vulnerable to smallpox as 
were those of the Triple Alliance.  Technology, too, played an ambiguous role in the 
Conquest.  Cortés certainly had superior weapons and technology, but it was the 
contrasting view of warfare stemming from cultural attitudes towards war that aided 
Cortés the most.  Finally, I will show that it is perhaps the Tlaxcalans’ unwavering 
anathema towards the Mexica combined with a continuous chain of cultural 
misunderstandings that aided Cortés the most. 
 
  
                                                 
12
 Hassig, Aztec Warfare, 246-9. 
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Chapter One 
 
From Aztlan to Tenochtitlan 
“And they placed their trust in Uitzilopochtli.” – Florentine Codex13 
 
 
 To understand the effects of environmental and cultural factors on the Conquest 
of the Triple Alliance by Cortés, one must first examine the ways in which the Alliance 
came into power in 1428 CE.  As the Mexica ethnic group, commonly known today as 
Aztecs, was the principle leader of the alliance this chapter, like much of this work, will 
focus on them.  The Mexica entered the Valley of Mexico in 1325 CE as a minor, semi-
barbarous ethnic group from the larger Chichimec peoples of Northwestern Mexico.  See 
map 3.  Within a hundred years they would supplant dominant powers of the Valley and 
begin ruthless conquests and consolidations of power until contact with Cortés.  The 
Mexica became the de facto power of the Triple Alliance and over many conquered 
peoples.  This was achieved by restructuring their religion and society; they glorified 
their own tribal god to a new position that could only be satiated by the hearts of enemies 
captured in war. The Mexica created a political system built on religion that was fueled 
by warfare; however, these changes were built on already existing cultural norms.  This 
chapter will examine the general history of the Valley of Mexico, the ways in which the 
Mexica took power, the societal restructuring after they took power, the ways in which 
the empire was created, and how it maintained unstable control.  
The religious, societal, and organizational changes of Mexica society had 
dramatic effects on the expansion of their empire but also contributed to its collapse by 
                                                 
13
 Fray Bernardino de Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New 
Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble (Santa Fe: The School of 
American Research and The University of Utah Monographs of the School of American 
Research, 1975), III: 5. 
 16 
Cortés’ forces.  Montezuma Xocoyotzin, the tlatoani (king) in power at the time of 
Cortés arrival, had been trying to consolidate and stabilize the Mexica Empire 
immediately prior to contact, and those efforts will also be discussed. 
The supra-ethnic group known as the Chichimecs began migrating into the Valley 
of Mexico from just outside its north/northwest mountain range sometime after 900 CE.  
They mixed with the remnant Teotihuaca people whose dominant empire had suddenly 
collapsed around 750 CE for unknown reasons.  The subsequent mixing of people 
revitalized the area that the Teotihuacan had ruled over, and together the mixed groups 
formed the Toltecs.  The Toltec state lasted from around 950 to 1200 CE.  They began to 
fragment as new waves of Chichimec peoples flooded into the valley.  Remnant Toltec 
cities were the sources of legitimating heritages because the Toltecs were considered 
civilized while Chichimecs were considered barbarous.  If a city-state wanted to establish 
itself it needed a link to the Toltecs to legitimize themselves.
14
  
Between 1200 CE, around the end of the Toltec civilization, and 1500 CE, the 
population of the Valley of Mexico increased eightfold from approximately 200,000 to 
over 1.6 million.  Population doubled every century from a combination of population 
growth and migrations into the valley by Chichimec groups.
15
  The Mexica claimed that 
they were the last of the seven Chichimec tribes to leave their mystical home of Aztlan 
and enter the Mexican Valley.  Although Aztlan is likely a fantasy it is true that the 
Mexica were latecomers in the valley.  Most of the fertile land was had been inhabited; 
                                                 
14
 Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, Religion and Empire: The Dynamics of 
the Aztec and the Inca Expansion  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 13-9. 
15
 Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture 
History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 438-9. 
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the Mexica were forced to settle on the swampy island on the near the western shores of 
Lake Texcoco.
16
 
Despite being on an island, Tenochtitlan was founded in 1325 CE at the 
confluence of three city-states, meaning that their subjugation was likely inevitable.  The 
city was divided into quadrants due to the religious importance of the cardinal directions.  
Each section was controlled by a calpulli, essentially a kinship group with its own 
internal stratifications ranging from commoners to an elected leader, and was allowed to 
develop as it so pleased.
1718
  Soon after the founding, the Mexica were subjugated by the 
Tepanecs, an ethnic group ruling from Azcapotzalco, the capital of the Tepanec Empire, 
on the western shores of Lake Texcoco.  Undeterred, the intrepid Mexica went to work 
building their city, draining the swampy island, and creating fields around the island, 
known as chinampas.
19
 
 In addition to building their city, they also began adapting themselves to the 
political systems of the valley.  When the Mexica had first migrated, and even when they 
had settled in Tenochtitlan, they followed a more “primitive” system of rule, that of the 
calpulli. While some calpullin (plural of calpulli) were of higher status than others, all 
were flexible and could absorb migrants or lose members if people desired to emigrate.  
The calpullin also allowed for some social mobility, which was the basis for individual 
gains during the imperialistic phase of the Mexica described below. The Tepanecs, now 
in control, imposed a new political structure on the Mexica, in effect forcing them to 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 440-2. 
17
 Fray Diego Durán, History of the Indies of New Spain, trans. Doris Heyden (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1994), 46.  
18
 Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University 
Press, 2006), 60. 
19
 Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America, 446. 
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mimic the valley’s political structure. Foremost they imposed a tlatoani, essentially a 
king.
20
 
  With the creation of a tlatoani comes the creation of nobility – called the pipiltin.  
The pipiltin were an important group of warriors, supposedly, with the all-important 
Toltec heritage, and were the pool from which a new tlatoani would be selected. 
Together, the tlatoani (king) and the pipiltin (nobility) once independent, ran the Empire 
and drove its conquests.  Another change to the Mexica’s political tradition that came 
from the Tepanecs was the ending of the calpulli’s tradition of communally owned land, 
on which small farmers could prosper, but which limited the power of the budding 
nobility. During the Mexica’s conquests the nobility would be similar to feudal lords 
ruling over the mayeque (essentially non-Mexica serfs) who would owe tribute to the 
pipiltin.
21
  The Mexica were now primed to expand; that is, they had the socio-political 
structure that allowed for military expansionism and tributary gain, but first they would 
need to stop being vassals themselves. 
The rise of the Mexica and of the Triple Alliance can be linked to a war between 
the city-states of Azcapotzalco and Texcoco.  Texcoco was an Alcohua (an ethnic group 
in the Valley) city-state on the eastern shore of lake Texcoco and was the only true rival 
to Tepanec power.  Ixtlilxochitl, the tlatoani of Texcoco, waged war against 
Azcapotzalco.  The Mexica were in an awkward position as their current tlatoani, 
Chimpalpopoca, was the grandson of the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, and Ixtlilxochitl was 
married to Chimpalpopoca’s half-sister. Still, Chimpalpopoca was faithful to his 
grandfather and fought against Texcoco, and with the help of the Mexica, the Tepanecs 
                                                 
20
 Conrad and Demarest, Religion and Empire, 23-5. 
21
 Ibid., 15-6. 
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were victorious against the killed Ixtlilxochitl.  The Mexica were rewarded for their help, 
and Texcoco became their tributary.
22
  Even though Texcoco was at the time a de jure 
tributary, Texcoco was treated as, and would ultimately become, an ally to the Mexica. 
The Tepanecs, worried about the Mexica’s increasing strength, sought to curtail 
Mexica political and military power.  Relations between the Tepanecs and the Mexica 
soured when the Tepanecs, in 1426, began an embargo against the Mexica to curtail their 
economic growth.
23
  In addition to the embargo, which was strangling the supply of 
materials they needed to maintain life on the swampy island, the Tepanecs raised the 
amount of tribute required from the Mexica.  Tensions rose rapidly in 1427 with the death 
of Tezozomoc, the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, and the assassination of Chimpalpopoca, the 
tlatoani of the Mexica. The Mexica, likely, assassinated Chimpalpopoca themselves 
because he was an ineffective leader, and by assassinating him the Mexica cut their 
consanguineous tie to the Tepanecs and could then act to counter the embargo.  These 
incidents led to the ascension of leaders on both sides who were determined to bring 
about war.  Itzcoatl became the new Mexica tlatoani because he was an excellent warrior 
capable of facing the Tepanecs, and he was likely behind the assassination plot.  After the 
death of Tezozomoc, ruler of Azcapotzalco, Maxtla, a nobleman with strong anti-Mexica 
sentiments, usurped his brother, who the Mexica had supported for ascension.
24
 See fig.1. 
This was not just a rebellion for the Mexica; it was their chance at greatness.  No 
one knew this more than the Machiavellian Mexica nobleman Tlacaelel.  Tlacaelel was 
the nephew of Itzcoatl, who was praised by Durán as “the greatest warrior, the bravest 
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 Smith, The Aztecs, 48-9. 
23
 Ibid., 50. 
24
 Alan Knight, Mexico from the Beginning to the Spanish Conquest (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 143. 
 20 
and mightiest, that the Aztec nation has ever had – the most cunning man ever produced 
by Mexico.”25 Working with Itzcoatl, Tlacaelel’s first step was to incentivize the 
noblemen to back a war against Azcapotzalco, and to do this he needed to make the 
commoners of Tenochtitlan into serfs in order to reward their compliance.  According to 
Durán this was achieved by making a deal made with the commoners: if the Mexica won, 
the peasants would serve the nobles, but if they lost, the peasants could literally eat the 
nobles “in cracked and dirty dishes,” so that their “flesh” would be “totally degraded,” 
which was meant to disgrace their bodies.
26
 It is doubtful that any commoner would have 
agreed to this lose-lose agreement, and is likely a fictional part of Mexica history to 
justify the nobility’s dominance.  If the Mexica had won, the peasants would have owed 
the nobility tribute, and if Tepanecs had won, the peasants would have owed 
Azcapotzalco tribute.  However, the concocted wager served its purpose of inducing the 
nobility to fight, reinforcing their importance as well as legitimating their high status.
27
 
In order to dislodge the Tepanecs of Azcapotzalco from power, the Mexica 
needed to both make alliances and exploit Tepanec weaknesses. In 1428 this culminated 
in an agreement that would initiate the Triple Alliance, so named because of the three 
city-states that formed it: Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan.  The Mexica began by 
recruiting their newly conquered tributary, Texcoco.  This was an easy alliance because 
of the long-standing rivalry between Texcoco and Azcapotzalco. The Mexica next 
exploited the internal divisions among the Tepanecs; they successfully had the Tepanec 
                                                 
25
 Durán, History of the Indies, 72. 
26
 Ibid., 78. 
27
 Conrad and Demarest, Religion and Empire, 35-6. 
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city of Tlacopan ally with them and the Alcohua of Texcoco.  As mentioned, these three 
city-states would form the Triple Alliance.
2829
 
In that same year the Mexica, the Alcohua, the unfaithful Tepanecs of Tlacopan, 
with the help of two groups from outside the Valley of Mexico, the Tlaxcalans, and the 
Huexotzinca formed a transitory alliance and attacked Azcapotzalco.  After 112 days 
Azcapotzalco fell, and the Tlaxcalans and Huexotzinca returned to their individual city-
states.
3031
 Afterward the Mexica, Alcohua, and the unfaithful Tepanecs formed a 
triumvirate alliance; it was meant to aid one another in military defense and campaigns.  
The spoils of future of conquests and tribute would be divided between the city-states of 
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan as two-fifths, two-fifths, and one-fifth 
respectively.
32
  The lesser distribution to Tlacopan represents their minor status in the 
Alliance both militarily and politically. 
Along with gaining independence the Mexica gained the farmland of 
Azcapotzalco and used this to reward those nobles and warriors who fought courageously 
for independence.  According to Durán, Tlacaelel advised Itzcoatl to distribute the lands 
amongst those “who had distinguished themselves in war.”33 This was no egalitarian act 
considering it was only nobles who were granted these lands.  Even so, this act shows the 
break from traditional calpullin centered societal structure to that of more distinct social 
strata.  The wager with the commoners in essence was “fulfilled,” and they were 
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increasingly marginalized.
34
 
After their victory, Itzcoatl and his advisors took the opportunity to continue to 
diminish the influence, of the calpulli – the commoner class that constituted the cities 
population.  The first step in shifting power was to formalize how the position of tlatoani, 
the equivalent of a king, was transferred.  The calpullin were no longer the decision 
makers in the selection of the new tlatoani, rather it was a newly founded oligarchy 
called “‘Council of Four,’” which consisted of the previous tlatoani’s personal council.  
The Machiavellian-like Tlacaelel went further and reorganized religious and civil offices.   
Unfortunately, the histories are vague about what exactly occurred.  Montezuma 
Ilhuicamina, who would later become tlatoani and from now on referred to as 
Montezuma I, rigidified social classes’ dress and privileges and created separate schools 
for the nobility and commoners.  Conrad and Demarest assert that these changes, which 
occurred over the forty-two year period of Itzcoatl and Montezuma I’s rules, had only put 
them on the same level as the Tepanecs.
35
 
Beyond inheriting Azcapotzalco’s territories, the Mexica also inherited its 
problems.  The most pressing problem was the lack of a cultural authority from not 
having Toltec heritage.  When Tezozomoc (the tlatoani of Azcapotzalco) died, the 
Tepanec state, which he created and ruled, weakened under his successor, Maxtla. This 
weakness contributed to the decision of the Tepanecs of Tlacopan to side with the 
Mexica.  The largest obstacle to Tepanec authority was the absence of Toltec heritage to 
legitimize their rule within the Valley.  Toltec ancestry was important because Toltecs 
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were considered to be descendants of the god Quetzalcoatl.
36
 Royal sanguinity trumped 
ability to rule, at least for the transfer of power from Tezozomoc to Maxtla.  Itzcoatl, 
Tlacaelel, and Montezuma I knew this, and in an Orwellian maneuver had all of the 
Mexica’s pictographic histories burned and rewritten, or drawn rather.  Their new 
histories down played the Mexica’s “barbarous” ancestry and linked them instead to 
Toltec ancestry.  A large part of the new and “official” history revised the course the 
Mexica took from Aztlan to Tenochtitlan.  By having the Mexica “visit” many city-states 
that had Toltec heritage, they could link themselves to and claim they were of the Toltec 
lineage. The Mexica also claimed that Colhua, a city-state that was a bastion of Toltec 
ancestry, granted them a princess in arranged marriage, which gave them a link to the all-
important Toltec heritage.
37
   
After their revolution, the Mexica needed a figure to become a central god that 
was unique to their own people, and Itzcoatl, Tlacaelel, and Montezuma I found what 
they were looking for in Huitzilopochtli.  He was a figure unique to the Mexica and could 
be manipulated into a powerful motivational figure through his need for human sacrifice. 
See fig. 2.  His viciousness in the new histories served this purpose by linking 
Huitzilopochtli’s violent tendencies and both his literal and metaphorical thirst for blood 
through human sacrifice.   The selection of Huitzilopochtli demonstrated that the Mexica 
had, and would continue to have, no choice but to follow the rituals Huitzilopochtli 
demanded of them. Those rituals included supplying Huitzilopochtli, the sun god, with 
the human blood he needed to sustain himself after his daily battles fighting to cross the 
sky, specifically by the sacrifice of captured warriors.  This made war an integral part of 
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Mexica’s culture and ritual sacrifice a powerful incentive for the Mexica to go to and 
perform well in battle.
38
 
The origins of Huitzilopochtli are complex.  He was an amalgam of the more 
common, older gods of Mesoamerica Tonatiuh and Tezcatlipoca.  Tonatiuh had been the 
god of the sun for the Toltec people circa 950 CE.  According to legend, he was created 
when a lesser warrior god willingly immolated himself in order to become the sun. He 
was originally a humble, sickly figure before casting himself into a pyre wearing only 
paper armor.  However, after he became the sun, he became greedy and would only move 
around the earth if the other gods sacrificed their hearts for him.  And so, the other gods 
agreed and did so, and people had to continue this process by sacrificing human hearts to 
Tonatiuh.
39
  In a poem Huitzilopochtli is described as “he who is dressed in paper, he 
who inhabits the region of heat.” This is a clear reference to Tonatiuh who originally 
wore paper armor and became the sun.
40
  
Also like Tonatiuh, Huitzilopochtli was originally a hero-like figure who was 
minor, but unique, to the Mexica. The important new part of Huitzilopochtli was his need 
for daily human sacrifices.  Sahagún recounts veneration to Huitzilopochtli: the priest 
“had taken his heart from him [a captive], he [the priest] raised it in dedication to the 
sun.”41  Sahagún also included a song that venerated Huitzilopochtli calling him the 
“leader in war” and Mexica warriors wore a dress in a “yellow feathered cape, which 
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through me is the sunshine.”42  Through the imagery of the sun, Huitzilopochtli is 
equated to Tonatiuh, the earlier warrior sun god.  Karl Taube, an anthropologist, believes 
that aspects of Huitzilopochtli were not only drawn from Tonatiuh, but also done so to 
replace him as a central figure Huitzilopochtli being the actual sun god validated the 
Mexica’s ascension to power as a necessity the because it was their god who was the sun.  
And through their conquests and sacrifices they kept the sun moving through the sky.
43
 
The second god to be incorporated into Huitzilopochtli was Tezcatlipoca, whose 
name translates to the “Lord of the Smoking Mirror.” He was a major deity to many 
Mesoamericans. The smoking mirror refers specifically to mirrors ground from obsidian; 
“smoking” refers to the way the black volcanic glass obfuscates reflections.  Obsidian 
mirrors were believed to have divination-like powers, and Tezcatlipoca could gaze back 
through the mirror.
44
  Mirrors were not always made from obsidian but also pyrite, 
known colloquially today as fool’s gold.45  The Nahuatl term for pyrite is tezcatl, which 
literally translates to “mirror stone.”46 Tezcatl is also Nahuatl for mirror itself.47  Thus, 
tezcatl is a linguistic link to the Lord of the Smoking Mirror and his namesake mineral. 
Tezcatlipoca, beyond being metaphysically connected to the mirror stone also had one 
physically attached to his foot.
48
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Tezcatlipoca’s place in the pantheon is by no means clear.  He was the child of 
Ometeotl, the little mentioned hermaphrodite who birthed the four gods that created the 
various worlds.  Ometeotl had four Tezcatlipoca sons: Red, White, Black, and Blue 
Tezcatlipoca.  Each colored Tezcatlipoca was a different god and each was assigned to a 
cardinal direction: Xipe Totec (Red, east), Quetzalcoatl (White, west), Tezcatlipoca 
(Black, north), and Huitzilopochtli (Blue, south).  Huitzilopochtli’s position is unique to 
the Mexica as he was exclusively their god.
4950
   
The Black Tezcatlipoca is the figure that has been and will be discussed; he was a 
benevolent god. At times he would give “riches to men,” but at other times he was 
malevolent and would bring “men misery, [and] affliction.” 51   Young warriors who tried 
to imitate him also admired him, and they practiced in a cult whose followers were 
known as telpochtli.
52
  Like Huitzilopochtli, Tezcatlipoca had been an important deity to 
the Toltecs, and he was transmogrified into a central figure for the Toltecs.  The Toltecs 
attributed some of the powers of rain god Tlaloc to Tezcatlipoca.  This melding of 
Tezcatlipoca and Tlaloc occurred simultaneously as their religion and politics merged, 
similarly to the Mexica’s sacrificial oblations with Huitzilopochtli.53  This tradition of 
veneration for Tezcatlipoca carried into the Mexica culture; they referred to Tezcatlipoca 
as “‘he whose slaves we are.’”54 
In the same song about how warriors sang to venerate Huitzilopochtli, there is a 
line that reads, “you have but one foot”; this might be a allusion to Tezcatlipoca, who as 
                                                 
49
 Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in the Aztec World, 138. 
50
 Taube, Aztec and Maya Myths, 32-4. 
51
 Sahagún, The Florentine Codex, III: 11. 
52
 Olivier, Aztec God, 27-8. 
53
 Knight, Mexico, 123-4. 
54
 Taube, Aztec and Maya Myths, 32. 
 27 
mentioned had only one real foot while the other was an obsidian mirror.
55
  In 1486, after 
Ahuitzotl, a Mexica tlatoani, returned from a successful military campaign, the Mexica 
held a ceremonial coronation for him.  During this ceremony the Mexica placed a mirror 
stone on the head of a Huitzilopochtli. This is significant because when a new tlatoani 
was crowned, he needed to thank and ask Tezcatlipoca for guidance.
56
  Part of this 
process of thanks involved the new tlatoani repeating a speech in which he refers to a 
“two-faced mirror wherein we commoners lie.”57  Placing the mirror on Huitzilopochtli’s 
head seems to connect the awesome powers of Tezcatlipoca to Huitzilopochtli. This 
symbolism might allude to the fact that Huitzilopochtli is also referred to as the Blue 
Tezcatlipoca in some creation myths.  Or it might reference the guidance this warrior sun 
god figure had over the Mexica. 
In the Mexica’s mythical journey from Aztlan, Huitzilopochtli is their guide, and 
he often mimics Tezcatlipoca’s capriciousness. He bestows fortune on them by bringing 
them to their new preordained home of Tenochtitlan; however, he also brings upon them 
misfortune by having them purposefully offend the Colhua in order to be cast out from 
their lands.  At the end of their journey Huitzilopochtli guided the Mexica to the island 
where they were to found their city. They Mexica they were home when they saw an 
eagle clutching a rattlesnake on a cactus on a stone.  Supposedly, the island itself had 
grown from a heart that a Mexica priest had excised and threw into the lake as 
Huitzilopochtli ordered him to.
 58
  The balance between the good and bad acts of 
Huitzilopochtli mimics the ways in which Tezcatlipoca could bestow fortunes or miseries 
                                                 
55
 Sahagún, Florentine Codex, II: 222. 
56
 Oliver, Aztec God, 248, 252. 
57
 Sahagún, Florentine Codex, VI: 41, 44. 
58
 Durán, History of the Indies, 32. 
 28 
on men.  This similarity goes further, and at the end of Sahagún’s account of the birth of 
Huitzilopochtli, he records that the Mexica “placed their trust in Uitzilopochtli” (an 
alternate spelling for Huitzilopochtli).  This is not unlike the faith the newly crowned 
tlatoani Ahuitzotl, placed in Tezcatlipoca, and both these figures were guides to the 
Mexica. 
For these changes to become official canon, the Mexica’s society needed to 
undergo drastic changes.  Itzcoatl’s first order of business was to burn their old histories 
and rewrite them in a more favorable light, which justified the extreme stratification of 
classes and the nobility’s right to rule.59  Tlacaelel and Montezuma I created schools for 
the commoners called telpochcalli, which taught boys how to be warriors and girls to be 
housekeepers.  But more importantly, the schools taught children the basics of their 
history and religion.
60
  There was a separate school for the nobility and young priests 
called a calmeca; here students would also be indoctrinated and taught religious practices 
and “official” Mexica history.  Part of this schooling involved teaching the pupils how to 
identify “good” teachers and priests, that is, people who knew the sanctioned histories 
and religious beliefs.  Another tool to shape public understanding were artworks 
commissioned to represent the newly transformed gods and customs. However, this 
artwork never seemed to make it far out of the Valley of Mexico, which stresses how 
confined these views were.
61
  The new schools – along with new pictographic histories, 
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new religious practices, and new artwork – replaced original oral histories and quickly 
imbedded itself into Mexica society.
62
 
The Mexica had come to be told that their success, militaristically, was in essence 
the divine fortune of their god and their god alone.  In return for Huitzilopochtli’s guiding 
the Mexica to their homeland and aiding their military endeavors, they owed him 
sustenance.  This came in the form of human sacrifice, specifically hearts from warriors.  
For the Mexica, the fate of the entire world was in their hands; if they did not provide 
Huitzilopochtli with hearts he could not complete his daily battle through the sky.  In 
effect, there would be no sunrise the next day.  This was an intense motivation for their 
conquests, and the drastic changes that the Mexica psyche experienced from this 
transformation in religious ideology is difficult to understate.  No matter how violent the 
acts were, in the Mexica mind, these acts were literally saving the world and their 
civilization. 
Beyond the religious pressure to capture soldiers in war, there also was a 
socioeconomic incentive for warfare.  Success was measured in captives taken and brave 
deeds performed in battle.  From success in war, nobles were allotted lands and 
administrative positions, which dealt mostly with tribute.  But this also could be said of 
the commoners who were rewarded with certain privileges of dress and status within their 
class. This was an important tool because everyone had a stake in conquest, both earthly 
and heavenly.  Demarest and Conrad encapsulated this view the best, “if successful, the 
freeman warrior would gain privilege in this life, and if he perished in the divine quest he 
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would gain immortality in the next, as a warrior-companion to the sun.”63  Warfare was 
so important to the Mexica that even dying was in battle was sacred.  Success in warfare 
meant bringing in captives to sacrifice to Huitzilopochtli, and if you were successful 
enough you could gain heritable status, which marked your children apart from the rest of 
society.  
The Mexica had successfully created a society that tied religious imperialism to 
personal incentives.  This was incredibly successful as the Mexica began to expand.  
Itzcoatl next sought to takeover the rest of the Valley of Mexico, and around 1430 CE the 
Triple Alliance did just that by conquering the southern lakes covered in rich and highly 
productive chinampas, which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.  
However, Chalco, the city-state on the western portion of Lake Chalco, remained 
stubbornly independent until the mid 1440’s. See map 4.  Next, in the late 1430’s, they 
expanded southward out of the Valley and took control of important semi-tropical 
agricultural lands of what is today part of the Federal District of Morelos.  In 1440 
Montezuma I assumed control after Itzcoatl had died.  In 1458, the Triple Alliance 
continued their conquests; they took control of the rest of Morelos, parts of modern day 
Oaxaca, and moved eastward – gaining access to the Gulf Coast.64 
Montezuma I died in 1468, and his successor was his grandson Axayacatl.  
Axayacatl made some westward expansions, reaching the border of the Tarascan Empire, 
but the Tarascans halted this expansion by crushing his army.  The rest of Axayacatl’s 
rein was spent consolidating previous conquests and solving the logistical problems the 
bureaucracy faced from collecting and managing tribute.  This meant creating new 
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bureaucratic roles and reconquering rebellious areas.  Axayacatl finally cemented control 
of Tenochtitlan’s sister city, Tlatelolco, by officially conquering it.  Strangely, the 
Mexica had allowed the city-state, founded simultaneously by a separate group of Mexica 
on the same island, to remain independent.  They likely were left independent because of 
ethnic ties and because the Mexica of Tenochtitlan did not want to disrupt Tlatelolco’s 
economics.   Tlatelolco had become a major trading hub even before Tenochtitlan 
became powerful, but at the time of its conquest it was the largest center of trade in 
Mesoamerica.  Axayacatl replaced Tlatelolco’s tlatoani with a military governor giving 
the Mexica control over their merchant class.  Axayacatl’s consolidations were attempts 
to strengthen political control, prevent unrest in amongst the tributaries, and with the 
addition of Tlatelolco increase control over trade.
65
 
Axayacatl died in 1481 and Tizoc, an ineffective leader, replaced him and was 
assassinated five years later leading to the ascension of Ahuitzotl in 1486.  By this point, 
the Triple Alliance had shifted from being relatively equal partners to favoring the 
Mexica, but under Ahuitzotl the Mexica were the de facto leaders of the Triple Alliance.  
Ahuitzotl began his career by reconquering troubled areas.  He continued campaigns 
taking over the rest of Oaxaca and advancing westward, pressing against the Tarascan 
Empire, to the Pacific Ocean.  Ahuitzotl was focused on securing the important trade 
routes through these areas and fortifying the western border with the Tarascans to secure 
his control.   
Ahuitzotl’s conquests underscored an important shift in Mexica expansion.  Early 
on the Alliance focused on conquering areas that were important for food production. 
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Now however, conquests began to focus on regions important for their trade routes and 
luxury goods.  These changes were making the Empire incredibly wealthy.  The shift in 
strategy reflects one of trying to gain power but also support its growing population.  By 
Ahuitzotl’s reign the Empire was more focused on generating wealth and prestige.66  This 
stemmed from a growing demand for status and religious items as all the classes of 
Tenochtitlan grew in size and wealth.  The growing demand for luxury items can be seen 
in the increase of full time artisans, the dwindling number of part time craft producers, 
and the centralization of specialists in key cities, specifically Tenochtitlan.  With a few 
exceptions, which will be discussed later, the areas in and around the Valley of Mexico 
shifted from part time craft production exclusively to agriculture in order to support the 
burgeoning population as well as increased demand for high quality goods.
67
 
With Ahuitzotl’s death in 1502, Montezuma Xocoyotzin, known here on as 
Montezuma II, became the Mexica’s new tlatoani. Montezuma II had many problems to 
address.  One problem was weakening the Tlaxcalan kingdom, a plucky Nahuatl group to 
the east of the Valley of Mexico.  Another problem was suppressing uprisings within the 
Triple Alliance.  Montezuma II did manage to subjugate a few new territories to the 
south.  Montezuma II, like his predecessors, struggled to maintain control over 
subjugated city-states and regions because the Triple Alliance never really had full 
control over them in the first place.
68
  Originally, this process of reconquest was a normal 
and agreeable part of the Empire; rulers proved themselves in war and nobles and 
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commoners used it to gain privileges which in turn fed the priests sacrificial needs.  
However, by the time of Montezuma II the Empire became too large to maintain the 
constant warfare that expanded it so quickly.  Montezuma curtailed the reward system by 
restricting upward mobility within all the Mexica classes.  The nobility was rigidified and 
focused on lineage rather than ability in war.  This was meant to curtail the Mexica’s 
internal motivations for warfare.
69
  Paradoxically, Montezuma II needed to be perceived 
as an effective general in control of a powerful army as perceived power was just as 
important in maintaining and conquering new tributaries. 
Warfare in Mesoamerica came in two forms, combative and flowery, and through 
both system soldiers were rewarded for their captives.  A combative war is in a sense a 
traditional form of warfare meant to conquer an enemy town or city-state.  Opposing 
armies, which consisted of small units of a mix of veteran and novice warriors, would 
face each other and begin battle by firing long distance projectiles.  After these munitions 
began to dwindle the arms infantry would advance using atlatls, spear throwers, until 
they came close enough to switch to hand-to-hand weapons.  Units were kept about a 
two-meter distance from one another so that opposing warriors could pair off and fight 
one another.  The purpose in these fights was not to kill but to maim an opponent until 
they were disabled enough to be taken off the battlefield and used as sacrificial victims.  
However, this is not to say that there were no outright fatalities from wars of conquest.
70
 
  Flowery war, despite its deceptive name, was not a matter taken lightly.  It was 
conducted in a much more regulated fashion than wars of conquest.  An equal number of 
equally skilled warriors would square off in a flowery war.  A flowery war was meant to 
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display the military prowess of a power’s soldiers.  Therefore, combatants would only 
use hand-to-hand combat weapons such as the maquahuitl, a sword like weapon, and the 
tepoztopilli, a lance-like weapon.  These weapons will be discussed in greater length in 
the obsidian chapter.  These weapons required diligent training, which both commoners 
and nobility received in their respective schools although the nobility was better trained.  
Therefore, winning in a flowery war was achieved when one side took more captives by 
carefully disabling them in combat.  While this seems similar to regular combat, there 
were much less outright fatalities, and a flowery war was a protracted conflict that could 
go on, potentially, indefinitely.  At its best a flowery war was meant to demonstrate that 
to an enemy the futility of fighting in a combative war, and at least it served to syphon off 
strong enemy’s best warriors.71   
Ross Hassig views flowery warfare as a development to overcome the logistics of 
warfare as the Empire expanded.  The Triple Alliance’s large empire with its constant 
upheavals did not have enough soldiers or the logistical capability of supplying entire 
armies for a season worth of campaigns in various places.  Therefore, they developed the 
flowery war to be used amongst its neighboring enemies such as Tlaxcalans to display 
power and eliminate strong warriors.  In combination with flowery warfare the Empire 
sought to strangle trade routes and chip away at enemy territories in a process known as 
circling.  Because the Empire had enmeshed itself so strongly into trade, once a territory 
was encircled it would see extra-territorial trading cease.  This was the case with the 
Tlaxcalans.
72
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Conquered peoples did not suddenly live under Triple Alliance law; rather, they 
were expected to pay yearly tributes often based on whatever goods were plentiful within 
the region.  This process facilitated conflict because the loose control and high tribute 
demands led to rebellion, which once reconquered were raised higher.  The conquered 
areas owed the Triple Alliance a mix of goods ranging from foodstuffs to extreme 
luxuries such as live eagles.  See fig. 3.  Some tribute items were unobtainable in a local 
region and could only be acquired through trade.  This became a standard practice as the 
Empire had grown in order to enrich its own merchants because it was through their 
merchants that some tributaries would gain the items needed.  Tribute originally was 
brought to Tenochtitlan where it was divided amongst the three city-states of the Triple 
Alliance with, as mentioned, two-fifths going to Tenochtitlan and Texcoco and a fifth 
going to Tlacopan.  Whether or not this was the way goods were actually shared, seems 
dubious because of the immense power the Mexica held.
73
   
Montezuma II radically altered the manner in which tribute was collected.  
Traditionally, tribute flowed from conquered areas to closest city-state that was 
conquered and then to Tenochtitlan.  Montezuma II reorganized the tribute system by 
creating a bureaucracy.  Tributaries were now organized into thirty-eight provinces that 
were focused around tributary capitals.  Tribute from areas still pooled to local towns but 
now those local towns sent what they owed to the tributary capitals.  From the tributary 
capital the tribute was sent to Tenochtitlan; each level had nobles who were only 
concerned about that levels tribute and sending along the chain.  This process became 
even more efficient as tribute was delivered based on standard times, quarterly or every 
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eighty days; perishables were the exception and brought when ready.  Montezuma II 
made these changes for several reasons: to make it easier to keep track of the flow of 
goods; to impress the local leaders that would arrive at times that would awe them; and to 
gauge the fealty of the provinces by whether or not the tribute was timely or even if it 
arrived.
74
   
Tribute was more complex than simply bringing the goods to the island city.  
Some regions could not naturally produce certain valuable goods, and they needed to 
trade in order to obtain them.  This process of trading went through channels controlled 
by the Mexica regime.  This allowed Mexica traders to travel all edges of the empire to 
use its trading ties, establish new ones, and even spy for the government.  Spying was an 
important function, since traders were the only group allowed into enemy or foreign 
states.  The traders belonged to guilds that had their own stratification and could advance 
within them. The Mexica Regime subsidized their profession, and technically the Mexica 
government controlled the goods being traded.
75
 However, the merchants were rewarded 
like the other classes and could gain special privileges and status.
 76
  Professional traders 
dealt almost exclusively with luxury items.  These consisted of goods ranging from furs 
and cloth to obsidian and copper items.
77
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Chapter Two 
 
Indian Corn 
“It has dried husks, maize silk, tassels at the top” – Florentine Codex78 
 
Central American ecology played a major role in shaping Mesoamerican society; 
consequently, understanding Central American ecology is essential to appreciate the very 
different developmental path Mesoamerica took when compared to Eurasia.  The ecology 
of the New World would had far reaching consequences in agriculture, technology, and 
socio-political formations.  This chapter will explore what the ecological differences were 
and how they led to the style of agriculture that spread across all of Mesoamerica.  Jared 
Diamond is correct to trace civilizations to their roots to understand why events, such as 
the Conquest of Mexico, played out the ways in which they did.  He is also correct the 
Americas lacked some of the potentials in flora and fauna, but Mesoamericans made up 
for these “deficiencies” and created elaborate systems of agriculture.  The ecology and 
style of agriculture had a strong influence on the ways in which Mesoamerican culture 
and technology developed.  I will begin to explore these differences in this chapter as 
well as the following two chapters. 
Arguably, the largest difference between the Americas and Eurasia was the 
Americas lack of large animals capable of being domesticated.  Many animals capable of 
being domesticated became extinct around the end of the most recent ice age.  The reason 
for this is hotly debated.  Some scholars believe it was climate change, while others 
believe Paleo-Indians overhunted large game animals driving them to extinction.  
However, it is more likely a combination of the two theories: rapid climate change altered 
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habitats, which when compounded with occasional hunting was enough to push large 
mammal species with slow reproductive rates over the edge and into extinction.
79
  These 
extinctions left the Americas with fewer animals that could be domesticated.  Not all 
animals can be domesticated. Some species have problems with breeding in captivity, and 
others have too wild a disposition to ever be tamed.  Therefore, with many large 
mammals becoming extinct, Amerindians had fewer choices for domestication.
80
 
 The lack of large domesticable mammals led to noticeable differences in the diet 
and agricultural techniques of Mesoamerica and Eurasia.  Without large mammals, there 
was no dairy and little meat in the Mesoamerican diet.  Some historians have seized upon 
this difference and see it as the reason for the practice of cannibalism. In fact, however, it 
led to the development of a diet that focused on plants with high fat and protein content. 
Mesoamericans domesticated a wide variety of crops to fill nutritional needs.  
Mesoamericans relied on a combination of maize, beans, squash, and a variety of other 
crops.  Of course, old world agriculture also had pulses and other plants, such as wheat, 
barely, and flax that filled fat and protein needs.
81
   
 Mesoamericans also used a technique of intercropping known as the milpa 
system, which not only was highly productive but also important in maintaining soil 
fertility.  However, one must first understand how the more “conventional” agricultural 
practices of Eurasia developed and worked in order to understand the differences between 
new world and old world agriculture.  Southwestern Eurasia, the Fertile Crescent, is 
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arguably the area of the oldest developed form of agriculture, and the first step towards 
agriculture is the domestication of the crops.  
 According to Jared Diamond, the Fertile Crescent had several distinct advantages 
that facilitated crop domestication.  Geographically the Fertile Crescent was part of the 
largest area in the world with a Mediterranean climate, a climate with mild wet winters 
and long dry summers.  This climate favored annual grasses that would sprout rapidly 
and be able to grow in drier conditions.  They would not grow long, and tended to have 
large seeds to be dispersed for the following growing season.  Diamond includes a study 
of the world’s wild grasses, of the fifty-six best, grasses with seeds at least ten times as 
large as the median grasses, thirty-six are native only to Eurasia’s Mediterranean zone. In 
addition many of these plants were self-pollinating, but could occasionally cross-
pollinate.  This meant that useful hybrids were more likely to develop and retain their 
traits, because they could not easily cross-pollinate again.  This ability would facilitate 
domestication by making new and better hybrids that could be easily sown.  Diamond 
also postulates that because of a decline of gazelles and a lack of aquatic resources, proto-
farmers were pushed to focus on the use of grasses as a new staple in their diets.
82
  The 
cultivation of Maize in Mesoamerica is far different than the crops of the Fertile 
Crescent. 
 Maize is much more difficult to cultivate than the eight “founder crops” Diamond 
mentions for the Fertile Crescent.  The history of maize is still controversial; the most 
reliable date for domestication is around 4,000 BCE, but maize is potentially much older.  
Maize’s closest wild relative is teosinte, which may not even be its actual ancestor and 
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looks nothing like a stalk of maize.  Teosinte is a shrubby grass with many thin stems and 
small “ears” and no cob.  The seeds of teosinte, numbering seven to twelve, have a hard 
inedible shell, and all of a seeds on an ear of teosinte combined still have less nutritional 
value than a single kernel of modern maize.  Farmers tended to breed out a feature of 
wild plants that led to the dispersal of seeds in cereal crops, and thereby keeping the 
seeds from falling off and making harvesting easier.  Teosinte has at least sixteen genes 
that control how seedpods shatter and disperse in nature.  By comparison wild cereals in 
the Fertile Crescent have only one gene controlling the shattering effect.
83
 
Maize is also not self-pollinating, but instead is pollinated by the wind so that one 
maize variety can pollinate another, introducing new and different plants in the same 
area.  This forced a Mesoamerican farmer to comb through and choose the desirable 
varieties, a difficult task since modern Mesoamerica might have as many as 5,000 
cultivars.  A cultivar is one variety of a crop bred for certain attributes and can be thought 
of as a breed.  Maize is unique in being a domesticated species that has more genetic 
diversity than its wild ancestor, which might be explained by multiple domestications or 
the interbreeding with multiple wild species.
84
  
  Maize was not enough to fill all the nutritional needs, which led Mesoamericans 
to develop a different style of farming all together.  Another noticeable difference was 
that Mesoamericans did not grow their fields in straight furrows.  Rather, Mesoamericans 
developed a unique style of intercrop farming known as the milpa, a Nahuatl term that 
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meant cornfield but has come to mean more.
85
  To understand the milpa it must again be 
examined in comparison to farming in the Fertile Crescent.   
Along with its amber waves of wild grains, Southwestern Eurasia was also gifted 
with numerous species of large mammals that could be domesticated.  Eurasians 
domesticated thirteen of their seventy-two large mammals, compared to one out of 
twenty-four in the Americas, the llama.  By 6,000 BCE cows had been domesticated in 
Southwestern Eurasia.
86
   Oxen pulled plows developed in Southwestern Eurasia around 
4000 BCE.
87
  The technology was perhaps inspired by an ingenious farmer watching 
oxen drag rudimentary carts and replaced the cart with a digging stick to drag instead.  A 
person dragging a digging stick was a common practice to score the earth.   So using 
knowledge of ox drawn carts, early farmers lashed the digging stick to the horns of an ox 
or by attaching a bar across the head of an ox.  The ox then walked forward, cutting into 
the earth.
88
  As the ox dragged the rudimentary plow, the farmer scattered seeds of 
cereals across the just upturned ground.
89
  This practice of scattering seeds after an ox 
drawn plow is part of the explanation of why straight furrows were a common feature of 
Eurasian plow agriculture. 
 Mesoamericans had ample time to watch the natural world around them when 
they began developing maize, and their forms of agriculture demonstrates this by 
mimicking natural cycles. The milpa system which grew mainly maize used an 
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innovative technique that not only mimicked natural cycles but also enhanced yields 
while being ecologically sustainable on the scale that it was practiced.  While many crops 
can be grown in a milpa, the three most important are maize, beans, and varieties of 
squash.  Other crops include tomatoes, chilies, peppers, amaranth, chia, avocadoes, and a 
variety of other vegetables.
 90
 
Maize, beans, and squash were the three to spread far across the Americas and 
have become known colloquially as the “three sisters,” and they grow particularly well 
with each other.  Maize grows a thick tall stalk and requires many nutrients from the soil 
and thereby depletes it. Beans grow tendrils that run up the maize stalk so as to get 
adequate sunlight; the roots of the bean nitrify and rejuvenate the soil.  The squashes’ 
lush leaves spread out and protect the base of the other two plants and deter weeds.  This 
interplay may have natural origins; beans and squash often grow in the same areas as 
teosinte, and wild beans have been noted to climb teosinte as domesticated beans climb 
maize.
 91
  At its highest output a milpa was believed to have produced somewhere around 
3,000 kg/ha; it is estimated that a return of this value could feed approximately fifteen 
and a half people beyond the farmer.
9293
 
The ways that maize, beans, and squash were grown on farms in Mesoamerica 
might be due to the long time it took to domesticate the maize.  Perhaps through the 
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difficultly of finding the right variety of teosinte the farmer found how to grow crops that 
worked in a symbiotic manner.  The milpa system also owed much of it success, and 
possibly its existence, to the lack of any animals that would make plowing viable.  The 
relatively limited agricultural tools, mainly the digging stick and simple hoes, made the 
milpa style practical because using a digging stick meant manually digging the hole for 
each seed.  The milpa demanded more attention and planning because crops were often 
intercropped in small mounds.  This is far different from farming in the old world where 
the farmer simply scattered the wheat grain as the oxen plowed the land.
94
 
Metallurgy’s incorporation into Mesoamerican agriculture was far different than 
they way it was used in the Fertile Crescent.  Mesoamerican agricultural tools included 
digging sticks, which tips were mostly fire hardened but occasionally had metal tips, and 
hoes, which also sometimes had metal blades as well.
95
 Eurasia invented the plow and 
because of plowing they scattered the seeds.  Farming in Mesoamerica, however, did not 
significantly advance with its tool assortment for agriculture.  And while this is partly 
because of the lack of a plow, it is also because the crops and style of agriculture were 
adapted to fit the tools at hand.   Seeds were purposefully planted individually and 
intercropped which did not need the plow.
96
  However, metals were not designed 
principally for tools as they often were in the old world.  Copper and bronze advancement 
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focused more on status items rather than tools such as axes and hoes, which will be 
discussed in greater detail in the chapter on metallurgy.
97
 
Households in Mexica Valley had calmilli (the plural form), or gardens, but they 
were a more substantial source of food than what is now known as a garden.  Susan 
Evans, an anthropologist who studied farming practices of the valley, notes that in the 
north a calmil (the singular form) was around half a hectare and would supply many 
vegetables for the household.  Milpas, she claims, tended to have more maize while 
calmilli were more diverse and had a heavier emphasis on vegetables such as tomatoes, 
peppers, herbs along with some traditional milpa standards – maize, beans, and squashes. 
The calmil served as a reservoir for seeds for the next year’s milpa and calmil plots along 
with much of the farmer’s food.  The farmer’s milpa plot was focused more on crops that 
were required for tribute or used in trade; the main four crops of tribute were maize, 
beans, amaranth, and chia.
98
  
Possibly the most famous form of agriculture used in the Mexica Valley was the 
chinampa, known colloquially as a floating garden.  Floating garden is a misnomer 
because the artificial islands were attached to the lakebed; however, this stemmed from 
confusion around the floating reed mats that were used to germinate seeds to allow 
chinampas to be in continuous use.
99
  A chinampa was made by driving stakes into the 
lakebed and then weaving them with sticks and reeds to make a border.  The woodwork 
was filled in with rotting vegetation and sediment from the bottom of the lake.  Planting 
trees along the border allowed roots to take hold and secure the chinampa.  Water from 
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the lake would then irrigate the chinampa and create a sort of hydroponic garden, which 
was incredibly productive. See fig. 4.1 and 4.2. Historian Aguilar-Moreno claims that the 
chinampas of Lake Xochimilco, the southernmost freshwater lake of the valley’s 
lacustrine system, were much more extensive than those of Tenochtitlan, which 
surrounded the city itself, and supplied about half of the food for Tenochtitlan.
100
 
Terracing was also common throughout the Mesoamerican world and, especially, 
on the more vertical landscapes.  These terraces were not as well planned and precise as 
those of the Incas, nor were they always made of stone.  Some of the terraces’ walls were 
made of rough stone, compact earth, or cacti and agave.  The maguey terraces not only 
prevent erosion but also retained soil moisture, which was very important for the higher 
and drier altitudes.  The average amount of maguey planted on a farm could provide 
farmers with three liters a day of aguamiel, a potable sap-like product. This was 
extremely important and should not be underestimated since farms did not have a 
constant supply of water.  The aguamiel could also be fermented into pulque, an 
alcoholic beverage, which was very important to Mesoamericans and was traded widely.  
The leaves of the maguey plant were also used to produce fiber used as cordage, clothes, 
and even for roofing.
101
 
Within Mesoamerica, all fields were well taken care of, and the Amerindians of 
Mexico had many husbandry techniques.  Fields were either ridged furrows to deter 
erosion or had a series of small mounds in which crops were planted.
102
  Beyond using 
the milpa style of intercropping to maintain fertility, farmers also used various sources of 
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biodegradables to fertilize fields.  Once a stalk of maize reached maturity and was picked, 
the stalk had little purpose, and a farmer would sow the stalk and other vegetable waste 
back into the soil.  Human waste was also collected and used for fertilizer among other 
things.
103
  Additionally, pond scum accumulation between chinampas had the added 
benefit of being an extra source of fertilizer.
104
   
Beyond the fertilizing, sustainability, and hyper-productivity associated with 
hydroponic chinampas, ordinary fields were irrigated or drained to increase yields or to 
make agriculture possible.  Levees were crucial in maintaining proper irrigation and 
drainage; the tops of which were even farmed.   Farmers would even cultivate wetlands 
through elaborate drainage systems making the land suitable for agriculture.  The 
mountain range known as the Sierra Madre had steep slopes that hampered agriculture, 
but intrepid farmers terraced the slopes and were to have two annual yields because of 
fog moisture at the high altitudes.
105
  The Mesa Central, which includes the Valley of 
Mexico and Tenochtitlan, used essentially one method of irrigation; although, agriculture 
often relied on rain as the main source of water.  Farmers used a system of dams and 
weirs that would collect silt from runoff during floods and then spread the water onto 
fields.  Similarly, they utilized springs, streams, and collecting pools to do the same.
106
  
As productive as agricultural styles were, they have come under attack by some 
scholars, not because of the feasibility of their large-scale production but because of 
skepticism about the nutritive value of the crops.  Most specifically maize, which lacks 
the essential amino acids lysine and tryptophan.  Michael Harner famously, or infamously 
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for some scholars, theorized that cannibalism in the Mexica culture was a response to an 
increased population.  For Harner, the lack of domesticated animals would mean no fats 
and no animal protein.
 107
  This ignores the immense population of both Tenochtitlan, 
estimated from 200,000 to 250,000 in 1519, and the Valley of Mexico, with a population 
estimated at 1.6 million in 1519, which would require more than cannibalism to sustain 
themselves.
108109
 
Harner ignored the nutritional value of the Mexica diet.  The “three sisters” were 
not only ecologically complementary but also nutritionally complementary.  Maize 
provided much of the nutrition for Amerindian societies but lacked the key amino acids 
lysine and tryptophan and the vitamin niacin.  Beans were rich in lysine and tryptophan, 
but lacked the other essential amino acids cysteine and methionine.  Squashes provided 
vitamins and minerals that rounded out the farmer’s diet.  Therefore, these three crops 
provided a nutritionally balanced diet.
 110
   
Additionally maize in many Mesoamerican cultures underwent an additional 
processing step that made viable a diet of only maize and beans.  Once shucked, the 
maize kernels were soaked in a mixture of limewater, calcium hydroxide, and then 
boiled.  This chemical process freed niacin from the kernels and added calcium to the 
diet.  The kernels were then washed and shelled to remove the pericarp, and, once dried, 
the maize would be ground into flour.
111
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The Mexica also harvested tecuitlatl, which can be considered a miracle crop.  
Tecuitlatl is the Nahuatl name for a food made from spirulina geitlerii, a type of algae.  
Tecuitlatl was collected by fine nets from the lakes in the Valley of Mexico and then 
squeezed and pressed into cake shapes.  The pressed cakes of algae were dried and sold 
in the markets of Tenochtitlan.  Bernal Diaz, one of the conquistadores who helped topple 
the Mexica, described tecuitlatl as tasting “very much like cheese.”112  Tecuitlatl was 
incredibly rich in protein; it was comprised of 70% protein and a complete source of 
amino acids.  Anthropologist Bernard Ortiz de Montellano calculated that harvesting only 
.25% of Lake Texcoco for the algae could feed the population of Tenochtitlan for a year, 
which he estimated around 300,000.
113
 
The agriculture grown over a variety of these regions became incredibly 
important to the Triple Alliance as the population of the Valley increased.  As mentioned 
the Empire began its expansion based on its need to secure its food supply.  The 
chinampas around Xochimilco were major producers of Tenochtitlan’s food supply early; 
however, Susan Evans believes that even by the 1450’s the population of the Valley of 
Mexico was reaching the limit of its carrying capacity under farming techniques of the 
time.
114
  By the time of Montezuma II this made tribute demands of staples an important 
matter.   
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In total, the Alliance was owed twenty-eight bins of maize, twenty-one bins of 
beans, twenty-one bins of chia, and eighteen bins of amaranth.
115
  This amount has been 
estimated to feed around 360,000 people, which Alan Knight cautions at being somewhat 
high.
116
  Based on my own calculations it could feed at most 100,000 people.  According 
to Knight this food, once received, was then distributed or sold to the population of 
Tenochtitlan.
117
  Historian Ross Hassig contends that some of these foodstuffs were 
meant to be prepared for soldiers on way to battle and that runners would be sent in 
advance of an army to have tributaries still loyal to Alliance to assemble needed 
supplies.
118
  In either case tribute in the form of agricultural goods was an important 
matter for the Empire, in feeding both its people and its army.  These foodstuffs along 
with whatever else was required by a province were collected in the tributary’s capital 
then carried to Tenochtitlan by porters over the cities’ causeways or up to the lakeshore 
where canoes did the rest.
119
 See maps 5.1 and 5.2. 
 Agriculture developed radically different in Mesoamerica than in Eurasia.  It 
domesticated an important number of crops that were nutritionally complete.  Rather than 
developing a style of agriculture based on technology, Mesoamericans developed 
agriculture to mimic natural processes.  This allowed for a much more sustainable form 
of agriculture.  However, the negative aspect of this style was the limited impact it had on 
advancing metallurgy.  Yet, as the next chapter will discuss, this was not a priority for 
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Mesoamericans.  Furthermore, agriculture played a large role in determining the original 
course of Alliance expansion to sustain population growth, and it affected military 
campaigns by supplying soldiers with supplies.  Nonetheless, the reliance on food from 
outside Tenochtitlan would be one advantage Cortés would use during the conquest. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Itztli 
“It Takes Its Name From Itself” – Florentine Codex120 
 
 
To understand the path of technological development that Mesoamerica, and more 
specifically the Nahuas, undertook we must examine obsidian’s material uses and cultural 
aesthetic.  Obsidian was pervasive throughout every part of a Nahua’s life, including 
linguistics, household objects, tools, deities, and religious practices.  In this section I will 
examine all of these uses and their connection to obsidian in order to show that 
Mesoamericans emphasized lithic technology because of the cultural importance of 
obsidian.  Compared to metal, stone was much more important to Mexica and Nahua 
societies as a whole.  Stone was a link to the gods, through physical items, and the 
spiritual and metaphysical powers they represented.  It is because of these connections 
and obsidian’s physical properties that it was emphasized in tools.  Anthropologist 
Nicholas J. Saunders encapsulated many of the important reasons for obsidian’s 
importance: 
Obsidian’s peerless utility in a world without metal tools, together with its 
occurrence only at particular geological locations, generated an enduring 
Mesoamerican aesthetic, which saw the controllers of obsidian sources 
and the makers of obsidian blades connected to cosmic forces.  This in 
turn endowed subsequent acts of obsidian use with potency and 
significance, whether in acts of sacrifice and bloodletting, or in producing 
a web of regional exchange networks throughout Mesoamerican 
prehistory. From this perspective, obsidian can be considered unique in its 
capacity to create social relationships, and stimulate symbolic connections 
between materiality and culture across Mesoamerica.
121
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While Mesoamericans did have some metallurgy – beginning in Western Mexico around 
650 CE, Saunders is accurate in that many of the important civilizations in this region had 
developed solely with lithic technology.
122
  Saunders believed that the aesthetic qualities 
of obsidian were the reason for its ubiquitous uses throughout Mesoamerica.  It was these 
unique qualities that gave it an enduring mystique in the Mesoamerican mind, and which 
I will explore throughout this chapter. 
Sanders’ statement about the few geological sources of obsidian refers not to its 
scarcity, but to the mystique of only being able to obtain the material in a few locations.  
In addition, perhaps further supporting his geographic and aesthetic theory is the 
specificity of some types of obsidian.  For example, obsidian from Pachuca has a unique 
green hue that allows archeologists to easily identify the source of obsidian tools.  
Similarly, even if some obsidian stones look alike, each obsidian source has a unique 
chemical composition, which leads to minor differences in appearance and might explain 
another part of the aesthetic of obsidian.
123
  Pachuca obsidian was widely traded.  It was 
used in prismatic blades, sacrificial tools connecting users to their religion and gods, and 
lapidaries made it into religious and status objects, which, too, were widely traded.  It is 
the cultural attributions of status and religious connections to this material that shaped the 
development of technology in Mesoamerica.  In fact obsidian, along with other lithic 
materials, were so essential to ways of life that controlling their sources shaped the 
expansion and policy of the Alliance. 
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Before exploring the worldly uses of obsidian, we must understand Nahuatl 
societies’ linguistic connection to it.  In the Florentine Codex the section on obsidian 
reads, “it takes its name from itself”124; Sahagún’s seemingly existential phrase is 
actually referring to the fact that in the Nahuatl language itztli, the word for obsidian, is 
what modern linguists describe as a morpheme.  Morphemes are the smallest units of 
meaning within a word; for example, the English word “iconify” contains the morphemes 
“icon” and “-ify.”125  Other morphemes related to stones are tetl (stone), xiuitl 
(turquoise), chalachiuitl (emerald), and tecpatl (flint or sacrificial knife).
126
  
The Nahuatl word for obsidian, itztli, functions as a morpheme that is often used 
in words relating to sacrifice, such as: tentitzania (tentli-itztli), a verb that translates as “to 
sacrifice and cut ones lips for the idols.”127  The Florentine Codex describes an act called 
neçoliztli, which translates to “the bloodying.”  Sahagún’s entry reads as, “When they 
bloodied themselves, thus did they do it: with an obsidian blade one cut [the lobes of] 
one’s ears, and then they let the blood flow from about the ears.”128  This entry is listed 
under a section about different Nahua forms of offerings to the gods.  The entry directly 
links the act of blood letting with obsidian; even the entry header appears to have itztli, 
the Nahuatl word for obsidian, as a root.  Itztli is also a morpheme associated with words 
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that refer to sharpness of cutting edges, such as: tenitztic  “something sharp or which has 
a cutting edge” and tenitzticayotl “edge, or sharpness of a knife, etc.”129 
Obsidian is a remarkable natural material. Obsidian is formed as silica rich lava 
that cools quickly with its small crystallites, essentially seedlings from which larger 
crystals form, being packed closely together.  This close packing and lack of large 
crystals gives obsidian its typical jet-black appearance.  When fractured its edges have a 
smoky luster, becoming clearer and less hazy as it comes to a microscopic edge.
130
  It is 
obsidian’s lack of a crystalline structure that allows it to be knapped into blades that are 
the sharpest in the world.
131
  Experimental archaeology has shown that the edges of 
obsidian blades are 500 times sharper than a razor blade as it can fracture down to the last 
molecule; this results in points that can penetrate 25% deeper than steel. Obsidian is also 
ranked as one of the easiest lithic materials for knappers and lapidaries.
132
 
Obsidian tools were ubiquitous in Mesoamerica, and archaeologist Michael E. 
Smith notes that the only material that surpasses obsidian in quantity in archaeological 
sites are ceramics.  Beyond the physical characteristics that made obsidian popular as 
tools, there are about seven natural deposits that were all located in the Mexican 
highlands. See maps 6 and 7.  The Mexica themselves were located close to two obsidian 
sources, Otumba and Pachuca.  The latter, Pachuca, is a source of high quality obsidian, 
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and as such is better suited for production of prismatic blades.
133134
 
Prismatic blades are made by creating and grinding the bases of the obsidian core, 
and occasionally other stones, then using a tool to apply large amounts of pressure to the 
edges of the base of the core.  This is an advanced form of knapping known as pressure 
flaking.  The results of this are long thin slivers of obsidian, or prismatic blades, which 
have incredibly sharp edges.  One obsidian core could produce up to 200 prismatic 
blades, which could vary in length with some examples longer than 23 cm.  These blades 
could then be worked into a variety of tools and weapons.  The production of prismatic 
blades dates back to the archaic period, approximately 4000 BCE.  However, it is not 
until the early formative period, an archeological period from 2000 – 700 BCE, that 
obsidian prismatic blades were traded all over Mesoamerica.
135
  Common household 
items made from prismatic blades include knives, razors, and blades for sickles.
136
 
Mesoamerican weapons made from obsidian included the famous maquahuitl, a 
malicious looking slender cricket paddle fringed with prismatic blades on its two edges.  
The maquahuitl was constructed from hard wood to which were glued the prismatic 
blades in either contiguous or serrated fashion; the blades could not be removed or 
broken.  Another intimidating weapon was the tepoztopilli, a thrusting spear whose 
diamond shaped point was brimmed with prismatic blades.  See fig. 7.  The weapons date 
back to the Olmecs, 1200-800 BCE, and were used as far south as the Yucatan Peninsula.  
Unfortunately, the only extant copies of a maquahuitl and tepoztopilli were destroyed in 
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the fire of the Royal Armory of Madrid in 1884.
137
  Bernal Diaz del Castillo describes the 
“arsenals” of Montezuma where he mentions both the maquahuitl and the tepoztopilli: 
These arms consisted in shields of different sizes, sabres, and a species of 
broadsword [maquahuitl], which is wielded with both hands, the edge 
furnished with flint stones, so extremely sharp that they cut much better 
than our Spanish swords: further, lances [tepoztopilli] of greater length 
than ours, with spikes at their end, full one fathom in length, likewise 
furnished with several sharp flint stones. The pikes are so very sharp and 
hard that they will pierce the strongest shield, and cut like a razor; so that 
the Mexicans even shave themselves with these stones.
138
 
 
It is unclear what is meant by “sabre” and “pikes” if they other kinds of maquahuitl and 
tepoztopilli, or perhaps these words were poorly translated.  There were two forms of the 
maquahuitl, a one-handed and two-handed variety, which might account for the “sabre” 
and “broadsword” confusion.  The sword-like maquahuitl was occasionally pointed and 
was meant primarily to be a one or two-handed slashing weapon.  The pike might be 
another kind of tepoztopilli; the one destroyed in the fire was drawn and looks very 
different from other depictions of tepoztopilli. See fig. 9.  The tepoztopilli was used to 
slash and thrust, and its prismatic blades were incredibly effective.
139
  Bernal Diaz del 
Castillo personally attested to their effectiveness saying, “I myself received a heavy 
thrust from a lance, which completely pierced my armour, and I should certainly have 
lost my life on the spot if my cuirass had not been strongly quilted with cotton.”140  
The maquahuitl and tepoztopilli were developed to take advantage of the 
incredible sharpness of obsidian.  To use these weapons effectively required intensive 
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training, especially the maquahuitl.  Therefore, the weapons are associated with the 
nobility who could afford training.  Distance weapons such as the bow and arrow and the 
sling were associated with commoners.  The battle tactics of Mesoamericans were highly 
organized and viewed through a ritual lens.  Captives would be taken in warfare to be 
ritually slain for the gods.
141
 
One type of sacrifice was known as tlahuahuanaliztli, “gladiatorial sacrifice,” is a 
form of sacrifice meant for enemy warriors who were captured early in battle.
142
  In a 
gladiatorial sacrifice the victim would be placed on a raised stone platform to which his 
waist was tethered. See fig. 6.  He was also given “a war club [maquahuitl] decked with 
feathers, not set with obsidian blades.”143  Giving the victim a weapon without obsidian 
was essentially neutering him.  His ineffective weaponry was in stark contrast to the 
warriors fighting him who not only wielded weapons with obsidian, but also performed 
ritual dances in which they raised “their obsidian-bladed clubs in dedication to the sun.”  
The Mexica warriors would then stand below the captive and attack him.  The Mexica 
warrior did not want to kill him quickly, but slowly slice him with their obsidian sided 
weapons.  The act was known as “striping” and was meant to lace the body with blood as 
well as display the swordsmanship of the warrior.  Once the victim collapsed of blood 
loss, his heart was excised, his skin was flayed, and the warrior wore the “striped” flesh 
of his victim for a full month of their calendar, or twenty days.
144
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When Mesoamericans excised hearts, they used a sacrificial knife known as a 
tecpatl.  The tecpatl is the namesake of the minor Mesoamerican deity Tecpatl.  Artworks 
of Tecpatl are knapped flint blades inlaid with white flint teeth and sclera and a black 
obsidian pupil See fig. 10.1.
145
  It is not exactly clear whether or not obsidian was also a 
material used for sacrificial knives.  Scholar Guilhem Olivier postulates that both 
obsidian and flint are integral in sacrifice, but in different ways.  Obsidian to him is 
reserved for self-sacrifice, such as bloodletting, and flint is for the excision of hearts.  
This is because obsidian is associated with atonement and divination and flint is 
associated with the sky and its physical ability to spark and make fire.
146
 
The few extant examples of sacrificial knives with their original handles have flint 
blades.  The handles are commonly depicted as a god or warrior.  One existing example 
of a sacrificial knife’s handle depicts the sun god Tonatiuh; his hands are portrayed as 
holding the flint blade.  There is also a depiction of the xiuhcoatl, the fire serpent atlatl 
associated with Huitzilopochtli, the Mexica’s main god.147 See fig. 11.2.  As mentioned, 
Huitzilopochtli became a god of central importance to the Mexica who essentially 
replaced Tonatiuh.  Huitzilopochtli became the warrior sun god demanding hearts from 
victims, and this knife handle depicts this the merging of Tonatiuh with Huitzilopochtli 
represented by the iconic weapon, the xiuhcoatl.  The knife’s original blade was 
unfortunately lost and contemporarily replaced with a flint blade, so it is difficult to draw 
further conclusions about this particular artifact. 
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Other handles have been found that are more innately adorned in mosaics and are 
actually thought to be offerings rather than actual knives used for sacrifice.  This is 
because plain handled, non-mosaic, knives have been found with victims, while the more 
ornate handles were discovered in “offering caches.”  One such example of an ornate 
handle is of an eagle warrior, who traditionally was part of a warrior class among the 
Mexica. See fig. 11.1.  This particular eagle warrior is holding a white chalcedony 
knapped blade.
148
  The plain sacrificial knife of Tonatiuh would physically connect its 
user to the gods themselves, who through the priests guiding hands would slice open a 
captive’s abdomen in order to excise his or her heart.  The ornate knife of an eagle 
warrior would represent the warrior, through whose bravery in war the captive was taken.  
Perhaps as an offering it could potentially be the opposite metaphysical link of the 
Tonatiuh sacrificial knife.  The ornate knife would connect the warrior to the gods by 
representing the warrior holding the white chalcedony blade as an inverse to a god 
holding a black obsidian blade.  However, these are merely hypothetical meanings of the 
eagle warrior effigy knife, since there is no real way to confirm any meaning. 
Tezcatlipoca is the god associated with developing the act of heart excision.
149
 As 
mentioned earlier Tezcatlipoca has a close association to Huitzilopochtli.  Tezcatlipoca 
was often associated with obsidian, partly from his being the black Tezcatlipoca, the 
obsidian mirror attached to his foot, his obsidian sandals, and even some obsidian statues 
of him.  The color black, beyond its association to Tezcatlipoca and obsidian, is a color 
important to penance and self-sacrifice.  Priests and even occasionally commoners would 
paint themselves black with soot as a way to observe some religious practices as well as 
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to become closer with Tezcatlipoca.  Priest-historian Diego Durán mentions that there 
was a statue of Tezcatlipoca “made of a shining stone, black as jet, the same stone of 
which sharp blades and knives are fashioned.”  This is a physical tie between the Lord of 
the Smoking Mirror and obsidian. Another tie was the obsidian mirror, which is 
associated with divinatory practices; polished obsidian is remarkably reflective. The 
“smoking” aspect of the mirror is likely alluding to ways in which the black surface 
obfuscates the reflection.  The Nahuatl word for one of these mirrors is tezcatl, which 
shows a linguistic link to Tezcatlipoca. The obsidian mirror also was a way for 
Tezcatlipoca to see people as well as for a person to catch a glimpse of the god.  
Furthermore, the mirror was given to the Mexica king, and he could reportedly see the 
commoners while they only saw their own reflection.
150
 
 Lapidaries comprised a very important artisanal class in Mesoamerica and to the 
Mexica.  Lapidaries had their own four gods that “they attributed the art [of the lapidary]. 
Their creations were lip pendants, lip plugs, and ear plugs, ear plugs of obsidian, rock 
crystal, and amber; white ear plugs; and all manner of necklaces,” and any other precious 
stone jewelries were considered “their creation, their invention.”151  See fig. 10.2 and 
10.3. These four gods were Chiconaui itzcuintli, Naualpilli, Macuilcalli, and Cinteotl, and 
once a year the lapidaries would have one person represent each of the gods and sacrifice 
them in an act of veneration.
152
   
A lapidary used a variety of stones in his craft – from rock crystal, to jade, to 
turquoise, to obsidian – but particular focus will be given to the large number of craft 
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items created from obsidian.
 153 
Ear spools, a type of earplugs that resemble spools for 
thread, are incredibly thin and delicate and require great expertise to fabricate.
154
  In the 
market place there were sellers who sold finished necklaces, which were of “[worked] 
obsidian, of rock crystal, of amethyst, of amber, of black mirror-stone,” obsidian mirror.  
The sources are not clear if the seller was in fact the lapidary or just a dealer.  But there 
were specialized sellers of obsidian and pyrite mirrors who are described in the 
Florentine Codex as “the mirror-stone maker [is] a lapidary.”155  See fig. 5. 
Lapidaries were fulltime specialists with their own hereditary class who often 
made goods directly for nobles or priests.  Nobles either consumed these goods for 
themselves, using them to display their status and wealth, or they were given as gifts for 
other nobles in order to facilitate and strengthen social and political relations.  Priests 
often used luxury goods in offerings to gods and would bury them in offering caches.  
Priests also bought many mosaic works for ceremonial displays. They were often made of 
turquoise, shells, and obsidian, which held special religious significance.  Commoners 
were excluded from purchasing some goods, but there were some items that they could 
purchase if they could afford to do so.
 156
  Only nobles were allowed to wear lip plugs, 
ear spools, and nose plugs of precious materials, gold or stone; commoners who were 
successful warriors were allowed to wear these items, but they had to be made of wood or 
bone.
157
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 The production of specialized products, which included those of lapidaries, 
became increasingly centralized to the city of Tenochtitlan while many of the 
surrounding subjugated areas focused more on agriculture.  However, one location that 
also intensified its production of luxury items was the city-state of Otumba.  Otumba 
produced various specialty items including textiles, pottery, and lapidary, but again I will 
focus on its obsidian production.  Otumba is located near a gray obsidian source, but the 
majority of the waste and finished obsidian products found there were that from the 
higher quality Pachuca obsidian, which has a green coloring.  Lapidaries from Otumba 
would use cores left over from prismatic blade production.  These goods were created for 
various levels of “local, regional, and extra-regional elites,” and the objects most 
commonly exported were ear spools and labrets.
158
  
 Lapidaries’ products were so important to the Mexica that they were able to hold  
influence expansion of the Empire.  Montezuma II expanded south to conquer the city-
states of Tototepec and Quetzaltepec.  According to Diego Durán,  
“the lapidaries of the city of Tenochtitlan, of Tlatelolco, and of other cities 
heard that in the province of Tototepec and Quetzaltepec there existed a 
type of sand that was good for working stones, together with emery to 
clean them and polish them until they became bright and shining.  The 
stone workers told King Motecuhzoma about this and explained the 
difficulties in and obtaining the sand and emery from that province and the 
high prices for that were asked.  Motecuhzoma, after consulting with his 
council, decided to send envoys to Tototepec and Quetzaltepec to ask as a 
favor that this sand be sent to his master lapidaries.”159 
 
Montezuma conquered the two city-states solely to support the craft specialists of the 
Empire, specifically those of Tenochtitlan.  This demonstrates how important the 
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lapidaries’ crafts were to a society heavily focused on the artisanal works to display status 
and honor their gods.   
 As can be seen, luxury goods made of obsidian were highly valued and even 
though they were made of a common material, they were regarded just as highly as those 
made of jade or gold.  Yet the lapidary crafts were only minor consumers of obsidian.  It 
is important to examine the daily usage and ubiquity of obsidian.  Otumba, besides 
exporting luxury items of obsidian, also exported prismatic blades, and it was the 
remaining cores from prismatic blade production that were then used for luxury craft 
production.
160
  See fig. 8. These finished and semi-finished goods were traded all over the 
empire. 
Obsidian played a tremendous role in local and long distance commerce.  As seen 
in Otumba, despite being near its own obsidian source, it used the superior Pachuca 
obsidian.  Other towns, near their own deposits of obsidian, also opted for Pachuca 
obsidian even for simple domestic tools; 90% of the obsidian artifacts found in Nahuatl 
sites were of Pachuca obsidian.  Under Mexica control, Pachuca obsidian was traded all 
over Mesoamerica and even as far as the Yucatan peninsula.  The stone was even traded 
into the Tarascan Empire, the Triple Alliance’s western enemy.  Likewise, goods entered 
the Triple Alliance’s Empire despite their hostilities; judging from archeological finds, 
merchants crossed imperial borders and traded.
 161
   
Long distance trade like this was carried out by the pochteca, professional 
merchants.  These merchants were a part of a special class and were organized in special 
guilds that only existed in twelve city-states exclusively in the Valley of Mexico, this 
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included Tenochtitlan, its sister-city Tlatelolco, and Texcoco.  The most economically 
active of all these cities were Tlatelolco, Otumba, and Xochimilco.  The pochteca would 
go on month long trading trips with expert merchants, novices, and porters; all of whom 
were expert soldiers armed to defend themselves if necessary.  On these trips the 
pochteca would trade state goods as well as their own goods.  From these merchants 
many luxury items came to Tenochtitlan in response to the demand of the nobility.  The 
pochteca carried only the most expensive and lightest of luxury goods to maximize their 
energy expenditure and profits. Pachuca obsidian was among these items.
162
 
Pachuca obsidian had been extensively used by various civilizations such as those 
of the city-states of Teotihuacan and Tula, but it was never so exhaustively used as by the 
Triple Alliance.  During previous civilizations, part-time specialists, who were also 
farmers in the local area, did the extraction and knapping of the green obsidian of 
Pachuca.  However, the Triple Alliance turned part-time labor into full-time work.  The 
highly organized operation had the workers in a sort of guild.  The work was done in 
phases rather than one or a few people finding the cores of obsidian and then knapping 
them.  The labor was not paid, but was part of the tribute demand that Pachuca owed the 
Alliance.  Despite the distance from Tenochtitlan, 70 km, it was still the most important 
source of obsidian for the Alliance, and its quality outweighed the use of closer lower 
quality obsidian.
163
 
Laborers needed to find the deposits then tunnel them out to remove them.  This 
involved creating tunnels sometimes 50 m in depth.  Once excavated, the workers of 
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Pachuca would create uniform cores and blanks, which could then be fabricated into 
various items.  Large cores could be used in prismatic blade production or for large 
religious items such as vessels.  Smaller blanks could be knapped into bifacial knives or 
arrowheads.  It should be noted that blanks were ten times heavier than the tools 
constructed from them.  Depleted cores, as mentioned, were then used to produce various 
luxury items. The mines had temporary houses built around them, which archaeologists 
Alejandro Pastrana and Silvia Domínguez believe were moved when needed to begin 
new mineshafts.  These settlements were supported with food and tools brought in from 
an outside source.  Just as the blanks and cores moved along established trade routes 
within the empire, so did the food and tool supply for the settlements.  The trade of 
blanks and cores supplied the craft centers of Tenochtitlan, Tlatelolco, Texcoco, and 
Otumba as well as other areas.  Controlling and exploiting this Pachuca was of both 
strategic and economic importance to the Triple Alliance as its obsidian made their 
weapons and tools as well supplied the growing market for status and religious items.
164
  
Perhaps the place where all of the forms of obsidian met was in the market place.  
Here lapidaries sold their goods, and porters carried the merchants’ finished and 
unfinished obsidian goods.  The obsidian seller, itznamacac, is described in the 
Florentine Codex as actively making obsidian tools and prismatic blades for his 
customers: 
“The obsidian seller is one who, [with] a staff with a crosspiece, forces off 
[blades; he is] one who forces off [blades], who forces off obsidian blades.  
He forces off obsidian blades, he breaks off blades.  He sells obsidian, 
obsidian razors, blades, single-edged knives, doubled edged knives, 
unworked obsidian, scraping stones, V-shaped [pieces].”165 
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It was here in the market place that a chinampa farmer could buy prismatic obsidian 
blades for a new sickle, a nobleman could purchase ear spools as a gift for a colleague, 
and a priest could buy a knife for bloodletting.  Obsidian was used in almost every part of 
daily life and the tight control of obsidian was important to support the increasing 
demand of obsidian as the population of all classes grew.  The Triple Alliance increased 
both the extraction of obsidian as well as its own borders to keep prices and materials 
cheap for knappers, artisans, and consumers.  Obsidian’s importance was, more than a 
physical material, but also a way to connect with the gods.  In fact, after the conquest, 
obsidian would be used in religious iconography such as atrial crosses.
166
 
 Beyond Saunders claim of the metaphysical and spiritual link to obsidian 
stemming from the latent development of metallurgy, obsidian weaponry was developed 
and viewed as a part of a complex relationship to nobility, who were the few people that 
were taught to use such weapons.  Nobility also were the few people who were allowed 
to wear obsidian lip, nose, and earplugs.  Obsidian’s physical qualities might have also 
been contributing factors in the ways in which metals developed in Mesoamerica.  
Obsidian, unlike metals, once mined is immediately ready to be worked.  Where as the 
only metal that this can also be done with is telluric copper, which is a copper occurring 
in a natural form that can be cold worked without smelting.  Yet copper is a duller and 
softer material than obsidian.   
Obsidian’s sharpness had been exploited for centuries as past civilizations 
developed advanced weaponry based around techniques to exploit this sharpness.  
Furthermore, the flowery wars further ingrained these weapons and style of ritual 
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fighting.  These wars were viewed in religious terms with the most skilled warriors 
pairing off fighting with their obsidian weapons and displaying their swordsmanship by 
disabling one another in an attempt to capture and sacrifice the opponent.  This style of 
fighting is the clearest representation of the Mesoamerican view of war as a sacred duel 
between equally strong forces to determine whose gods were more powerful and to 
provide sacrifices to that god.
167
  Therefore, obsidian was the material means to prove 
oneself and one’s god as the best. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Mexican Metallurgy 
“Thus I make things beautiful; thus I make things give off rays” 
– Florentine Codex168 
 
Metallurgy, traditionally, filled two roles: utilitarian and ornamental.  Early 
utilitarian developments in metallurgy were in one of three areas: weaponry, transport, 
and agricultural tools.  Metallurgy for ornamental use was originally relegated to jewelry 
and status items.  As I have shown in the previous chapter, obsidian filled both of these 
roles in Mesoamerica.  To understand the use of metals in Mesoamerica I will first 
examine the origins of metallurgy in the old world. While the cultural motivations that 
spurred this branch of technology have never truly been investigated, the technological 
advances in metallurgy often had clear new uses – harder metals held sharper stronger 
edges that were used in weaponry, transport, and agricultural tools.  Next I will examine 
the origin of metallurgy in the Americas, the Andes.  Finally, I will examine metallurgy 
in Mesoamerica, and how it arrived via cultural diffusion from modern Ecuador to the 
Pacific coast of Mesoamerica circa 650 CE.
 169
 
The origins and notable advancements between the various metal ages in the old 
world all occurred in the same area, Southwestern Eurasia.  The earliest known examples 
of true copper smelting comes from Tepe Yahya, Iran.  These tools date to approximately 
3800 BCE and ushered in the chalcolithic, or copper, age.
170
  From here true bronzes, 
bronze made with tin and copper rather than arsenic (like alloys seen today), stem from 
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Mesopotamia.  The first known appearance of bronze was an axe head found in a grave 
and dated approximately to 2800 BCE, but it is possibly even older.
171
   
 Next iron comes into play, possibly created as a waste product of copper smelters 
who realized the iron oxides added as a flux, meant to help separate copper from 
impurities, were producing a malleable new metal along with the slag at the bottoms of 
their furnaces.  Actual ironworking does not occur until a little after 1,500 BCE, in the 
Anatolian-Iranian region.  Originally iron was used for small pieces of jewelry, but when 
ironworking techniques improved the metals were immediately applied to the 
manufacturing of blades.  The Eurasian metallurgic tradition developed harder and 
stronger metals that could hold an edge better and were fracture resistant in combat.  For 
example, if an iron sword was swung and hit a shield it would not break, which was one 
of the great advantages of iron weapons over those of bronze.
172
   
Archaeologists assume that the driving force for the advancement of metals was 
the perpetual arms race of weapon against armor, piercing versus protection. Next came 
metal use in transportation and, later, in agriculture.
173
   That being said, the cultural 
importance of those metals are relatively unstudied and need more scholarly attention.  
According to sources, there seems to be an implicit assumption that copper, bronze, and 
iron had largely utilitarian values.  This, however, is not the case for the Americas. 
Anthropologist Heather Lechtman has made important contributions in understanding the 
cultural values towards metallurgy in the Andes.  Even though metallurgy had different 
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values in Mesoamerica, the Andes is where the technology originated and where the first 
cultural values in the Americas towards it were formed.  
Lecthman not only explores how metallurgy developed but also why it developed.  
Andean cultures valued gold and silver as holy materials, each seen, respectively, as the 
“‘sweat of the sun’” and the “‘tears of the moon.’”  Andean metallurgists had a unique 
method of making and casting gold and silver objects that had only coatings of the 
precious metals, but this should not be confused with gilding.  Copper would be mixed 
with a small amount of gold or silver during the smelting process, for example a four to 
one ratio.  This would create a homogeneous mixture of the metals, and then 
metallurgists would treat the surface to remove the copper and create a gold or silver 
surface.  Lechtman stresses that this was done not solely for the stronger physical 
properties of the alloys, but also for the knowledge that the prized metal was present 
throughout the material.  Although this mixture made the material easier to cast and 
work, Lechtman believes it was the knowledge that the precious metal was present 
throughout the amalgam was the leading factor in the development of this method.
174
 
Lechtman points to three factors that were detrimental to the advancement of 
metallurgy in the Andes: warfare, transportation, and agriculture.  Hand to hand combat 
in the Andes focused on the crushing power of blunt maces.  Maces were often in the 
shape of stars and made of stone or bronze.  The hardest defense against the mace was a 
small wooden shield; otherwise, the mace came against tightly woven cloth armor.  
Consequently, the ability of a metal to hold an edge or to be resilient against blows was 
not a deciding factor in developing a fitting metal.  In contrast, in Mesoamerica the 
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opposite was true for their most valued weapons.  They developed weapons that had 
extremely sharp cutting edges.   
As mentioned, obsidian is the sharpest material in the world, and it was this 
physical quality that drove technology in Mesoamerican warfare.  An obsidian blade 
could break if a maquahuitl were to strike another maquahuitl; otherwise, it would come 
against cotton armor or wooden shields, which did not seem to affect the blades. A 
nobleman in warfare showed his majesty by successfully crippling a warrior and then, 
displaying his swordsmanship, delicately slicing an opposing warrior until he collapsed, 
and then his heart would be excised.  The most successful warrior was, in fact, not the 
deadliest on the battlefield, but rather the one capable of crippling and capturing the most 
enemies so that they could be sacrificed later.  Such a victorious warrior could then 
display his success by being granted privileges of dress.
175
   
This style of combat, based around the sharp quality of obsidian, was long 
embedded in Mesoamerican warfare.  In fact, I postulate that because this style of warfare 
was so embedded in the culture that Mesoamericans were likely resistant to replacement 
of obsidian weapons with metal ones.  Without another culture introducing iron or steel 
technology, Mesoamericans could not develop iron weapons on their own, which, while 
duller, had the benefit of durability over the delicate obsidian blades.  Metallurgy must be 
developed in stages, unless the technology was passed through cultural diffusion.  The 
Americas would have had to develop metallurgy as was done in the old world with the 
chalcolithic, bronze, and iron ages.  This would mean that the Mesoamericans would 
have to undergo duller weaponry, which would clash with ingrained cultural views and 
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battle tactics.  Battle tactics of the Mexica and their neighbors will be discussed in depth 
in the following chapter on the Conquest of Mexico. 
As for transportation and the invention of the wheel, Stuart Piggott, an 
archeologist, offers one hypothesis for its creation by examining the factors for the 
invention of the wheel.  The criteria necessary for wheel development appears to have 
emerged in areas of relatively flat and firm terrain, along with suitable timber, and 
domesticated animals “stronger than man.”176  The wheel, which also benefited from 
advances in metallurgy, would have little use in the environment of the Andes with its 
massive mountainous and rocky terrain and lack of strong animals.  In fact, the strongest 
animal able to pull a cart was the llama, and adult llama could carry no more than sixty 
pounds.
 177
  The Valley of Mexico is in an even worse position with its own mountainous 
terrain, but only having the dog as the largest domesticated animal.
178
 
As for fauna, Piggott sites the domestication of cattle specifically oxen, castrated 
bulls, as the solution – domesticated 6000 to 5000 BCE? about 2,000 years earlier than 
the invention of the wheel.  Additionally, and perhaps more interestingly, he notes that 
the first communities to utilize the wheel “were among the first to possess stone axes and 
adzes and, soon thereafter, copper and bronze tools suitable for elaborate carpentry.”  It 
seems that metallurgy is not only important to actually helping to construct lighter and 
stronger frames and wheels, but also were important in the fabrication of carts and 
wagons.  Despite the lack of suitable fauna, Mesoamerica did in fact invent the wheel as 
early as 1000 BCE by the Olmecs.   However, due to their boggy coastal surroundings 
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they lacked the suitable roadbeds for wooden wheels, and their use was reserved only as 
the wheels of clay toys.  The Olmecs used canoes for most of their transportation needs, 
and men could pull skids effectively for their more difficult tasks.
179
  Lechtman places 
agriculture in a close third as an impetus for metallurgy, but again it is of little 
significance for its development in Mesoamerica.  As mentioned in the agricultural 
section, Mesoamericans developed a form of intercropping built around the digging stick 
and seeds were planted individually, often in mounds.  This system is incompatible with 
the plow, and while metallurgy helps with a digging stick, it does not have the same 
incentive for develop as a metal plow would.  Plow agriculture is meant to slice into the 
land and churn soil.  Whereas, Mesoamerican agriculture was designed to be self-
sufficient, with the plants mimicking natural cycles.  The only agricultural tool that 
received a significant advantage from metallurgy was the blade of a hoe, but no 
significant advances came from it.  As with transport, perhaps the largest hindrance to 
metallurgy was the lack of domesticated animals.  That is while there are examples of the 
man pulled plows in the old world, there is less motivation to form this technology 
without an animal to pull it, similar to conundrum of the cart.
180
 
Mesoamerica followed in the Andean footsteps of having metals that mimic the 
quality of precious metals in color; however, the advances in Mesoamerica did so by 
unique techniques.  To understand why these techniques developed , one must first 
investigate how Mesoamericans, specifically the Nahuas, viewed metals. To the Nahuas, 
gold and silver were the excrement, specifically diarrhea from the Sun.  The word for 
gold derives “from [the fact that] sometimes, in some places, there appears in the dawn 
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something like a bit of diarrhea.  They named it ‘the excrement of the sun’; it was very 
yellow, very wonderful, resting like an ember, like molten gold.”181  The Nahuatl word 
for gold is cuztic teocuitlatl, which translates literally to “‘yellow divine excretions’” and 
the word for silver is iztac teocuitatl, which translates literally to “‘white divine 
excretions.’”182  Thus the word that comes before teocuitatl, cuztic or iztac, determines to 
which substance it is referring.   
Archaeologist Dorothy Hosler has interpreted silver as being the excrement of the 
moon; however, in the Florentine Codex silver is listed in the section on gold in the 
chapter that “telleth of all the metals in the earth.” In the gold section, gold is listed as 
“the yellow” and silver as the “the white”; the Nahuas only make the distinction in color, 
but they do not do the same for the other properties of the two metals.
183
  It seems that the 
Nahuas did not make the distinction of them being two separate metals, but only a 
variation of the same metal.  The Nahuatl word for mica is metzcuitlatl, which comes 
from the words meztli meaning moon and cuitatl meaning excrement.  Nahuas believed 
that mica was the excrement of the moon, not silver.  They also seem to have considered 
that mica was a metal, since it was placed in the same metal section in the Florentine 
Codex as gold.  However, both gold and silver were sacred, even the words for them 
convey this meaning, and like the Andean cultures they sought to mimic the visual 
properties of precious metals in their metallurgic technologies. 
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Neither the Mexica nor any other Nahua group were premier metal smiths in 
Mesoamerica; the Tarascans were.
184
  The Tarascan state is situated on the western coast 
of Mexico, and was on the northwest border of the Triple Alliance’s Empire.  The 
Tarascans were fierce enemies of the Mexica; the Tarascan city of Tzintzuntzan was the 
Carthage to the Mexica’s Rome, Tenochtitlan.185  The Tarascans were the cultural 
inheritors of the copper and bronze metallurgists.  The first Mesoamerican smithies began 
smelting copper around 650 CE; they learned copper-smelting techniques from the 
peoples of what is now Ecuador.  Traders from Ecuador made balsa rafts and travelled 
along the western side of Central America, and Western Mexico was an important stop.  
Western Mexico was the only place that spondylus oyster grows; the shells of this 
particular spiny bivalve were highly prized in Ecuador.  Judging from the artifacts found 
in both Western Mexico and Ecuador, it appears that the copper objects were traded and 
then the skills of metallurgy were learned by cultural diffusion.  The budding 
coppersmiths in Mexica mimicked the goods received through trade with Ecuadorians, 
and made similar but distinctly Mesoamerican second-generation items.  Meaning that 
they had unique chemical properties that occurred from using local copper sources .
186
 
Bronze and coppersmiths were primarily focused on the colors of the metal items 
they made because they were trying to replicate gold and silver colors.  This was 
achieved through bronzes that used levels of tin or arsenic in higher than necessary 
levels, which would change the color of the resulting bronzes; typically metalworkers 
used somewhere around between five and twenty percent of the alloying metals.  The 
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effect, depending on the increasing concentration, would change from red to gold to 
silver.  There are a smaller number of utilitarian objects that used lower levels of arsenic 
or tin that created strong bronzes, but did not alter color. Because the finds of utilitarian 
objects to those of ceremonial or status objects are much smaller it seems that this was 
not the focus of metal development.
187
 
The main focus of metallurgy in Mesoamerica was the production of colored, well 
sounding bells.  Even though the Tarascans were the predominant metal workers, their 
techniques were also used in many areas that the Mexica controlled.  These two 
kingdoms had very similar religious and cultural practices, even overlapping gods – 
Tlaloc, Xipe Totec, and Quetzalcoatl.  And in both societies bells were used for 
ceremonial practices, protection in war, and status among the upper class.
188189
 
Bells were used in various religious activities with the gods, Tlaloc (the god of 
rain), Xipe Totec (the god of agriculture and goldsmiths), Quetzalcoatl (the god of wind 
and knowledge), Huitzilopochtli (the god of war, the Mexica, and the sun) are among a 
few gods whose rituals are characterized with bells.
190
  For the Mexica, bells, 
counterintuitively, provided protection in warfare.  This practice stemmed from the myth 
in which Huitzilopochtli’s brothers wore bells when they went to war against him and 
were quickly slaughtered.  Perhaps it was a way of mimicking Huitzilopochtli who right 
before the battle “just then was born” and only had a shield and magical atlatl.191  After 
slaying his brothers, he “he took their finery” and he “appropriated them” and 
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“incorporated them into his own destiny” making them apart of his own “insignia.” 
Perhaps warriors were paying more reverence to Huitzilopochtli’s accomplishments than 
wearing them as protection.
192
 
While bells were an important focus of Mesoamerican metallurgy and were often 
made of bronze, they were meant to mimic gold and silver, and they are actual examples 
of gold and silversmithing.  The making of bronze bells was the specialty of Western 
Mexico; however, the Mexica were adept gold and silversmiths.  Perhaps their skill came 
from immigrant Mixtecs, an ethnic group from southwest Mexico, but, nevertheless, 
Tenochtitlan had adroit smiths.  They used the lost wax method to cast lip, nose, and 
earplugs along with bells, pendants, and many other kinds of jewelry.  Like the lapidaries, 
smiths were organized into their own class-like structure of the calpulli, and also like 
lapidaries, much of their work was made directly for nobles because only the nobility was 
allowed to wear gold or silver ornaments.
193
  
So as we’ve seen, metal was not the material for tools or warfare, which perhaps 
has led to the incorrect belief that the Mexica were still in the Stone Age.  The Mexica 
were in fact in the “Bronze Age.”  However, their “Bronze Age” is dissimilar to the 
Eurasian Bronze Age.  In contrast to Eurasia, the Mexica, and many other 
Mesoamericans, used obsidian for their tools.  In fact it has been so commonly used that 
it has been known as the “steel of Mesoamerica.”  However, obsidian was much more 
than a utilitarian material.  Obsidian held important prominence in the ranking of social 
status; it was associated with gods; and it was the material that used in sacrifice, the 
ultimate tribute to the gods.  Having examined the technologies and advances of 
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Mesoamerica, and the Mexica in particular, the next chapter will explore how these 
cultural and environmental impacts on technology and society played out in the contact 
between the Old and New Worlds. 
 
 
 
  
 79 
Chapter Five 
 
New Arrivals 
“‘Are we among enemies?’” – Codex Aubin194 
 
In this chapter I will examine the contact between Europeans and the Triple 
Alliance, and Cortés’ travel to and expulsion from Tenochtitlan.  I have relied on Hugh 
Thomas’ narrative account of the conquest for many of the details because of his 
thoroughness; I have struggled to find another scholarly account that examines the 
Conquest in such detail.  While Thomas’ account is amazingly thorough and a pleasure to 
read, he relies mainly on Spanish sources and is writing from their perspective.  This is 
partially from the paucity of Mexica sources about the conquest compared to the 
Spaniards. However, my work is an attempt to understand the events from an indigenous 
standpoint, consequently, I also draw on insights of the Conquest from Inga Clendinnen 
and Camilla Townsend. 
On April 20, 1519 Hernán Cortés landed off the shore of what is today, Veracruz.  
He had three distinct advantages: advanced technology, diseases, and two interpreters, 
Gerónimo de Aguilar and Malintzin.  (Cortés had other interpreters, but they were largely 
ineffective; I will discuss them in more detail later.)  Aguilar was a Spaniard enslaved by 
the Chontal Maya for eight years after he had the misfortune of being shipwrecked off the 
coast of the Yucatán.  Malintzin was an indigenous woman, originally a Southern Nahua, 
who also was a slave to the Chontal Maya.  These two interpreters would translate from 
Spanish, to Chontal Mayan (a dialect of Mayan) to Nahuatl (Malintzin spoke a southern 
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dialect of Nahuatl, but could still communicate with the Mexica).
195
 Some historians 
claim that these interpreters allowed the Spaniards to triumph on August 13, 1521, when 
Cuauhtémoc, the last tlatoani of the Mexica, forcibly surrendered to Cortés. 
 Throughout my examination of the Conquest I will assess not only the previously 
three mentioned advantages of Cortés, but also the cultural misunderstandings that 
compounded one another throughout the Conquest.  I believe it was these cultural 
differences and misinterpretations that gave Cortés the largest advantage.  I will first give 
a brief account of the first half of the Conquest of Mexico.  The Conquest can be divided 
into two parts: The first half of the Conquest extends from Cortés leaving Cuba, in 
February 18,
 
1519, until the Noche Triste, his expulsion from Tenochtitlan on June 30, 
1520.  The Noche Triste is both the end of the first half and beginning of the second half 
of the Conquest of Mexico.  I make this distinction because the first half is largely devoid 
of combat. In fact, until the Noche Triste, Cortés never fought the Triple Alliance or even 
the Mexica themselves.  There are some minor skirmishes with the Tlaxcalans, the 
Massacre of Cholula, but none of these conflicts brought Cortés against an Alliance 
army.  
The first half of the Conquest is important because it marked Montezuma’s 
attempt to understand who Cortés was and what his purpose and intent was.  Montezuma 
struggled to understand who these foreign people were, what they wanted, what they 
were capable of, and whether they were friend or foe.  Cortés, arguably, was in a better 
position, his nation and people were not in any danger, and while there were certainly 
high personal risks, there was also the possibility of great rewards. He was an outsider 
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from an unknown place guided only by interpreters for his basic insight into a foreign 
culture.  Even though Cortés was hardly tactful with the foreign cultures he encountered, 
he had to only look for weaknesses in what he quickly learned was an Empire full of 
unhappy city-states.  While the Mesoamericans were more advanced than the 
Amerindians of the Caribbean, Cortés knew he had a technological military advantage.  
For the first half of the Conquest, technology was only an advantage in that it kept him 
and his men alive, rather than making the Spaniards an unstoppable force. 
The first half of the Conquest culminated in the drawing of sides, and there would 
no longer be any ambivalence about the Spaniards. The Mexica knew that the Spaniards 
were not ambassadors but solely enemies.  However, this knowledge cost the Mexica 
almost all of the political power they held over the Empire and culminated in the drawing 
of sides.  I will examine the events of Cortés’ arrival and travel to Tenochtitlan, and 
attempt to glimpse the reasons for Montezuma’s actions.   
The second half of the conquest is important in that while the Spaniards suffered a 
terrible military loss, they maintained the advantage as they were forced into indigenous 
politics.  In addition, they fought not only with European weapons, but also a European 
view of war.  This was an immense factor in the second half of the conquest; others 
included the indigenous view of weapons and combat, the effects of a smallpox out break 
shortly after the Noche Triste, and finally the way in which Cortés took advantage of the 
indirect rule of the Triple Alliance Empire. 
 On February 18,
 
1519, Hernán Cortés left Cuba with ten ships on the third 
exploration of the Yucatán with approximately 530 soldiers (thirty of whom had 
crossbows and twelve with harquebuses, a musket common of the time), sixteen horses, 
 82 
and fourteen artillery pieces.  Cortés also had with him four Indian interpreters, all given 
Spanish names – or at least nicknames, who were captured in a previous expedition to the 
Yucatán.  They were, “Old Mechor,” “little Julián,” “Pedro Barbara,” and a boy renamed 
“Francisco.”  “Old Mechor” and “little Julián” spoke Chontal Maya and some Spanish; 
Pedro Barbara spoke both Yucatec and Chontal Maya, but had a limited knowledge of 
Spanish, and “Francisco” spoke Nahuatl, but not until later in the Conquest did he learn 
enough Spanish to be useful as an interpreter.  However, all of these interpreters would 
be play only a minor role, once Cortés had Aguilar and Malintzin the other interpreters 
would not be needed.
196
   
From Cuba, Cortés headed for Cozumel, a large island off the east coast of the 
Yucatán Peninsula.  Here the locals told him that there were two Spaniards living on the 
Peninsula, and Cortés set forth to find them in hopes of having native speakers of 
Castilian. To repair a ship’s hull from rot, Cortés and crew stopped at what they called 
the “Isla de Mujeres” (the Island of Women) and sent a small crew of men to in search of 
the two Spaniards on the mainland.  Around March 12, 1519, a canoe from the mainland, 
carrying three people, approached Cortés and his men. To the Spaniards’ surprise, one 
man spoke Spanish.
197
  It was Gerónimo de Aguilar; in fact he looked so much like an 
Amerindian in appearance and dress that when “Cortés beheld the man in this attire, he, 
as all the rest of us had done, asked Tapia where the Spaniard was? When Geronimo 
heard this, he cowered down after the Indian fashion, and said: “‘I am he.’”198   
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Aguilar would constitute the first half of Cortés’ translating duo.  He was 
shipwrecked off the coast of the Yucatán in 1511 with a few other Spaniards; only he and 
Gonzalo Guerrero, a fellow crewman, had survived.  They became slaves of the Maya, 
and while Guerrero assimilated and started a family with a Mayan woman, Aguilar 
refused and remained at heart, if not in appearance, a Spaniard. Aguilar was freed when 
he had received a letter sent by Cortés’ scouting party, and, unable to convince Guerrero 
to join; he left for the coast to find salvation from his servitude. Aguilar, for much of the 
early conquest, was invaluable as an interpreter.  He was likely fluent in Chontal Mayan 
having been a slave with them for eight years; in fact, he had initially had difficulty 
speaking Spanish upon joining the expedition.
199
 
 With one half of arguably the world’s most famous translator duo, Cortés sailed 
westward hugging the coast of the Yucatán, soon to complete the other half.  Around 
March 22, 1519, Cortés arrived off the coast of the Chontal Mayan city-state Potonchan, 
in what is today part of the Mexican State of Tabasco.  Cortés landed with a few men and 
demanded provisions from the Maya of Potonchan.  It is not clear if Aguilar had at this 
point effectively replaced the original two Mayan translators, but all three were present.  
The locals were hesitant and fled to the surrounding woods.  After a day or so the Mayans 
gave Cortés some food and gold, but they claimed this was all their food and that the 
Spaniards should leave or else they would be killed by their warriors.  Cortés refused and 
demanded more supplies.  Relations soured after several days, and Cortés sent out 250 
men divided into three groups to explore the land for supplies.  Mayan warriors engaged 
one of these groups, leading to two days of skirmishes.  Finally, with sixty Spaniards 
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wounded, an estimated 200 Mayans killed, and the desertion of their translator the “Old 
Mechor,” the Mayans sued for peace.  The Spaniards were given around twenty women 
including Malintzin, the second half of the translating duo.
200
 
 Information surrounding Malintzin’s origins are foggy at best.  The only account 
of her origins comes from Bernal Diaz, who calls her, “a lady of distinction, the daughter 
of a powerful cazique [the Taino word for ruler, which the Spaniards used as a blanket 
term for chief or ruler] and a princess who had subjects of her own.” He goes on to state 
that after her father’s death, while Malintzin was just a child, she was sold into slavery, as 
her mother wanted her half-brother to inherit the land.
201
  It is impossible to know 
whether or not Malintzin’s father was a tlatoani or not, but she was from Jaltipan, a city-
state south of what is today Vera Cruz.  As a child, her age unknown to scholars, she was 
sold into slavery and ended up in Potonchan.  Scholar Anna Lanyon believes that, as she 
lived and learned Chontal Mayan, she was taught womanly duties, such as weaving, until 
the age of fourteen when she would have become a concubine.  At around the age of 
eighteen or nineteen she was given to Cortés.
202
  And, although Malintzin would learn 
enough Spanish to eventually replace Aguilar, the famous translator duo was now 
complete.   
These two translators would be the only ones that Cortés relied on for the rest of 
the conquest because of their superior quality in translating.  Aguilar was a native speaker 
of Spanish, and Malintzin was a native speaker of Nahuatl, and both learned Yucatec 
Maya fluently.  Therefore, the other indigenous translators were ineffective because 
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either they did not know Nahuatl or, in the case of “Francisco,” they did know enough 
Spanish to be useful. 
 While the two translators were incredibly important to the conquest, their 
translating abilities need to be assessed.  Malintzin and Aguilar were effective in basic 
translating, but it is unclear how effective they were at conveying ideas and cultural 
insights.  Specifically, Malintzin’s effectiveness as a cultural insider needs to be assessed.  
Malintzin, despite her royalty, was still a slave and a woman; this means that her 
understandings of political protocols and customs, which were affairs reserved to male 
nobility, would be limited.  Furthermore, it is unclear how much her royalty had helped 
her in understanding the political customs of elites, as she was only a child when she was 
sold; the exact age remains a mystery.  Therefore, it seems that her political knowledge 
and diplomatic skills would be slight.  Aguilar, being a slave to a Chontal Mayan lord, 
was no better off in understanding such procedures. Historian Inga Clendinnen believes 
this is why Cortés saw the diplomatic acts of gift giving of Montezuma as signs of 
submission rather than in the Mesoamerican tradition as a display of power because it 
was never explained to him otherwise.
203
   
Furthermore, Malintzin, being from the southern extremity of the Triple 
Alliance’s Empire, spoke a dialect of Nahuatl, which would have made the chain of 
communication between Nahuatl, Chontal Maya, and Spanish more difficult an 
endeavor.
204
  Clendinnen argues that the “daisy chain” of translation created a struggle to 
force cultural concepts through unfamiliar languages.
205
  It, therefore, seems doubtful that 
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Cortés held the upper hand by having translators; rather, it placed him on a more equal 
footing now that he could communicate with locals. Gestures between Amerindians and 
Europeans would remain difficult to grasp for both sides. 
 On 17 April 1519 Cortés and his fleet left Potonchan and arrived three days later 
off the coast of what would become modern day Veracruz; the Vera Cruz Cortés founded 
was a bit farther north than today’s.  On the day he arrived, his fleet was greeted by a 
canoe of Nahuatl speakers who historian Hugh Thomas believes not to be locals.  This is 
likely the case because the Amerindians that lived on the coast where Cortés had 
anchored were Totonacs, and while living under Mexica rule these people did not speak 
Nahuatl.
206
  It is likely Cortés’ first contact was with the watchmen whom Montezuma 
had stationed along the Gulf Coast after a Spanish ship was first spotted in 1517.
207
  
According to Durán’s History, Montezuma even had the sighting from 1517 drawn and 
recorded.
208
  It would seem that Montezuma was worried about newcomers even before 
Cortés’ arrival. 
The Totonacs treated Cortés well, and on Easter Sunday, April 24, 1519, 
emissaries of Montezuma met with Cortés.  The two explained who they were; Cortés 
claimed he was an ambassador of King Charles V of Spain.  It is dubious if they believed 
this, as both the emissaries and Montezuma already knew of the skirmishes at Potonchan.  
Either way, gifts were exchanged; the Mexica meant to show the splendor of their 
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tlatoani, but Cortés saw it only as goodwill.
209
  Cortés displayed the pinnacle of Spanish 
military might and fired his cannons.  Unsurprisingly for people who have never seen 
such a weapon, the emissaries fell to the ground in fright.  The emissaries recorded the 
number of men and “deer” (horses) through their pictographic writing system and 
returned to Tenochtitlan.
210
 
As the weeks passed, Velázquez de León and other members of the expedition 
who were allies to Diego Velázquez, the Governor of Cuba who had funded the 
expedition, wanted Cortés to return to Cuba.  In order to prevent mutiny Cortés needed to 
validate his actions.  Technically, Cortés was only under orders to explore the coast of the 
Yucatán, look for a river that could potentially lead to China or India, and search for the 
explorer Grijalva.  The latter request is particularly confusing because Grijalva was not 
lost.  The arguments for return were that Cortés had completed his contract, freed a 
Spaniard, and amassed some gold.  Furthermore, from explorations inland, the Spaniards 
encountered evidence of human sacrifice that made them reluctant to stay.  On the 7
th
 of 
June, 1519, to avoid returning to Cuba and to free himself from the contract, Cortés 
moved northward up the coast and found la Villa Rica de la Vera Cruz.
211
 La Villa Rica 
de la Vera Cruz was officially founded on June 28, 1519, while the supporters of 
Governor Velázquez were away on an expedition.  Cortés did this to exploit a loophole 
and have himself elected by his men as the town’s Chief Justice and Captain.  Thus, he 
was no longer under orders from Governor Velázquez, just King Charles V, and could 
pursue, unrestrained, a new plan to venture to Tenochtitlan.  
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All along the journey to Vera Cruz, Cortés had encountered Totonacs 
complaining of the tribute demands from the Triple Alliance; he would use this as a 
justification to make some political blunders.  While visiting a Totonac town, Cortés 
encountered Mexica bureaucrats who were collecting tribute.  He had the tax collectors 
arrested by the Totonacs, and then he secretly freed two.  He told the two that he did so to 
save their lives from the Totonacs, and that he was a friend of Montezuma and had them 
relay that message to the tlatoani himself.
212
  Perhaps Cortés thought of himself as clever 
for displaying “friendship” towards Montezuma and the tax collectors, but he 
unknowingly declared an act of war against the Triple Alliance.  Refusal to pay tribute 
was akin to a declaration of war in Mesoamerica.  According to Inga Clendinnen, after 
Cortés released the remaining tax collectors the chief of the town lied and sent Cortés and 
his men after phantom Mexica warriors in order to remain in good standing with the 
Triple Alliance.
213
   
Cultural misunderstanding continued as Cortés returned from the fruitless venture. 
The Spaniards passed through the village of Cempoallan, where the locals further assured 
the Spaniards that there was evidence of the phantom Mexica warriors. Conquistador 
Bernal Diaz claims that when they reached the town they were told that there was a 
“Mexican garrison in their township, which, however, had returned home.”214 Cortés 
perhaps feeling emboldened by the non-combat and his deep sense of religiosity preached 
conversion and had his men tear “down the idols from their pediments, broke them to 
pieces, and flung them piecemeal down the steps.” This caused a great commotion and 
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almost led to a battle as natives began to shoot arrows at the Spaniards. Ultimately the 
chieftain stopped the skirmish.
 215
  Cortés subsequently whitewashed the broken idols’ 
temple and replaced them with a cross.  Cortés’ actions, in a way, mimicked the ways 
that victory was declared in Mesoamerica.  A city-state was defeated when its temple was 
burned and idols destroyed thereby signifying that the local deities had lost.  The Mexica 
would on occasion take idols from the conquered people for themselves.
216
  Vaguely, 
Cortés had conquered Cempoallan and once again mimicked cultural cues that were 
unknown to him. 
Around August 16, 1519, Cortés set out westward with 300 conquistadors (with 
about forty crossbowman and twenty harquebusiers), fifteen horses, and three small 
cannons.  See map 8. Many of the men had donned light but tight woven cotton armor 
worn by natives.  800 Totonacs helped to carry all sorts of supplies along with the 
cannons.
217
 His plan was simple: to either “take him [Montezuma] alive in chains or 
make him subject to” Charles V of Spain.  Cortés would change his mind as he suspected 
the Mexica of treachery and wrote, “now I intended to enter his land at war doing all the 
harm I could as an enemy, though I regretted it very much, for I had always wished rather 
to be his friend and ask his advice on all things that must be done in this land.”218  This 
statement, according to Townsend, is part of Cortés’ legal rhetoric to justify his actions 
because King Charles could only gain territory if it was justifiable.
219
 
Along the way, Cortés and his men were brought through Tlaxcala.  The territory 
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that was under the control of a loose federation of small Tlaxcalan and Otomí city-states 
that was similar to the Triple Alliance.  This area is commonly referred to as Tlaxcala, 
taking its name from its dominant city-state. Cortés initially sent native emissaries to 
Tlaxcala to ask for their aid against the Triple Alliance, but they never returned.  Despite 
this, Cortés set forth, but he and his men were attacked by a large number of Tlaxcalan 
warriors, perhaps numbering in the thousands.  They killed two horses, but the Spaniards 
killed between sixteen and sixty, leading the Tlaxcalans to retreat. Over the next several 
days, as the Cempoallan guides tried to assuage the Tlaxcala to side with Cortés, the 
Spaniards fought various skirmishes with both Tlaxcalans proper and Otomí warriors.  
Montezuma had sent emissaries to the Spaniards who advised them against going to the 
city of Tlaxcala and watched the Spaniards in battle.  Cortés lost between forty-five and 
fifty-five Spaniards and at least three horses, and in one instance a horse was captured for 
sacrifice.  Cortés almost died from injuries and a subsequent fever.  This did not stop 
Cortés from burning villages and killing their inhabitants.
 220
 
On September 18, 1519, Cortés and his men peacefully entered the city of 
Tlaxcala.  They knew that if it were not for their Totonac allies, they would have been 
killed, so they must have been thankful to have new indigenous allies.  Montezuma’s 
emissary, still with Cortés, urged him not believe the Tlaxcalans, and to head to the city 
of Cholula where he would be well received.  The Tlaxcalans, in turn, told Cortés that 
this was a trap, and that the city was secretly preparing to slaughter them.  Cholula 
ambassadors came to Tlaxcala to assure Cortés that this was not the case and invited him 
to their city.  On October 12, Cortés and his expedition set out for Cholula with their new 
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Tlaxcalan allies in toe.  The Spaniards were, by all accounts, well fed; however, after a 
few days the Tlaxcalans convinced Cortés that the Cholulans had set a trap for them.  
Cortés asked to meet with the Cholulan nobles in a courtyard.  A hundred or so, unarmed, 
amassed in the courtyard, and Cortés, locking them inside, confronted them about the 
conspiracy.  They promptly confessed to it as a plot devised by the Montezuma and that 
20,000 warriors were waiting along the road to the Mexico to attack the Spaniards. Cortés 
took this as license to execute all of them and destroy the city.  Cortés estimated that 
3,000 people were killed as the Spaniards and their allies sacked the city for two days. 
Cholula was an important city sitting just outside the Valley of Mexico; it was one of the 
oldest cities with its population second only to Tenochtitlan, an estimated 180,000 
people.  3,000 people seems too small a figure for two full days of sacking.  The city was 
razed, destroying many of its hundreds of temples.
221
  
Historian Hugh Thomas insists that there were the inklings of an impending attack 
on the Spanish.
 222
 
 
This is doubtful because there was no resistance, which would be 
expected if the city were preparing for to attack.  The Mexica warriors, just like the 
resistance, never materialized.  Inga Clendinnen believes that the trap was a ruse by the 
Tlaxcalans to, with the aid of their new Spanish allies, attack an enemy city.  She also 
believes Cortés had done so to raise the morale of soldiers who had realized their 
vulnerability at the hands of Amerindians in their fights against the Tlaxcalans.
223
  She is 
likely right in both cases, and the supposed planned attack on Cortés was just as fake as 
the warriors Cortés chased after he arrested the tax collectors. 
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The emissaries of Montezuma witnessed the destruction of Cholula, and were 
forced to send a message to Montezuma asking for a meeting between him and the 
conquistador.  Despite his reservations, Montezuma could no longer delay the meeting.  
Cortés departed Cholula, and besides a Maginot Line-like defense on a trail that Cortés 
routed and a Montezuma impersonator who Cortés realized was the real tlatoani, Cortés 
was unimpeded in arriving at Tenochtitlan.  On November
 
8, 1519 Cortés and 
Montezuma met; the usual gift giving and pleasantries were exchanged. Cortés, his men, 
and allies were invited over the causeway into the city.
224
 
Later, in a famous exchange between Cortés and Montezuma, Montezuma called 
the Spaniards gods and willingly became a “vassal” to Charles V.  However, this account 
of events is hotly debated. Camilla Townsend has analyzed the writings of the native 
accounts and compared them to the Spanish accounts and has found that the reason the 
Spaniards are called gods is two fold.  First, the natives called people based on their city-
state, ethnicity, or position, had no word to call the Spaniards since their native land, 
ethnic group, and position was unknown.  Second, the word for god was not as definite as 
it is in Spanish, and had a broad connotation including demons and god-impersonator, 
such as those in ritual killings.
225
  Furthermore, it has been shown that the notion that 
Montezuma thought that Cortés was the god Quetzalcoatl returning to Mexico was a 
post-conquest construction immortalized in the Florentine Codex.
226
 Montezuma’s 
emissaries witnessed the Spaniards fight and die against Tlaxcalans, information he 
would have received.  Mortals make for weak gods.   
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The matter of accepting to be the “vassal” of Charles V is also unbelievable, and 
it appears to be a complex form of miscommunication that stemmed from the problem of 
translation. Inga Clendinnen notes that at the time there did not seem to be a translation 
of vassal because politics in Mesoamerica did not work in such a fashion.
227
 Cortés also 
misinterpreted indigenous hospitality and abused it.  Cortés receiving gifts and meeting 
with local leaders was part of his treatment as a guest of honor of the Mexica, not as a 
head of state.
228229
  Furthermore, it has been shown that had Cortés been in control during 
the entirety of his stay then he would have made his success known. Instead he did 
nothing until he heard from Narváez, and only then did he arrest Montezuma, which will 
be discussed later.
230
   
The immediate question is why had Montezuma allowed for the Spaniards to 
arrive safely at his city?  Why did he not confront them on the coast? Why did he let 
them pass through his Empire?  Inga Clendinnen cautions against reading too deeply into 
Montezuma’s actions, remarking, “Much of Montezuma’s conduct must remain 
enigmatic.”  She explains that this caution and permanent uncertainty is because all of the 
sources have a bias against him, and that none of them could accurately portray his 
thinking process for his decisions.
  
The Florentine Codex was written using native 
interviewers who, while being witnesses of the Conquest, were too young to have been in 
Montezuma’s close circle of advisors.  Diego Durán’s History goes further in 
misinterpreting, and has Montezuma immediately imprisoned by Cortés after their first 
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meeting.
231
  Spanish accounts conflict over how much power Montezuma maintained 
while captive.  It seems that Montezuma was in full control of his Empire from 
November 1519 to May 1520. Cortés claimed that Montezuma voluntarily relinquished 
the Empire to Charles V, which has been shown as legal justification for Cortés’ actions 
because Charles V could only have gained territory through just war or voluntary 
submission.  Cortés used the notion that he and his men were gods returning to take over 
the Empire as another attempt to show that Montezuma voluntarily submitted his 
Empire.
232
 
However, we can still make some basic assumptions about Montezuma and his 
actions.  While Cortés was gallivanting through Alliance territory – proselyting, forging 
relationships with natives, advancing towards Tenochtitlan, and gathering information 
along the way – Montezuma, too, was gathering intelligence.  Montezuma’s emissaries 
recorded military information about the Spaniards in their meeting, and Montezuma had 
messengers in every town Cortés and his men visited.
233
  This should not be seen as a 
surprise, as mentioned earlier, merchants’ roles in Mesoamerica included spying. 
Montezuma had ordered messengers stationed along all the roads so that he could be told 
of news without delay.
234
  In fact, after the Massacre of Cholula, Spanish notes 
accompanying the Florentine Codex indicate that these information channels were 
flooded as Montezuma’s “messengers came to tell him of them [the massacre]; the whole 
road was full of messengers.”235 
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The following are some assumptions we can make about Montezuma as a ruler.  
Montezuma was an experienced general when he was unanimously elected tlatoani; the 
reasons given was that his “advice and decisions were always correct, especially in 
matters of war.”236  His utmost concern, as shown, was gathering information as any 
experienced general and ruler, having governed for twenty-seven years, would have done.  
He had all towns, on “pain of death,” provide provisions for Cortés and his men.237  This 
is likely because Cortés had repeatedly claimed to be an ambassador with peaceful 
intentions.  Mesoamericans took the treatment of ambassadors very seriously, which 
might explain the initial kindness and provisions from Montezuma.
238
  Yet it is unlikely 
that Montezuma believed Cortés was an ambassador.  The combination of the news from 
the fighting in Potonchan, the arresting of tax collectors, the pseudo-conquest of 
Cempoallan, and the massacre at Cholula would belie Cortés’ true intentions.  
Furthermore, Cortés’ insistence on seeing Montezuma’s “face,” which could only be seen 
by his closest family members, makes for another cultural ambiguity that would be 
difficult for the ruler to interpret.  Finally, war in Mesoamerica was a sacred contest, and 
the inequality of provisions would spoil the sacred results of such a conflict.
239
  
Therefore, Montezuma likely also supplied Cortés expedition with staples during their 
stay in his land, so if there were a fight it would be a fair one.   
 The Spaniards, when they arrived off the coast, were an entirely new people and 
potential enemy.  Reports trickling in from the Yucatán, before Cortés made landfall, 
must have been unnerving, first because of the casualties of Potonchan, and second 
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because the reports’ potential unreliability and novelty.  In Cortés’ first meeting with 
Montezuma’s emissaries, he had his men in battle formation displaying their arms, the 
horses, and the cannons.  The display as a show of military force would not have been 
lost on Montezuma; however, he did not yet know of how the new weapons and soldiers 
would fare in battle.  Hugh Thomas mentions that a Mexica guide might have tricked 
Cortés expedition to Tenochtitlan by bringing the Spaniards through Tlaxcala so that they 
would be killed. The Tlaxcalans themselves remark that if Montezuma was responsible 
for sending the Spaniards through their territory he was also responsible for saving them 
from destruction.
240
   
It is possible Montezuma did this so that he could simultaneously gain important 
reconnaissance about the Spaniards as well as weaken them if not annihilate them.  
Montezuma knew the fighting abilities of Tlaxcala, and this plan would be a far better 
yardstick to judge the Spaniards by than the distant battle of Potonchan and some cannon 
shots in front of his emissaries.  While under attack by the Tlaxcalans and Otomí, 
Montezuma’s emissaries watched the Spaniards in battle.  They advised Cortés not to 
trust the Tlaxcalans.
241
  Could Montezuma’s hope of the Spaniards’ destruction have 
come unraveled? 
 Perhaps it did, and Montezuma realized the folly of his decision to have his old 
enemies battle and test the mettle of his new ones.  Montezuma, like any other Mexica, 
knew that his city’s rise to power over Azcapotzalco was one in which various powers of 
the Valley and beyond came together to end Tepanec rule.  Upon the flood of information 
about the massacre of Cholula, Montezuma must have seen the irony: By trying to have 
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his enemies eliminate each other and buy time to learn more of the Spaniards, he had 
united an ambitious and ferocious city-state with an outside power.  The significance of 
Cholula’s sacking is hard to understate, yet its impact is rarely touched on in accounts of 
the conquest.  It was the first joint conquest between Cortés and Tlaxcala.  Still, after the 
massacre and sacking of Cholula, Cortés claimed to be an ambassador only seeking 
friendship and amiability with Montezuma.  Even if Montezuma never did claim Cortés 
intentions to be otherwise, the idea that Montezuma saw Cortés as peaceful is laughable.  
The unjustified slaughter and destruction of such a large city with the aid of your bitter 
enemies is a sign of aggression that communicates itself across any cultural boundary. 
 Montezuma could not stop Cortés from coming to Tenochtitlan, and was 
presented with a dilemma of whether or not to allow him into the city.  His options for 
war were limited as the month of November was an important time for harvests, leaving 
peasants, who would constitute the majority of his army, unavailable.
242
 In addition, 
Montezuma at this point gathered enough military intelligence to know that the cost of 
fighting an open field battle against the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans would have been 
militarily and politically disastrous.  Camilla Townsend believes that had Montezuma 
fought them he would have faced major political upheaval.  There would have been a 
high amount of casualties just a causeway away from the perceived indomitable city.  
Other city-states would have seen even a victorious battle as a sign of Mexica weakness 
and seized upon it.
243
  Furthermore, had Montezuma allowed Cortés to continue to 
explore the Valley and its city-states, he would have allowed Cortés to potentially seize 
upon internal dissatisfaction with the Mexica.  Montezuma had already seen Cortés gain 
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the favor of the Tlaxcalans; the idea that he could have free rein over the Valley would 
undermine Montezuma’s actual and perceived power. 
 Cortés claims that on November 14, 1519, he placed Montezuma under arrest, 
which he justified because of an attack by the Mexica on the Totonacs and Spaniards near 
Vera Cruz.  The Totonacs had refused to pay their tribute to the Alliance, and the 
Spaniards supported the decision.  Taking the act as a sign of rebellion, a Mexica garrison 
under orders of a nobleman attacked the Totonacs.  Four Spaniards were killed, and the 
head of one was sent to Tenochtitlan.  The Mexica nobleman in charge of the province 
was subsequently executed, which upset Cacama, tlatoani of Texcoco, because of the 
growing influence of the Spaniards.  Cortés and Montezuma working together invited 
Cacama to Tenochtitlan and arrested him.  From my own research, I have not found any 
of these events mentioned in an indigenous account beyond that of the Ixtlilxochitl’s 
Historia de la Nación Chichimeca, which was written about a century after the Conquest 
as a testament to his Texcoco family’s unrewarded aid to the Spaniards in the Conquest.  
It suffers from having a known prejudice against the Mexica.
244
  As previously 
mentioned, Cortés’ claim that he had complete control until the “Noche Triste” has been 
largely repudiated.  Cortés’ political actions in his own letters were legal rhetoric to 
explain his arrest of Montezuma as justifiable.  Historian Francis Brooks believes that the 
events in fact took place closer to May, and this might have played a part in Cortés 
arresting Montezuma.  Camilla Townsend sees as a desperate gamble by Cortés to 
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maintain power after having overstayed his welcome and the arrival of Spaniards in April 
to arrest him on behalf of Governor Velázquez.
245
 
 In mid-April, 1520, Pánfilo Narváez arrived off the coast of Vera Cruz with 
around 900 men; this event made the situation more confusing for Montezuma.  
Narváez’s goal was to arrest Cortés on behalf of Velázquez and take Cortés’ place in 
Mexico.  When Narváez landed, he made good relations with the Totonacs and publicly 
denounced Cortés as a villain.  He began a relay of messengers from the coast to 
Montezuma himself.  Narváez was granted permission to come to Tenochtitlan and was 
given gifts and supplies.  Montezuma finally told Cortés about his rival, and urged Cortés 
to leave the city.
246
  Townsend argues that Cortés, desperate to maintain his position and 
avoid an uprising, had to have “a gun to Montezuma’s head” to convince the newly 
arrived Spaniards to join him.
247
   
Native unrest was beginning to be felt by Cortés with the incidence among the 
battle orchestrated with Totonacs and Cacama’s arrest.  Attempting to quell native unrest, 
Cortés arrested Montezuma. Afterward, Cortés set out for the coast in early May in order 
to defeat Narváez. How he planned to do this with only 80 or so men and some 
Tlaxcalans seems unknown.  The remaining men were left under the charge of Pedro de 
Alvarado.  Narváez was situated in Cempoallan with all his men.  Cortés sprung a 
surprise attack against Narváez on the rainy night of May 28, 1520.  Despite the disparity 
of numbers, the attack was a success, and Cortés captured Narváez, who lost an eye and 
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was slightly burned in the process.
248
  While Cortés’ fortunes improved, those of Pedro 
de Alvarado’s had soured. 
 Before Cortés had left to intercept Narváez, Montezuma had asked permission to 
hold the immensely important festival of Toxcatl.  Cortés and Alvarado when asked 
separately allowed it.  However, Alvarado panicked at the sight of the bizarre preparation 
of the festivities and had several Mexica tortured until they confessed to a plot against the 
Spaniards.  Tlaxcalan warriors further undermined his confidence.  Around May 16, 
1520, Alvarado, frightened at the sight of noblemen dancing in front of the great temple, 
had the plaza closed off, and then slaughtered a hundred or so unarmed dancers as well as 
those attending the festival.  This night would not mimic Cholula as the Mexica rose in 
arms against Alvarado and his men.  Alvarado delayed direct conflict for a few days by 
threatening to kill Montezuma.  Still, Alvarado and his men were holed up in the palace 
without food or means of escape.  With over a thousand Spaniards and at least twice as 
many Tlaxcalans, Cortés made haste to the city upon news of the uprising.  Cortés arrived 
on June 28, 1520, to a seemingly deserted Tenochtitlan; however, it became obvious after 
four days that the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans were now trapped on the island city.
249
 
 After a few days, Cortés made a last ditch effort to escape.  He forced Montezuma 
to the roof of the palace where they were staying in.  On the roof, protected by two 
Spanish soldiers, Montezuma waved his hand for his fellow Mexica to stop yelling so 
that he could speak.
250
  He told his people, “‘We are not the equals of [the Spaniards]! 
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Let [the battle] be abandoned! Let the arrow, the shield be held back!’”251  The Mexica 
shouted back that they had elected a new ruler, Cuithahuac, and fired bows and slings at 
the soon to be former tlatoani.  Montezuma was hit three times and quickly taken inside.  
Wounded, he begged the Spaniards to kill him; before Cortés fled from the palace he did 
just that.  As the Spanish and Tlaxcalans fled on the night of June 30, 1520, Montezuma 
and the noblemen who had stayed by his side were found by the vengeful Mexica, 
already stabbed to death.
252
 
 Camilla Townsend views Montezuma’s plea for peace as his insight into the 
military strength of the Spaniards, and the inevitability of the Spanish victory from his 
ability to see the “longue durée.”  This view is plausible as Montezuma’s emissaries had 
watched Spaniards in battle coupled with the knowledge of that more Spaniards had 
arrived.  Montezuma might have realized that the Spanish weaponry and style of fighting 
were superior to that of the Mexica.  He might also have known that more Spaniards 
could follow.
253
  Yet Narváez’s arrival was a strange happening that surprised Cortés who 
told Montezuma he was not to be trusted, which Narváez also told Montezuma about 
Cortés.   
I believe that Montezuma was more worried that Tenochtitlan would be the next 
Cholula.  His great city had suffered a similar slaughter, which, according to the Codex 
Aubin, Montezuma had been warned of when preparing for the festival.  His nobles told 
him they should hide weapons in case they were entrapped by the Spaniards like the 
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Cholulans, to which Montezuma responded, “‘Are we among enemies? Disregard it.’”254 
Whether or not this conversation occurred, Montezuma must have had the image of a 
burning Tenochtitlan in his mind when he addressed the warriors crowding the palace 
walls.  At this point, there were even more Spaniards and Tlaxcalans in Tenochtitlan than 
there had been in Cholula.  The fighting and the massacre were both new for the citizens 
of Tenochtitlan, who had lived in a city that stood out above all others as invulnerable.  It 
was also unheard of having elected a new tlatoani while another was still alive.
255
  
Montezuma’s death by Spanish steel was an all too fitting end for a ruler who had been 
actively attempting to consolidate his city’s control only to realize that he gave the 
Tlaxcalans, the people he had been wearing down, the allies they needed to overthrow 
their oppressor. 
Even though Cortés had been allowed to return to Tenochtitlan after Alvarado 
attacked the noblemen in the festival, there was no longer a doubt in any Mexica’s mind 
that the Spaniards were enemies.  Cortés had used his novelty to its fullest advantage, his 
actions with the Totonacs, arresting the tax collectors and whitewashing a temple, were 
forgiven.  Montezuma brushed aside Cholula’s destruction because he could not stop him 
from arriving, face him directly in battle, nor ignore Cortés’ constant insistence that he 
was an ambassador.  Montezuma had no choice but to allow him into the city because he 
allowed him unchallenged to travel through the Empire itself.  Retrospectively, it easy to 
see that he should have immediately engaged Cortés, but Montezuma was a ruler of an 
Empire who came from a culture that treated strangers kindly.  Furthermore, Cortés was 
an enigma claiming to be an ambassador.  Despite the consequences of Montezuma’s 
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decisions, it is difficult to say that they were based on naiveté or superstition.  More 
likely they were poor decisions based on novel circumstances. 
 
 
  
 104 
Chapter Six 
 
The Fall of the Mexica 
“Long live the emperor, our master! Spain forever! Tlascalla forever!”256 
 
In this chapter I will now explore the clash of indigenous culture’s technology and 
views of warfare with those of the Spaniards.  The Mexica would face many problems 
after the successful expulsion of the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans from Tenochtitlan.  Cortés 
and his army would officially merge aspirations with Tlaxcala.  The Mexica and their 
allies would be faced with new technologies, new diseases, but most importantly a 
European view of warfare.  Towards the end of the Conquest these were problems the 
Mexica would face alone; for all intents and purposes the Triple Alliance was no more by 
the time of the Siege of Tenochtitlan. The Spaniards and Tlaxcalans would replace the 
violence that the Triple Alliance used to exert control over surrounding city-states with 
their own, and, effectively, take the place of Alliance as the dominant power to ally to.  
The final military clash of these cultures would occur where they began, in Tenochtitlan. 
Leaving Montezuma and his advisors dead, Cortés and his army headed west for 
the Tacuba Causeway in an effort to make it to the western shores of Lake Texcoco.  
They left the palace at midnight on June 30, 1520; this night would be forever 
remembered as “La Noche Triste,” the sorrowful night.  The Spaniards were attacked 
throughout the city as the headed to causeway.  The causeway had been partly damaged 
and its bridges removed by the Mexica to prevent escape from the island.  The Spaniards 
were attacked on all sides as canoes moved along with the caravan of soldiers packed 
onto the causeway.  Dead bodies filled up the holes of the bridges allowing the Spanish to 
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walk across.  Before making it to Tacuba, Cortés would lose 600 of his roughly 1,200 
Spanish soldiers, thousands of Tlaxcalans, and seventy of his hundred horses.
257
   This 
was the first battle the Mexica fought against the Spaniards, and it was an incredible 
victory for them. 
The expulsion of the Spaniards and Tlaxcalans, however, had cost the Mexica 
more than just manpower and a tlatoani; it cost them their image as the dominant force in 
the region.  The Mexica in had held the overwhelming majority of power in the Triple 
Alliance, which was keeping the Empire together.  As Cortés and the Tlaxcalans retreated 
to Tlaxcala, the window for the Mexica to maintain their control closed with them.  
Mexica authority was in disarray, and it is common when a tlatoani dies that tributaries 
attempt to rebel.  Because of the events of Montezuma’s death, the temptation for city-
states to rebel would have been even stronger.  Cortés brutality toward Alliance towns 
and cities would only worsen the situation.
258
  Cortés and the Tlaxcalans attacks on 
surrounding city-states were not only playing on this weakness but also resulted in the 
new dominating force and subjugating power in the Valley.  In essence, Cortés and the 
Tlaxcalans sapped power away from the Mexica by conquering their tributaries. 
The goal of Cortés was not to crush Tenochtitlan, but to have it succumb to the 
tactic of “example-at-a-distance,” that is, the sight of the destruction of the cities 
surrounding Tenochtitlan would result in its surrender.
259
  Cortés, seeing the beauty of the 
city of Tenochtitlan, which dwarfed any Spanish city, wanted to keep it intact through a 
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siege to force submission.
260
  This would ultimately be an impossible goal; nevertheless, 
Cortés, after destroying Tenochtitlan, finally forced the city to surrender on August 13, 
1521.  This would be the culmination of different views of war and weapons, disease as 
well as the usurpation of power by Cortés and the Tlaxcalans, which disrupted the 
Empire of the Triple Alliance.  I will now briefly examine instances of how all these 
factors they affected the Conquest. 
The Mexica, along with their allies from Texcoco and Tacuba, had created a loose 
knit empire built on passive rule of conquered city-states.  Their conquests originally 
focused on the Valley of Mexico, and all of their new subjects owed tribute as an 
expression of the Alliance’s dominance.  City-states closer to the Alliance owed 
foodstuffs along with luxury items, this was especially true of cities along the southern 
stretches of Lake Texcoco as well as cities on the other side of thee southern mountains 
of the Valley.  However, the farther the cities were from the Valley the more likely that 
their tribute would be paid in luxury items or assistance in maintaining borders.  As the 
Empire expanded the nobility grew in size and wealth, and to some extent the lower 
classes did too.  Consequently, demand for luxury items also grew.  In turn, select cities 
focused on luxury craft specialists, while others turned to agriculture, and the Alliance 
turned outward for raw materials.  The pochteca, merchant class, expanded with the 
Empire to new cities and areas.  The Alliance sought to stabilize trade routes and increase 
trade among regions to promote Mexica merchants.
261
 
The control of the Alliance over tributaries was not always military; often it was 
the projection of power.  Certainly if a rebellious area rose against the Alliance and 
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refused to pay tribute, they would be attacked and subjugated.  An example of how this 
fear instilled obedience can be seen when Cortés arrested the Mexica tax collectors.  The 
Totonacs, the natives living near Vera Cruz, feared far more from a reprisal by the 
Mexica than Cortés, so they sent Cortés off against imaginary Mexica soldiers.  Yet 
Cortés’ immediate military presence began to change this view as the Totonacs sided 
with him and aided him in his original journey to Tenochtitlan and fought with him 
against the Tlaxcalans. Cortés’ military exploits would continue to damage this the image 
of the powerful Mexica.  
Another method used to maintain power by the Alliance when some territories 
were difficult to conquer was to choke them off from trade and engage them in flowery 
wars.  These tactics sought to impoverish areas and drain them of their most confident 
warriors.  The Alliance used these strategies to win wars and minimize losses because 
conquering difficult areas would be costly in terms of manpower and potentially weaken 
the image of the Alliance’s strength.  This was the fate of the Tlaxcalans, who were 
confined by the Alliance and subject to indefinite war and poverty.
 262
  That is, until the 
arrival of Cortés; the Spaniards were a volatile catalyst in this unstable system.  They had 
managed to bring a Tlaxcalan army to the heart of the Alliance, Tenochtitlan.  Despite the 
heavy losses from the Noche Triste were, at least a fifty percent casualty rate, the 
Alliance was left in disarray. 
The loss of Montezuma was disastrous for the Mexica because the election of a 
new tlatoani was usually a time of uprisings where subjugated polities took advantage of 
the change in leadership.  The unprecedented circumstances of Cuithahuac’s election, 
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Montezuma’s death, and the presence of a new power in the appearance of Cortés made 
these uprisings more likely.
263
  However, to try to consolidate his power, Cuithahuac 
followed the success of the Noche Triste by continuously attacking the Spaniards and 
Tlaxcalans on their retreat to Tlaxcala.  While Cortés’ numbers dwindled, the conflict 
came to a head at the Battle of Otumba.  Outside the city of Otumba, which was vital for 
all things obsidian, the Spaniards, exhausted from their flight, met a large Mexica army. 
The Mexica began the battle with the upper hand, well-rested men with high morale, and 
the battle was going in their favor.  In a last ditch attempt to swing the battle his way, 
Cortés and five horsemen attacked what appeared to be the commanding officers of the 
Mexica.  The attack was a success, and Cortés and his men road back with the Mexica’s 
banner in hand.  Historian Hugh Thomas sees this as a moment where the lack of Mexica 
organization was key; without the banner to direct soldiers, the Mexica fled in disarray.  
To Thomas this is evidence of the power of horses to disrupt soldiers who had no 
experience against cavalry.
264
 
Inga Clendinnen, however, offers a very different and illuminating view on the 
significance of the battle.  Clendinnen writes that “the taking of a banner was to Indians 
less a blow to collective pride than a statement: a sign that the battle was to go, indeed 
had gone, against them.” When Cortés and his men killed and grabbed the banner of the 
director of war, the Mexica saw it as a sign that the battle was lost.  They were not 
thrown into disarray but saw that the battle, which was a sacred contest, had shifted to the 
Spaniards. Mesoamericans did not view war to be simply the conflict between two parties 
but as a predetermined conflict in which they could foresee who the victor would be from 
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subtle signs.  The taking of the banner was one such sign.
265
  At Otumba, the warriors 
were not, as Hugh Thomas claims, unorganized but in fact very well organized. However, 
they believed that the battle was not theirs to win. 
The assumption that warfare in Mesoamerica and Europe were fought with the 
same beliefs was and has been a characteristic misconception by both Cortés and 
subsequent scholars.  Warfare in Mesoamerica was replete in rituals that were reflections 
of cultural beliefs. As mentioned earlier, in Tenochtitlan there were schools established 
for both the nobility and commoners where they learned the art of war.  The nobility 
received more training, especially with shock weapons such as the maquahuitl and the 
tepoztopilli, and they did not use bows or slings in battle.  The maquahuitl was the most 
venerated weapon as it took the largest amount of training to use.
266
  The maquahuitl was 
the same weapon used in the gladiatorial sacrifices where the captive’s obsidian blades 
were removed while the captor used his fully functional maquahuitl to slowly slice the 
captive.
 267
   
Warfare was a highly organized affair.  A battle began at a relatively close 
distance of 50 to 60 meters; this distance might seem large, but in actuality 
Mesoamerican bows and slings could fire farther, but effectiveness and accuracy of these 
weapons would have been sacrificed.  Arrows were standardized and bows had a range of 
90 to 180 meters; slings threw standard size stones well over 200 meters. Projectile 
weapons were associated with the lower classes, and the only projectile weapon the 
nobility used was the atlatl, a spear or dart thrower, due to its association with the gods.  
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An atlatl had an effective range of about 45 meters.  Both atlatl darts and arrows were 
fletched, standardized in length and weight, yet they could have a variety of points, from 
fire hardened to obsidian tipped or even barbed.  The atlatl was a medium ranged 
weapon, which with rear support of bows and slings could disrupt the front of formations.  
As long distance weapons depleted munitions, the formations closed and the front line 
moved forward throwing darts from their atlatls.  As lines closed in, elite warriors 
switched to the highly regarded maquahuitl and novice nobility and commoners switched 
to the tepoztopilli.
268
   
The foremost soldiers were known as the cuahchicqueh; these soldiers were not 
organized into units but in pairs meant to end the battle quickly, aid an ally under duress, 
attack a retreating armies rearguard, or hold a position no matter the consequences.  
Warrior units, comprised of soldiers ranking from novice to expert with a high status 
veteran leading each individual unit, followed the cuahchicqueh.  Units were highly 
organized and veterans were meant to aid novices. The units moved together and 
maintained careful cohesion with ranks closing in as soldiers died or were captured.  In 
fact breaking rank for an unwarranted reason or defying command was punished with 
death.  Orderliness prevented enemies from pushing into the ranks and lessened the 
confusion of retreat.  If an enemy was too strong the units would retreat and projectiles 
would resume.  If all went well in battle, soldiers and units stayed together, pushed 
forward, and attempted to surround an enemy.
269
   
As a person rose in rank so did his attire and privileges, providing a social 
incentive to combat.  The number of captives and brave deeds achieved in battle 
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promoted one’s rank; anyone was eligible for promotion, but the process favored nobles 
because they were better trained and armed than commoners.  Soldiers did not try to kill 
their enemy but rather to wound and disable him, so that he could be captured as a 
sacrificial victim.  Warriors did not always capture an enemy because some were able to 
escape or they fought to their death rather than being taken, which seen more honorable.  
Ones military rank depended not only from the number of captives taken, but the city-
state they were from.  In fact, warfare was so strongly tied to status that even a tlatoani 
would enter combat with his generals surrounding him.
270
  Cuithahuac was absent from 
the battle of Otumba, so this must have made the loss even more humiliating to the 
Mexica, who desperately needed to show old allies that their new tlatoani was a capable 
leader.
271
 
Otumba was not just a battle but also a sacred duel among warriors.  The battle 
followed the traditional Mesoamerican view of war, likely beginning, as was customary, 
at dawn. The Mexica followed their traditional loose formation of a two-meter or so 
distance between one another, so that the warriors could pair off with infantryman.
272
  
This positioning would allow a warrior to parry the Spanish infantryman and try to slice 
him with his maquahuitl or tepoztopilli.  However, the effectiveness of these weapons 
would be compromised if the Spaniards wore any metal armor.  Nonetheless, they 
persisted with their tradition of fighting and indeed, tried to capture Spaniards as this 
style of fighting was ingrained in them.  The Mexica fought valiantly for hours, and the 
battle was going their way.  Yet seeing their banner waving as Cortés galloped back to 
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his line, so did, in their eyes, the favor of battle. Throughout the Conquest, Spanish 
banner carriers remained significant targets, yet the Spaniards’ obliviousness towards 
their loss must have been frustrating to the Mexica.  Clendinnen notes that this traditional 
view of war changed as the Mexica realized the Spaniards did not heed signs so obvious 
to the Mexica.
273
   
The Mexica had continued the tradition of reinforcing control and forging 
alliances. However, after the loss at Otumba the Mexica feebly tried to gain support 
through gift giving.
274
  The Mexica were so desperate after Otumba that they failed to 
make a bargain with the Tlaxcalans to kill the Spaniards.  The Tlaxcalans, too, continued 
to view alliances and war in traditional terms seen in their rejection of the Mexica’s offer 
and requested for an alliance with Cortés.  The Tlaxcalans demanded traditional 
conditions: to be given control of Cholula, have a Tlaxcalan manned fortress in the heart 
of Tenochtitlan, to be given a fair share of spoils, and not to have to pay tribute to 
whoever ruled Tenochtitlan after it was conquered.  The Spaniards did not stay true to 
their word.
275
   
Mexica attitudes towards warfare, despite how ingrained they were, did adapt to 
the Spaniards’ tactics, but this would occur after an outbreak of smallpox that ravaged all 
of Mexico following the “Campaign of Tepeaca.”  Tlaxcalans put forth the idea to siege 
Tepeaca, which was a hub for tributary items before being brought to Tenochtitlan.  This 
campaign was really a series of slaughters.  The city of Tepeaca, itself, refused to 
succumb and fought Cortés, but other towns willingly surrendered.  In one instance 
                                                 
273
 Clendinnen, “‘Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty,’” 86. 
274
 Hassig, Aztec Warfare, 246. 
275
 Thomas, Conquest, 428, 737. 
 113 
Cortés’ men rode up to a group of warriors outside their walled city ready to do battle, 
but the fighters were dissuaded from fighting, laid down their arms, and brought to speak 
with Cortés.  Cortés had all the men executed and their families enslaved.
276
 
It was traditional in Mesoamerica that defending armies would not engage an 
army, especially if they knew they were not likely to win.  A traditional sign of 
submission and acknowledged defeat was for an army to literally lay down their arms.  
Historian Ross Hassig notes that “expectations of victory and defeat played a significant 
part in Mesoamerican warfare.”  A town or city that expected to lose would surrender in 
order to minimize losses both in manpower and goods as submission without conflict was 
rewarded with lesser tribute demands.  The Spaniards, however, did not recognize the 
cultural subtleties of Mesoamerican warfare, which led to bloodier conflicts.
277
  Cortés, 
likely, understood acts of blatant submission, but knew that violence was a universal 
language, writing to his king, “we always routed them and killed many […] we had 
pacified and subdued many towns and villages and the lords and chieftains had come 
forward and offered themselves as His Majesty’s vassals.”278  As the Campaign ended, 
the native people of Mexico were visited by an even more horrific plague than Cortés, 
smallpox. 
Disease, while it did not weaken the empire in terms of manpower, it did shift 
politics of the Alliance and gave extra support and time to Cortés.  Disease, when 
mentioned with the conquest, is often seen as the factor that left the Mexica in huddling 
masses that Cortés swept down upon and conquered.  This is not the case, but it did 
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indeed favor Cortés for political reasons.  Smallpox spread throughout the Mesoamerica 
from a sick slave named Francisco de Eguía, who beyond having the misfortune of being 
a slave is also the known source of smallpox on the Americas’ mainland.  From him the 
disease spread to the Totonacs and followed the Spaniards’ path of conquest.  It swept 
through the Valley northwestward and arrived at Tenochtitlan in October of 1520.  The 
disease killed many; estimates of infected populations range from loosing a third to a half 
of their original size.  This is partially from being a naïve population, a group of people 
who have never been afflicted with a disease before, but also because of how native 
peoples sought to heal ailments and lack of care for the sick.  All indigenous remedies for 
skin ailments involved bathing and breaking of blisters, and both would spread this 
disease.
279 280
 This obviously affected all indigenous peoples equally; however, the 
Spaniards, despite some of their own soldiers being sick, were spared fatalities.  This is 
attributed to their inherited and acquired immunity, the latter from when they were 
children.
281
 
The impact of the smallpox epidemic on the conquest has been the subject of 
much debate.  Camilla Townsend views disease as having little effect on the outcome of 
the Conquest.
282
  Inga Clendinnen is largely in agreement and notes that while the 
Mexica did view ailments as the cause of gods, they did not associate Spanish related 
events and smallpox in the Florentine Codex.
283
  I myself have been unable to find any 
connection of the smallpox outbreak in relation to the Spaniards, who are not mentioned 
                                                 
279
 Sahagún, Florentine Codex, X: 137. 
280
 Sheldon Watts, Epidemics and History: Disease, Power and Imperialism, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), 89-91. 
281
 Ibid., 86, 89-91. 
282
 Townsend, “Burying the White Gods,” 38. 
283
 Clendinnen, “Fierce and Unnatural Cruelty,” 77, 97. 
 115 
as being spared by nor the cause of the epidemic.  In fact, in the chapter of the Florentine 
Codex that discusses the outbreak, the smallpox epidemic is immediately followed by 
how the Mexica soldiers recovered enough to leave the city.  And “the brave warriors 
[the Mexica] came following after them [the Spaniards].  None of the Mexicans died.  
Then the Spaniards turned their backs.”284  If the Mexica saw the disease as punishment 
and the Spaniards as divine they certainly did not show it. The peoples of the Triple 
Alliance would have been well aware that both allies and enemies of the Spaniards were 
suffering. 
Nevertheless, the contrarian argument lingers despite the lack of evidence to 
support it; William H. McNeill laid out the typical argument more than thirty years ago.  
He argued that, since both the Spaniards and Mesoamericans were very religious, “from 
the Amerindian point of view, stunned acquiescence in Spanish superiority was the only 
possible response.”  And that “the gods of the Aztecs as much as the God of the 
Christians seemed to agree that the white newcomers had divine approval for all they 
did.”285  The Spaniards certainly felt this way about the latter statement – with one 
conquistador writing, “When the Christians were exhausted from war, God saw fit to 
send the Indians smallpox.” Yet Amerindians seem silent on both assertions.  
Furthermore, there is an account that, after the Conquest of Mexico, the Zapotecs, about 
400 km south of Tenochtitlan, reverted back to their “idolatry” believing the outbreak of 
smallpox was punishment by their old gods for converting to Catholicism.
286
  There is 
also no Spanish account of natives viewing or even implying disease was an act of any 
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god(s) favoring the Spaniards.  Yet this view persisted in the European mind; when, half 
a century later, an epidemic in Mexico combined with the defeat of Spanish Armada led 
Philip II to ban writing in indigenous languages, thinking these events were God’s 
punishment to the Spanish Empire.
287
  Despite the lack of indigenous sources viewing 
disease as proof of European exceptionalism, many scholars perpetuate this belief, 
including Jared Diamond and Alfred Crosby.
288289
 
Perhaps this argument stems from the zealotry, flagrant among both Spaniards 
and Mesoamericans, and the fact that after the outbreak Cortés, literally, became a 
kingmaker. The epidemic raged for about sixty days and killed almost every important 
leader around: Cuithahuac, tlatoani of Tenochtitlan, the tlatoani of Tacuba, the tlatoani 
of Cholula, and the tlatoani of Tlaxcala amongst many others.
290291
  Cortés appointed 
new tlatoani of the latter two cities, among others.  Bernal Diaz reports that when Cortés 
was asked who should be the new tlatoani he “made a point of nominating those who had 
the best claim.”  Often these were the sons of the previous rulers, whether or not they 
were fit to actually rule.
292
   Cortés appointed the sons of the previous tlatoani for both 
Tlaxcala and Cholula; the latter being a twelve-year-old boy.
293294
 Cortés was 
unaccustomed to indigenous politics and was unaware that a council appointed a new 
tlatoani, so Cortés likely went by the European assumption that a king was determined by 
primogeniture. 
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Part of Montezuma’s tightening of the Empire’s control over tributaries had been 
the replacement of troublesome rulers with puppet ones.  Yet city-states in and 
surrounding the Valley of Mexico had willingly become more subordinate towards the 
Empire because it offered stability for the area.
295
  In effect Cortés had disrupted Valley 
politics dramatically by undoing this stability; this made Cortés the power to seek both 
safety under and from.  Since his expulsion from Tenochtitlan, Cortés had begun a 
campaign against anyone who was not on his side.  This increasingly made being an ally 
of the Triple Alliance a liability.  The sudden loss of leaders of almost every city through 
smallpox was further impetus to side with Cortés and the Tlaxcalans.  Cortés was a stable 
leader when compared to the Mexica, who had lost Montezuma, most if not all of his 
council during the Noche Triste, and countless nobles as well as Cuithahuac from 
smallpox.   
When the outbreak subsided, the Mexica then elected Cuauhtémoc, their final 
tlatoani. Scholar Manuel Aguilar-Moreno believes that had he been elected instead of 
Cuithahuac the Mexica could have defeated Cortés and the Tlaxcalans.
296
  Even so, 
Cuauhtémoc was newly appointed, and his ability to rule was untested.  As stated, the 
beginning of new reigns was a traditional time of revolt for city-states, underscoring a 
city-states’ desire to seek approval from Cortés and to be spared any further destruction 
by him.  Deaths from disease and the resulting chaotic change in Mexica leadership were 
smallpox’s most useful effects for the Spaniards. 
Cortés began his campaign into the Valley of Mexico itself on December 31, 
1520. On that day, Cortés arrived unharmed in the city of Texcoco, situated comfortably 
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on the western shores of its namesake lake.  The Triple Alliance no longer existed.
297
  
Why the tlatoani of Texcoco sided with Cortés remains unknown but perhaps he had a 
falling out with Cuauhtémoc. From here Cortés made various excursions around the lake, 
conquering either by force or by immediate surrender.  Occasionally the Mexica would 
chastise cities for switching sides, but in reality, neither the Mexica nor the Spaniards and 
Tlaxcalans had enough forces to maintain allegiance.  Both sides depended on a display 
of power to keep the fidelity of towns and cities.  The vacillation of alliances continued 
until the Spaniards permanently conquered the southern lakes after razing the city of 
Tepotzlan.  Surrounding city-states surrendered and supported the Spaniards.  Then, on 
May 26, 1521 Tenochtitlan suffered a serious blow with the severing of its aqueduct.
298
  
Cortés had with him ninety cavalrymen, 120 crossbowmen and harquebusiers, 700 
infantrymen, three large cannons, and fifteen small cannons dispersed unequally on his 
thirteen brigantines.
299
 
From this point it has become, retrospectively, an inevitability that the technology 
savvy Spaniards were destined to win as they indeed would.  However, the average 
Mesoamerican and Mexica warriors were not so easy to conquer and were adaptable to 
the new technological threats posed by the well-armed Spaniard.  Much of the Mexica’s 
adaptation dealt with their view of war rather than any technological deficiency.  As 
stated before, Mexica combat was at its best a one-on-one predetermined contest between 
evenly matched warriors.  There was no stigma in dying in combat in any type of warfare 
in the Mesoamerican mind; dying in war was referred to as the “flowery death,” and it 
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was honorable to die spread-eagled and sacrificed.  Dying in a gladiatorial fight, if you 
fought well enough and injured or killed your captor, could give you fame even as the 
opponent’s swordsmanship slowly “striped” you until you were sacrificed.300 
This view of combat was alien to the Spaniards, who did not understand its procedures or 
its meaning.  The gladiatorial sacrifice was meant to stripe a victim slowly and carefully; 
the obsidian blades could cut deep, but the captor did not.  Instead the captor cut 
delicately in order to display his ability as a warrior and by extension his status in society.  
Inga Clendinnen views the Florentine Codex’s thorough account of the Spaniards killing 
nobles before the “Noche Triste” as an attempt to understand how they used their swords 
and why the Spaniards would inflict devastating rather than debilitating wounds.
301
 See 
fig. 12. Similarly, on any battlefield, a Mesoamerican warrior attempted to disable his 
opponent, not kill him.  An opponent that realized capture was imminent would choose 
the flowery death on the battlefield over capture.  In fact, it was considered shameful if a 
captive was freed and not sacrificed.
302
 
The Mexica began to realize that the Spaniards were not worthy of sacrifice; they 
fought as cowards, killing from a distance with European arms.  This shift is seen in how 
captured Spaniards were dispatched; early on, captives from the Noche Triste would be 
placed under the sacrificial knife. Towards the end of the Conquest, when the Siege of 
Tenochtitlan was well under way, Spaniards were killed in the most disgraceful way.  
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Spaniards would be stripped of their armor and clothes, and the back of their heads would 
be beaten in.  This was a death reserved for disobedient slaves.
303
 
These differences became clear during the constant skirmishes for dominance 
along the lakeshore.  In one instance two elite warriors stepped forth and challenged 
Cortés to an equal fight; Cortés sent two cavalrymen at the warriors.  One warrior, 
wielding his maquahuitl, cut the charging horses legs and then its neck as it fell to the 
ground.  Fearing for his riders, Cortés had a cannon shot at the whole unit of opposing 
warriors.  The two horsemen lived.
304
  There is another account where a Mexica warrior 
could not be subdued by three or four horsemen, and, after catching a lance thrown at him 
by a cavalryman, he defended himself for another hour until he was shot twice by a 
crossbow and then stabbed to death. These accounts show the Mexica warriors as 
incredibly brave and adaptable.  Despite this being the first war in which Mesoamericans 
fought cavalrymen, they routinely grabbed lances from riders.
305
  See fig. 13. 
The European measure of success in battle by casualty count was nowhere to be 
found within the Mesoamerican culture of warfare.  Despite this, Mexica warriors did 
adapt to all the new threats of European warfare remarkably fast and as best as they 
could. The Mexica despised the crossbowmen, harquebusiers, and cannons not only 
because of their effectiveness, which they acknowledged, but also because of the lowly 
way they were used to disrupt the sacred contest of war.  Commoners killed at a distance.  
Mesoamerican battle formations were traditionally loose and good for equally armed 
enemies but not suited for Spanish cavalry. Mesoamerican battle formation did not 
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change because a tight formation would have taken too much time to retrain soldiers, and 
a tight formation would have provided better targets for cannons and harquebusiers.  
Mexica soldiers learned to duck and dodge on open field battles.  Knowing that they 
lacked the advantage on open and even terrain, the Mexica adopted the tactic of retreating 
to towns or ravines where they were on a more equal fighting level.  The Mexica also 
constructed pits filled with sharpened sticks to trap horses and enemy soldiers.  These 
changes also extended into the lake as canoes learned to zigzag from cannon fire, and the 
Mexica successfully trapped two of Cortés brigantines.
306307
 
The Mexica did attempt to use the weapons of Spaniards; they used captured 
pikes and turned swords into lances.  They used these to attack horses, especially from 
below.  They saw that horses could be frightened away by a barrage of projectiles.  The 
Mexica forced captive Spaniards to show them how to use crossbows.   At one point, a 
Mexica unit surprised a cannon squad, and pushed it into the lake.
308
  It is difficult to 
gauge the effectiveness of Mesoamerican weapons on Spaniards.  I mentioned before that 
the tepoztopilli was so effective it pierced Bernal Diaz’s steel armor and it was only 
stopped by his cotton armor underneath.  Diaz also mentioned how effective arrows were 
at penetrating the thickest cotton armor and that some Amerindians could fire three 
arrows at a time very effectively.  Diaz viewed the sling as the most effective enemy 
projectile because it could wound even the best-armored Spaniard.
309
  Yet no information 
on the effectiveness of obsidian weapons against metal armor is known, and historian’s 
claims are based on assumptions.  However, if Diaz was not exaggerating about the 
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tepoztopilli there should be some attention paid to obsidian weaponry, perhaps using 
experimental archeology.   
Possibly what saved the Spaniards was the Mexica preference for disabling their 
enemies rather than killing them.  Ross Hassig and Inga Clendinnen agree that had the 
Mexica originally fought to kill, uninhibited by their social construct of warfare, the 
Mexica or the Tlaxcalans could have defeated the Spaniards.
310
  The Mexica soldier did 
not compromise on taking captives as a means of status until the end when they marked 
their hatred by subjecting Spaniards to the death reserved for slaves.  The Mexica only 
understood this when it was too late, when they realized that Cortés was not fighting 
them to win battles but to begin an unconscionable act, a siege.  As Clendinnen puts it, 
“For the Mexica, siege was the antithesis of war.” A siege was slowly killing an enemy 
by having their resources dwindle, to the point that starvation forced the enemy to 
surrender. For the Mexica, a siege was not sacred combat between equals.
311
  Even Hugh 
Thomas remarks that part of Cortés’ decision to lay siege was to prevent loss of Spanish 
lives in direct combat.
312
 
Ultimately, the Mexica realized that Cortés’ campaigns around the lake were part 
of a plan to encircle them and cut off their food supplies.  This is why the southern 
shores, which produced most of their food, were the last to be under Cortés’ control.  The 
Mexica even realized the importance of their aqueduct, but that, too, was unsuccessfully 
defended and severed.
313
  The siege formally began on May 13, 1521 when Cortés 
divided his forces and attacked Tenochtitlan from the north, south, and east. With his 
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brigantines, Cortés controlled both the lake and the land around the causeways that led to 
the city. The city was cut off from water and food, unless canoes could make it past the 
embargo and smuggle in supplies. 
Siege was not an entirely foreign concept to Mesoamerica, but Cortés’ was.  For 
example, during Montezuma II’s campaign to control the areas that possessed the sand so 
valuable to his lapidaries, he came against the walled city of Quetzaltepec.  It was rare 
that towns had walls; more often they had small fortresses for their women and children 
to retreat to.
314
  Montezuma used a common strategy in which “many ladders were to be 
made so the soldiers could climb the walls and many wooden digging sticks were to be 
prepared in order to dig into the adobe and thus destroy the walls.”  The people of 
Quetzaltepec expected this and covered the edges of the walls with planks and the tops 
with sharp stones, while men kept guard should any climbing be attempted.  However, 
the next day the Quetzaltepec army came out, and was defeated by Montezuma’s armies. 
They retreated inside the multi-walled city and refused to submit.  Montezuma had the 
planks torn down and his men dig through every wall until they reached the city.  By this 
time, its inhabitants fled, and Montezuma burned the temple.  Seeing their city being 
sacked and their temple burning, the nobles of Quetzaltepec sued for peace and the 
looting was stopped.  According to Durán’s account, these actions lasted not much longer 
than a week.
315
 
The siege of Tenochtitlan was more sever than that of Quetzaltepec.  Water was 
cut off, food supplies dwindled, and Cortés was slowly killing everyone.  During the 
battles along the causeways the Mexica captured and killed several banner carriers, but 
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the Spaniards kept coming. Seeing the Spaniards continually ignore the “signs” of battle 
combined with the siege, the Mexica’s view of war had finally changed.316  The Mexica 
sent the skin and skulls of dead Spaniards and horses to cities along the shore.  This was 
certainly an act of psychological warfare, but it was also a show of defiance that the 
Mexica would not surrender.
317
  How could they? They were not allowed a fair fight as 
the Spaniards sought to starve them to death rather than to do battle.  Instead of warrior 
vs. warrior, maquahuitl vs. sword, it was cannon and famine vs. Tenochtitlan.   
Even though Cortés did not want to, because of the Mexica’s determination, he 
had the city burned by brigantines.
318
  The Mexica fought valiantly and with fortitude at 
every causeway and in the water.  At night they launched surprise attacks, which they 
normally regarded as deceitful.  But Cortés had innumerable allies to keep the attack 
going and to fill in the perpetual holes of the causeway made by the Mexica.  Cortés and 
his men would attack the same causeway day after day slowly gaining ground.  By the 
end of June, 1521, Cortés men had begun camping in the city itself.  Even still, in early 
July Cortés suffered a dramatic defeat where almost sixty Spaniards were killed in 
addition to over 2,000 indigenous allies.  This was when Cuauhtémoc sent body parts to 
cities.
319
   
The Mexica’s last attempt to stave off defeat is described in the Florentine Codex. 
Cuauhtémoc had the Mexica’s best warrior dressed in “quetzal-owl armor,” which had 
been the armor of Cuauhtémoc’s father, Ahuitzotl – the famed ruler preceding 
Montezuma.  They gave this warrior the xiuhcoatl, Huitzilopochtli’s legendary fire-
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serpent atlatl.  He was sent into battle, and Cuauhtémoc and his council decided that if he 
struck “one or two of [their] foes” Huitzilopochtli was still with them.  So the quetzal-owl 
went forward and terrified the Spaniards and their allies.  The four soldiers who 
accompanied him took three captives.  The next day there was no fighting, but that night 
a small “meteor” crashed onto the island city, and “the blazing coal broke into many 
pieces” and fell into lake.320321  The Spaniards recorded neither of these events.  Inga 
Clendinnen views the meteor as story constructed after the Conquest to justify the end of 
the city.
322
  This is likely the case as the city was, according to legend, to have grown out 
of a heart thrown into the lake by Mexica priest as directed by Huitzilopochtli.
323
  
Likewise, Huitzilopochtli would need to signal the death of the city, and his message of a 
“bloodstone” falling on the city and quenching itself in the water was an obvious sign to 
the Mexica. 
Cuauhtémoc refused Cortés’ peace offerings believing him to be untrustworthy.  
Although the accounts differ, on the day of the quetzal-owl warrior, Cortés says the 
Spaniards and the Tlaxcalans pushed into the last Mexica stronghold. The Tlaxcalans, 
whose forces Cortés estimated at 150,000, were ruthless, and Cortés told King Charles V, 
“forty-thousand were killed or taken that day.”  Cortés was grateful to get away from the 
“stench of the dead bodies.”  The day following the fabled meteorite, Cortés and his allies 
forced the Mexica onto the chinampas, and trying to escape, they “drowned amid the 
multitude of corpses.”  Cortés estimates another 50,000 died. Cuauhtémoc, however, 
escaped in a fleet of canoes, but was intercepted by the brigantines and brought to Cortés.  
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“Speaking in his language,” Cuauhtémoc told Cortés he had done his duty as tlatoani and 
placing “his hand upon” Cortés’ dagger asked that he be killed. Cortés declined and told 
him “he need fear nothing,” so Cuauhtémoc was denied his flowery death.  The siege 
ended on August 13, 1521 after seventy-six days of fighting.
324
   
Cortés likely exaggerated both the number of Tlaxcalans and the number of 
Mexica killed (those figures alone would have been almost the entire population after the 
smallpox epidemic).  Their violence, however, was not exaggerated.  Inga Clendinnen 
views the intense violence and hatred the Tlaxcalans exhibited in sacking the city as 
uncommon even for a land that routinely held human sacrifice.  The Tlaxcalans had been 
left unconquered and unincorporated in the Alliance’s Empire.  For decades the Mexica 
subjected the Tlaxcalans to flowery war, outright conquests, and Montezuma II had 
begun a campaign isolating them from trade.  This hatred had built up and the Spaniards 
were the means by which the Tlaxcalans could unleash their hatred of the Mexica.  
Clendinnen views this hatred as stemming from the Empire’s need for contest, which was 
actualized through their flowery wars with Tlaxcala.  The other city-states watched from 
afar, disgusted by these disgraceful tactics; only the Tlaxcalans went into the city with the 
Spaniards.
325
 
 But Clendinnen exaggerates the violence of the Tlaxcalans’ break from traditional 
view of war. There are numerous accounts of the Triple Alliance’s forces slaughtering 
whole cities.  Ross Hassig has convincingly showed that the flower war’s etiquette was a 
symptom of the Empire’s chronic rebellions and need to save manpower while displaying 
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strength.
326
  However, Clendinnen is correct about the pent up violence the Tlaxcalans 
sought to afflict upon the Mexica.  Cortés had come to Mesoamerica at a crucial time for 
the Mexica, who were trying to consolidate their control on their empire.  Cortés 
weakened the powerful city of Tenochtitlan by killing its nobles and their tlatoani inside 
the city itself, and by violently imposing his power on every town he passed through.   
Cuithahuac failed to defeat Cortés at Otumba and failed to actively defend the 
towns and cities Cortés harassed afterward.  Disease exacerbated the situation, as Cortés 
was one of the few leaders the epidemic did not effect.  Indigenous leaders subsequently 
flocked to Cortés.  Cuauhtémoc showed little power beyond offering gifts to cities, and 
by the time he did begin using brutality, Cortés had already begun encircling the city.  
Cortés was vicious and effective; he cut off traditional tribute not only from outside the 
Valley of Mexico but even from within.  To the Tlaxcalans, Cortés had led by example, 
and viewing themselves as equal partners, they acted as they saw fit. Only Cortés and his 
small group of Spaniards understood what the results of the Conquest would mean.  It is 
easy to look back retrospectively and chastise the Tlaxcalans for their naiveté, but they 
were used to a very different understanding of how events would proceed after victory. 
 Cortés found the Tlaxcalans even more to his advantage than his guns and germs. 
For there were several occasions where the Spaniards could have been defeated despite 
their advantages: at Otumba, at Tlaxcala after the Noche Triste, and before they had 
originally entered Tenochtitlan.   What kept Cortés alive were the Tlaxcalans, who saw a 
rogue agent unbound by any known rules of engagement.  The Mexica, on the other hand, 
had to gauge the novel situation in terms of political and military costs that could 
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dramatically shift the dynamic of their Empire.  Cortés only had to worry about staying 
alive; promises meant little for his post-victory aspirations.  Scholar after scholar has 
noted that had the Mexica sought to kill in combat, they could have defeated the 
Spaniards.  But to the Mexica it would have been a hollow victory.  They fought as they 
had been taught for generations: in battle, one displayed his skill as a warrior in order to 
capture victims for Huitzilopochtli, who needed blood and hearts to continue his daily 
battle through the sky. 
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Conclusion 
 
As I have shown, the peoples of Mesoamerica had established a unique society 
based both around their environment and culture.  Their flora and fauna were different 
from those of Eurasia, so subsequently they developed different methods of agriculture.  
Theirs more closely mimicked natural cycles, best seen in the three sisters.  A maize stalk 
functioned as a pole for beans, which rejuvenated the soil, and the large, low growing 
squash leaves covered the ground conserving moisture and protecting the roots of the 
beans and maize.  Even though Mesoamericans lacked large domesticated animals, which 
may have contributed to their “failure” to progress in metallurgy, they developed as their 
culture desired to without them.  
Before the conquest and before smallpox, Tenochtitlan was one of the largest 
cities in the world, built of stone and wood.  While a driving force of Eurasian metallurgy 
may have been weaponry, the availability of obsidian, which produced a sharper edge 
than any Eurasian metal, gave the Mexica not only a weapon, but also a spiritual material 
that as their culture developed became inseparable from everyday life. 
  The Mexica and the peoples of Mesoamerica had a sophisticated societies, with 
complex trade routes, productive agriculture, and well-organized social structures.  Their 
culture was by no means perfect, but it was no worse than the Spain’s Inquisition or 
Spanish rule in the Caribbean. The ultimate question addressed in this thesis is not a 
comparison of moral superiority of one society over the other, but the fundamental causes 
that led to the destruction of a Mesoamerican society by Cortés and his army.  It was to 
examine whether or not the it was the development of guns, germs, and steel an ocean 
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away were the determining factors.  Rather, I have aimed to show that it was a 
combination of a multitude of both external and internal factors that led to the fall of the 
Mexica and the Triple Alliance’s Empire.  I have tried to show it was truly a conquest by 
Hernán Cortés and the Tlaxcalans. 
 Yet the Conquest of Mexico is often used as one of the examples of the 
inevitability of European conquest during the Age of Exploration and afterward.  Cortés’ 
conquest, from a glance, epitomizes and validates this misconception.  Cortés with a few 
hundred Spaniards and a dozen or so cavalrymen, all clad in their state of the art armor 
and wielding the most advanced arms – steel swords, crossbows, guns, and even cannons 
– conquered the entire Triple Alliance’s empire within a mere two years.  New additions 
to this story have added some more truth with people thinking Cortés arrived, disease 
spread and killed, and he conquered.  Even when the version acknowledges the aid of 
indigenous allies, the story is still seen as the inevitability of European dominance.  Inga 
Clendinnen even mentions that when scholars discuss the Conquest of Mexico they often 
stop after the Noche Triste as if after this point there was nothing the Triple Alliance 
could have done to prevent defeat.
327
 
 However, this is not the case, and I believe that if there was one singular instance 
where the tides of war shifted in Cortés’ favor it was the Battle of Otumba.  Cortés had 
suffered devastating losses from the Noche Triste, and he was under constant attack by 
small bands of soldiers while he retreated to Tlaxcala.  Morale was low, most of his men 
were injured, and they were outnumbered by the Alliance’s army whose morale was high.  
The battle was going in the Alliance’s favor, and then Cortés and a few cavalrymen flew 
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through the loose ranks of Alliance soldiers and killed the banner carrier.  Had the 
Mexica and their allies remained undeterred by these events they would likely have won 
the battle.  Instead they dispersed; this is the Conquest of Mexico’s Gettysburg.  
Afterward, the Mexica were so desperate that they sent emissaries to intercept Cortés’ 
and the Tlaxcalans return to Tlaxcala.  The Mexica pleaded for the Tlaxcalans to betray 
the Spaniards and kill them.   
The Tlaxcalans could not have seen this act as anything other than an obvious 
sign of how weak the Triple Alliance was at that moment.  The Tlaxcalans fought bitterly 
for decades to remain independent of the Empire, and in return the Empire cut off their 
trade connections and relentlessly fought them in flowery and combative wars.  The 
Tlaxcalans knew that Cortés was their chance to take the battle from Tlaxcala to the 
Alliance’s territories.  They already had a taste of retribution with the destruction and 
massacre of Cholula. Now they took war to into the Alliance’s territory as Cortés began 
his Campaign of Tepeaca.  The Alliance by not having finished Cortés at Otumba 
allowed him to recover and begin campaigns in the eastern provinces of the Empire. 
It is after this point that the outcome of the Conquest can be seen as an 
inevitability, but only because of the Alliance’s inaction.  Cuithahuac was an ineffective 
leader who, for unknown reasons, did not partake in the Battle of Otumba.  If he had 
showed more fortitude by participating, which was not unheard of, it is possible the 
Triple Alliance’s army would not have lost their confidence as easily.  Even afterwards 
Cuithahuac leadership proved ineffective as he failed to fight Cortés in Tepeaca.  The 
subsequent outbreak of smallpox rather than contributing to the Mexica’s decline may 
have been fortuitous as it took the life of Cuithahuac and allowed for the ascendance of 
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Cuauhtémoc.  Yet Cuauhtémoc’s elevation to tlatoani was too little, too late.  By this 
time the confidence and the perceived power of the Triple Alliance and of the 
indomitable Mexica were in tatters, forestalling any help that might have come from 
vacillating neighboring city-states.  This is most clearly seen in Texcoco’s welcoming of 
Cortés in December of 1520. 
Not only had Cortés entered the Valley of Mexico unhindered, but also the 
Mexica’s most important and longest standing ally had welcomed him.  Texcoco was the 
Mexica’s most important ally in its war for independence, yet even they sided with 
Cortés.  The city of Texcoco became an important area for Cortés to launch attacks on the 
other city-states along Lake Texcoco that remained aligned with the Mexica.  It was also 
in Texcoco where Cortés built and launched his brigantines.  And it was in Texcoco 
where Cortés finally set out to lay siege to Tenochtitlan.  However, the Mexica and their 
remaining allies fought valiantly until the end at the siege and destruction of 
Tenochtitlan.  Cuauhtémoc’s determination and political leadership was likely the 
strongest factor of the tenacity that kept the Tenochtitlan going for so long. 
Nevertheless, Cuauhtémoc was captured as his city was destroyed and sacked, 
and the Tlaxcalans slaughtered his surviving, starving people.  Still he had lasted for 
seventy-six days, but on August 13, 1521 he surrendered to Cortés and begged for death.   
Instead Cortés lied to him saying, “He need fear nothing.”  Cuauhtémoc was later 
tortured in an attempt to find out where the tlatoani’s hidden treasure was; whether or not 
it existed, Cuauhtémoc never said anything.  In 1525 Cortés took Cuauhtémoc with him 
on a campaign in Honduras.  Cortés feared that the Mexica and other natives of the 
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former Empire might rise again if Cuauhtémoc remained alone.  In Honduras 
Cuauhtémoc was executed by hanging for charges of conspiracy against the Crown.
328
 
The defeat of the Triple Alliance, which was largely the defeat of the Mexica 
people, was a complicated matter.  Technology, disease, and the instability of the Empire 
itself were all factors in the Empire’s quick collapse.  However, it seems that the largest 
factor was a combination of cultural differences in societal organization and particularly 
in areas of diplomacy and warfare. Before Cortés arrival Montezuma II struggled to 
reconcile the tenacity of the Tlaxcalans and to maintain the traditional means of power of 
conquered areas.  His bureaucratization of the Empire and dividing it into distinct 
provinces might have eventually made it into a cohesive state rather than a grouping of 
conquered city-states that acknowledged Alliance dominance by yearly payments.  
However, Tlaxcala remained stubbornly out of his grasp, which he attempted to chip 
away until it too could be incorporated into the Empire. 
I find Montezuma to be the biggest loser in the Conquest of Mexico.  He 
attempted to reform the way in which the Empire functioned and curb the religious and 
social motivations for individuals to go to war.  He is invariably considered cruel in all 
the native sources written after the Mexica’s fall. These have left him an unworthy 
legacy.  This hatred stems from his failure to stop the Conquest, to stop the Spaniards. 
Indigenous histories show him as an incapable leader who failed in war and stifled social 
mobility.  However, what Montezuma’s policies were actually doing was attempting to 
dampen the constant uprisings, which made the Empire unstable.  He did tighten social 
mobility, but in order to slow down the internal drive for warfare.  Today he is seen as a 
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classical example of an ineffectual leader, who did not act, obvious to us now, when he 
should have.  A leader, so stupid, that he believed Cortés to be the god Quetzalcoatl, 
returning to claim power. 
Montezuma believing Cortés to be Quetzalcoatl is one of the most popular myths 
of the conquest.  It fits in so well with explaining how an outsider marched into the heart 
of an empire and tore it asunder.  It fits nicely with the belief that he accomplished this 
act with guns, germs, steel, and European ingenuity. Cortés is believed to have been the 
master Renaissance Machiavellian (despite The Prince being published after the 
conquest) who arrived on the New World’s shores in a suit of armor that might as well 
have been a space suit.  The story is romantic in its ideas and its assumption.  It is a story 
of how various European factors were decisive in destroying Tenochtitlan.  However, 
Cortés was, from as soon as he landed off the shores of the Triple Alliance’s Empire, 
supported by thousands of Amerindians, including, at first, Montezuma, who followed 
the native custom of treating ambassadors well. 
The army of Cortés may have been fronted by Spaniards, but was 
overwhelmingly made up of Mesoamericans.  These people fought for him, provided him 
food, shelter, and information.  He relied on Malintzin, who is now viewed in Mexico as 
a traitor, to translate and on the Tlaxcalans to finally conquer Tenochtitlan.  European 
technology played an important role, but many of these were factors that, at the time, 
could have been overcome by the sheer numbers of Amerindians facing the barrel of his 
harquebusiers and cannons.  It is difficult to decide which technology aided Cortés the 
most, if it was his cannons or the brigantines.  It was not just European technology and 
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indigenous support that led Cortés to win.  Perhaps the overriding factor was the differing 
views of warfare between the indigenous peoples and the Spaniards. 
Warfare as a religious and sacred contest was ingrained in Mesoamerican 
cultures.  It was not only acts of trying to take captives, although that certainly saved 
many Spaniards lives, but also the indigenous belief that warfare should be a contest 
between equals in hand-to-hand combat.  It was predetermined, but for man to undertake 
to find out who was the winner.  Projectile weaponry that Cortés relied on was seen as 
cowardly, so, too, was the act of siege.  But Cortés saw warfare as a European, as body 
counts and territory gained or lost.
329
  The differences in not only technology but also the 
concept of warfare were shaped by the environments that fostered the two cultures.   
Ultimately, Mesoamerica developed a culture within a very different set of 
parameters than Eurasia.  This led to its own advances and discoveries, but these did not 
stack up to an inevitable set of outcomes.  There were chances for the Triple Alliance to 
win, but it came down to human decisions that were shaped by their judgment, which is 
arguably the most basic influence of a culture.  These choices unfortunately led to the 
destruction of a magnificent city, but it was also the beginning of the painful experience 
from which Mexico would rise; the beginning of the syncretism of Mesoamerican and 
Iberian cultures. 
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Terms and Definitions* 
 
Alcohua:  The Ethnic group that constituted the city-state Texcoco.  
Amaranth: A type of herb whose seeds were collected as food. 
Atlatl:  Spear thrower. 
Aztlan:  The mythical home of the Mexica. 
Azcapotzalco: The capital of the Tepanec Empire on the western shores of Lake Texcoco. 
Aztec: A modern term derived from the Mexica’s mythical homeland Aztlan. 
 
Bernal Diaz del Castillo: Wrote an important memoir on the Conquest of Mexico.  Bernal  
Diaz had participated in all three expeditions to Mexico. His memoir is an invaluable 
primary source about the Spaniards experience during the Conquest of Mexico.  It was 
written when he was over seventy years old and was meant to correct incorrect 
accounts of what happened (Aguilar-Moreno 25-6). 
 
Calmeca: A school for nobility and priests who were better taught than the commoners in  
matters relating to warfare, history, and religion. 
Calpulli (pl. calpullin): Essentially like a kinship group with its own internal  
stratifications ranging from commoners to elected leaders. 
Chalachiuitl: Nahuatl for Emerald. 
Chia: A type of sage.  
Chichimecs: Supra-ethnic group of Northwestern Mexico, they were considered  
uncivilized. 
Chiconaui itzcuintli: One of the four gods of the lapidaries. 
Chimpalpopoca: The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan and ruled from 1417-26. 
Chinampa: Known as floating islands; they are actually artificial islands made in shallow  
lakes used for agriculture. 
Cholula: A major and old city-state just outside the Valley of Mexico. 
Chontal Mayan: A dialect of Mayan common in the Yucatán Peninsula. 
Cinteotl: Was one of the gods who created the lapidary crafts; he is also the god of Maize  
(Aguilar-Moreno 148). 
Cronica X: Is a lost history of the Mexica.  It is believed to have been written by a native  
in Nahuatl and with pictographs.  It was used by Durán and other chroniclers (Thomas 
781). 
Codex Aubin: Is codex dated to 1576 and is in the style of an indigenous history.  It is a  
“screenfold” and is a “collection of Mexican testimonies” dealing with the departure of 
Aztlan to the Conquest (Thomas 776). 
Codex Mendoza: Is an indigenous primary source; it is pictographic history with Spanish  
notes that contains a history of the Mexica, a list of tribute of what each tributary owed, 
and some glimpses of what life was like in the Valley of Mexico (Thomas 778-9). 
Cuitatl: Nahuatl for excrement. 
Cuztic teocuitlatl: Nahuatl for gold. 
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Florentine Codex: Is a twelve volume “ethnography” written by Fray Bernardino de  
Sahagún.  It was written in Nahuatl and used natives who were alive during the 
Conquest of Mexico as its sources.  He began the work in 1547 (Thomas 777).  It is 
arguably the most important primary source on the Mexica. 
 
 
Fray Bernardino de Sahagún: Was a Franciscan monk stationed in Mexico City who  
compiled and wrote the Florentine Codex.  He was born in Spain in 1499 and sent to 
Mexico in 1529 (Aguilar-Moreno 24). 
Fray Diego Durán: Was a Dominican monk who entered into order in 1556.  Although he  
grew up in Texcoco, he was born in Seville in 1537.  He is the author of various 
important primary sources on the Mexica: The Book of the Gods and Rites, The Ancient 
Calendar, and The History of the Indies of New Spain. (Aguilar-Moreno 25, Thomas 
781). 
 
Gerónimo de Aguilar: A Spaniard who was captured by Chontal Mayans and  
subsequently became fluent in the language.  He would be used to translate with 
Malintzin. 
Governor Velázquez: was the governor of Cuba at the time of the Conquest and funded  
Cortés’ expedition. 
 
Harquebus: A musket common during the time of the Conquest. 
History of the Indies of New Spain: Is an invaluable primary source on the written by  
Dominican Fray Diego Durán.  Durán used the “Crónica X,” native accounts from all 
ages and ethnic groups. The Historia is one of three works by Durán and was published 
in 1581 (Aguilar-Moreno 25, Thomas 781).  See also Fray Diego Durán.  
Huexotzinca:  An ethnic group from outside of the Valley of Mexico. 
Huitzilopochtli: The main god of the Mexica of Tenochtitlan.  He was their warrior sun  
god who required daily human sacrifice to sustain him.  He is a mix of the gods 
Tonatiuh and Tezcatlipoca. 
 
Iztac teocuitatl: Nahuatl for silver. 
Itzcoatl: The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan and ruled from 1427-40. 
Itztli: Nahuatl for obsidian. 
Ixtlilxochitl: The tlatoani of Texcoco  
 
Lake Chalco: The southernmost lake in the Valley of Mexico. 
Lake Texcoco: The largest lake in the lake system of the Valley of Mexico.  The island  
that Tenochtitlan was founded on is on the western side of the lake. 
Lake Xaltocan: The lake between Lakes Zumpango and Texcoco. 
Lake Xochimilco: The lake between Lakes Texcoco and Chalco; it had highly productive  
chinampas. 
Lake Zumpango: The northernmost lake in the Valley of Mexico. 
Letters From Mexico: Is a compilation of letters written by Cortés during the conquest as  
means to justify his actions in disobeying Governor Velázquez and found La Villa Rica 
de Vera Cruz. (Translated and edited by Anthony Pagden xix-xx). 
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Macuilcalli: One of the four gods who created the lapidary crafts. 
Malintzin: Cortés Nahuatl translator.  Also known commonly as La Malinche. 
Maquahuitl: A Mesoamerican weapon in the shape of cricket paddle lined with obsidian  
blades. 
Mayeque: Non-Mexica serfs. 
Maxtla: Tlatoani of Azcapotzalco ruled from 1427-9 (Aguilar-Moreno xii). 
The Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo: See Bernal Diaz del Castillo. 
Metzcuitlatl: Nahuatl for mica. 
Meztli: Nahuatl for moon. 
Mexica: The name of ethnic group inhabiting Tenochtitlan, commonly known today as  
the Aztecs. 
Milpa: A style of intercropping, or a term for a maize field.  
Mirror Stone: Was a mirror created from either obsidian or pyrite which divination like  
powers and was associated with the god Tezcatlipoca. 
Montezuma I (Montezuma Ilhuicamina): The tlatoani of Tenochtitlan from 1440-69. 
 
Nahua: A term used to describe speakers of Nahuatl and is used similarly to an ethnic  
group. 
Nahuatl: The language of the Nahuas including the Mexica. 
Naualpilli: One of the four gods who created lapidary crafts. 
Neçoliztli: A Nahuatl term for a form of bloodletting by cutting one’s lips or earlobes. 
 
Obsidian: A volcanic glass. 
Olmec: Is considered to be the “mother” culture for all of Mesoamerica.  The civilization  
existed from around 1200-800 BCE near modern Veracruz (Aguilar-Moreno 7-8). 
Ometeotl: A Mesoamerican hermaphroditic god who birthed the four Tezcatlipocas. 
Otumba: A small city-state located near the a gray source of obsidian but better known  
for its specialized craft production. 
 
Pachuca: A town located near a important source of high-quality green obsidian.  
Pánfilo Narváez: A Spaniard sent to Mexico to arrest Hernán Cortés. 
Pipiltin: Essentially a Nahuatl term for the noble class. 
 
Quetzalcoatl: One of the oldest gods in Mesoamerican mythology.  His name translates to  
“feathered serpent.” He is responsible for creating and destroying various worlds.  He is 
also the god of wind and of knowledge (Aguilar-Moreno 149-50).  A post conquest 
myth asserts that Montezuma thought that Cortés was Quetzalcoatl returning to take 
power.  
 
Tecpatl: Nahuatl for flint or sacrificial knife.  Also a minor deity. 
Tarascan Empire: An empire neighboring the northwestern portion of the Triple 
Alliance’s  
Empire. 
Telpochcalli: A Mexica school for commoners to learn basic military skills, history, and  
religion. 
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Telpochtli: A cult for young warriors who worshiped Tezcatlipoca. 
Tentitzania: Nahuatl verb that means to sacrifice and cut ones lips for the idols. 
Tenitztic: Nahuatl, translates to “something sharp or which has a cutting edge.” 
Tenitzticayotl: Nahuatl word that translates to “edge, or sharpness of a knife, etc.” 
Tenochtitlan: The capital city of the Mexica. 
Teosinte: The wild ancestor of modern maize. 
Teotihuaca: Remnant people in the Valley of Mexico from the collapse of the  
Teotihuacan Empire around 750 CE.  
Teotihuacan: A major city and established around 100 BCE and lasted until 750 CE  
(Aguilar-Moreno 11-3). 
Tepanecs:  an ethnic group ruling from Azcapotzalco the capital of the Tepanec empire,  
on the western shores of Lake Texcoco.   
Tepoztopilli: A Mesoamerican lance or spear whose head was brimmed with obsidian  
blades. 
Tetl: Nahuatl for stone. 
Texcoco: City-state of the Alcohua, and a member of the Triple Alliance. 
Tezcatl: Nahuatl for mirror or mirror stone. See also mirror stone. 
Tezcatlipoca: One of the four sons of Ometeotl, the creator god.  Tezcatlipoca holds a  
complicated place in the Mesoamerican Pantheon.  He has created and destroyed 
various worlds. 
Tezozomoc: The tlatoani of Azcapotzalco, succeeded by Maxtla in 1417 (Aguilar- 
Moreno xii). 
Tlacaelel: The nephew of Itzcoatl, and the half-brother of Montezuma I.  He was an  
important advisor to both Itzcoatl and Montezuma I. 
Tlacopan: A Tepanec city-state that was part of the Triple Alliance. Also known as  
Tacuba.  
Tlahuahuanaliztli: Is the form of sacrifice that translates to “gladiatorial sacrifice.” 
Tlatoani: The ruler of a city-state elected by the nobility (pipiltin) or a previous tlatoani’s  
council  and can be equated to a king. 
Tlaxcala: A city-state outside the Valley of Mexico 
Tlaxcalan: A native of Tlaxcala. 
Toltecs: The previous civilization in habiting the Valley of Mexico centered in the city- 
state of Tula.  The Toltecs lasted from circa 900-1150CE. (Aguilar-Moreno 16-7). 
Tonatiuh: A sun god dating back to the Toltecs, circa 950 CE. 
Totonacs: A Mesoamerican ethnic group that lived along the Gulf Coast. 
Triple Alliance: Triumvirate alliance between the three city-states that formed it:  
Tenochtitlan, Texcoco, and Tlacopan.  The empire they created is often referred to the 
Aztec Empire. 
Tzintzuntzan: The capital city of the Tarascan Empire. See also Tarascan Empire. 
 
Xipe Totec: Mesoamerican god of agriculture and goldsmiths (Aguilar-Moreno 151). 
Xiuhcoatl: Huitzilopochtli’s serpent atlatl.  
Xiuitl: Nahuatl for Turquoise. 
 
* I have listed sources only for any information not previously cited within the body of 
the work.  
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Maps
 
Map 1: The extent of Mesoamerica. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997), 6. 
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Map 2: The Triple Alliance’s Empire including ethnic enclaves. Source: Alan Knight, Mexico 
from the Beginning to the Spanish Conquest (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
132. 
 142 
 
Map 3: A map of the Valley of Mexico. Source: Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, Handbook to Life in 
the Aztec World (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 57. 
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Map 4: City-states’ territories in the Valley of Mexico. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs 
(Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 168. 
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Map 5.1, 5.2: Tenochtitlan (above and below). Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central 
America: Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 509, 447. 
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Map 6: Obsidian sources near the Valley of Mexico. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: 
Blackwell Publishers, 1997), 10. 
 
 
 
  
Map 7. Obsidian Sources of Mesoamerica. Source: Kenneth Hirth, “Craft Production in a Central 
Mexican Marketplace,” Ancient Mesoamerica Vol. 20, No. 1, (Spring 2009), 90. 
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Map 8: Route of Hernán Cortés.  Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America: 
Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 527. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Chronology and Genealogy of the Tlatoani of Tenochtitlan. Manuel Aguilar-Moreno, 
Handbook to Life in the Aztec World (Oxford: University Press, 2006), 38. 
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Figure 2: Human Sacrifice depicted in the Codex Magliabechiano. Source: Susan Toby Evans, Ancient 
Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture History (London: Thames & Hudson, 2004), 504. 
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Figure 3: A page from the Codex Mendoza depicting tribute owed to the Triple Alliance. Source: Frances 
F. Berdan and Patricia Rieff Anawalt, The Essential Codex Mendoza (Berkley: University of California 
Press, 1997), Folio 31r, pp. 67. 
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Figure 4.1, 4.2: Chinampa structure (above) and planting from the Florentine Codex (below). Source: 
Susan Toby Evans, Ancient Mexico & Central America: Archaeology and Culture History (London: 
Thames & Hudson, 2004), 444, 464. 
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Figure 5: Precious stones and obsidian mirror. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the 
Things of New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, XI: illustrations, 772-786. 
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Figure 6: Gladiatorial Sacrifice. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of New 
Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, IX: illustrations, 1-12. 
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Figure 7: Warriors with tepoztopilli. Source: Frances F. Berdan and Patricia Rieff Anawalt, The Essential 
Codex Mendoza (Berkley: University of California Press, 1997), Folio 67r, pp. 139. 
 
 
Figure 8: Obsidian tool and jewelry production. Source: Michael E. Smith, The Aztecs (Malden: Blackwell 
Publishers, 1997), 110. 
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Figure 9: A drawing of the maquahuitl and tepoztopilli that were destroyed in the fire of the Royal Spanish 
Armory in 1884. Source: Ross Hassig, Aztec Warfare: Imperial Expansion and Political Control, (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma, 1995), 82. 
  
 155 
 
Figure 10.1, 10.2, and 10.3: Tecpatl effigy knives (top), obsidian ear spools (middle), obsidian lip plug 
(bottom).  Source: Eduardos Matos Moctezuma and Felipe Solís Olguín, Aztecs (London: Royal Academy 
of the Arts, 2002), 255, 313. 
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Figure 11.1, 11.2: The Eagle Warrior effigy sacrificial knife (above) and the Tonatiuh sacrificial knife with 
Huitzilopochtli’s xiuhcoatl at the end of the handle (below). Source: Eduardos Matos Moctezuma and 
Felipe Solís Olguín, Aztecs (London: Royal Academy of the Arts, 2002), 232, 328. 
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Figure 12: Massacre of nobles in Tenochtitlan. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the 
Things of New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, XII: illustrations, 65-72. 
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Figure 13: The siege of Tenochtitlan. Source: Sahagún, Florentine Codex: General History of the Things of 
New Spain, trans. Arthur J. O. Anderson and Charles E. Dibble, IX: illustrations, 119-127.  
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